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Supreme Court
Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R. Mahadevan, Supreme Court

Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R. Mahadevan, Supreme Court

Supreme Court

Is FIR Of Confessional Nature Made By Accused Admissible In Evidence?: Supreme Court Explains

Swasti Chaturvedi
|
7 Aug 2025 1:15 PM IST

The Supreme Court reiterated that a statement contained in the FIR furnished by one of the accused in the case cannot, in any manner, be used against another accused.

The Supreme Court held that an FIR (First Information Report) of a confessional nature made by an accused person is inadmissible in evidence against him, except to the extent that it shows that he made a statement soon after the offence.

The Court held thus in a Criminal Appeal filed by an accused against the Judgment of the Chhattisgarh High Court, which partly allowed his Appeal challenging conviction.

The two-Judge Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan observed, “… an FIR of a confessional nature made by an accused person is inadmissible in evidence against him, except to the extent that it shows he made a statement soon after the offence, thereby identifying him as the maker of the report, which is admissible as evidence of his conduct under Section 8 of the Act of 1872. Additionally, any information furnished by him that leads to the discovery of a fact is admissible under Section 27 of the Act of 1872. However, a non-confessional FIR is admissible against the accused as an admission under Section 21 of the Act of 1872 and is relevant.”

The Bench reiterated that a statement contained in the FIR furnished by one of the accused in the case cannot, in any manner, be used against another accused.

AOR Manjeet Chawla represented the Appellant/Accused while Standing Counsel Sugandha Jain represented the Respondent/State.

Brief Facts

The Appellant-accused himself lodged an FIR in 2019 which was registered for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). Upon registration of FIR, the investigation commenced and thereafter, the Investigating Officer (IO) after arresting the Appellant, took him to the house of the deceased. After breaking open the house, the dead body of the deceased was found lying in a pool of blood inside his residence. A panchnama of the scene of offence was prepared in the presence of panch witnesses and the knife allegedly used by the accused to inflict injuries on the deceased was recovered from the place of occurrence i.e., deceased’s house.

The post-mortem report revealed shock resulting from excessive bleeding from the right side of the chest and injury to the upper lobe of the right lung. The accused claimed that he had been falsely implicated in the alleged crime and asserted his complete innocence. The Trial Court reached the conclusion that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and hence, it held the accused guilty of the offence of murder and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment. The accused preferred an Appeal and the High Court partly allowed the same by altering his conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part I of IPC, giving benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. Being aggrieved, he was before the Apex Court.

Court’s Observations

The Supreme Court in view of the above facts, noted, “Even as against the accused who made it, the statement cannot be used if it is inculpatory in nature nor can it be used for the purpose of corroboration or contradiction unless its maker offers himself as a witness in the trial. The very limited use of it is, as an admission under Section 21 of the Act of 1872, against its maker alone, and only if the admission does not amount to a confession.”

The Court said that the first error that the High Court committed was to read the contents of the FIR lodged by the accused into evidence.

“As observed earlier, the FIR lodged by the appellant amounts to a confession, and any confession made by an accused before the police is hit by Section 25 of the Act of 1872. There was no question at all for the High Court to seek corroboration of the medical evidence on record with the confessional part of the FIR lodged by the appellant”, it remarked.

The Court added that once it is said that the contents of the FIR are hit by Section 25 of the Indiane Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA), being a confession before a police officer, the only remaining evidence on record is the medical evidence and the oral evidence of the panch witnesses.

Evidence of an Expert Witness is only Advisory in Nature

The Court further observed, “The High Court should have been mindful of the fact that a doctor is not a witness of fact. A doctor is examined by the prosecution as a medical expert for the purpose of proving the contents of the post-mortem report and the medical certificates on record, if any. An expert witness is examined by the prosecution because of his specialized knowledge on certain subjects, which the judge may not be fully equipped to assess. The evidence of such an expert is of an advisory character.”

The Court enunciated that the credibility of the expert witness depends on the reasons provided in support of his conclusions, as well as the data and material forming the basis of those conclusions.

“An accused cannot be held guilty of the offence of murder solely on the basis of medical evidence on record. So far as the panch witnesses are concerned their depositions do not inspire any confidence. … Most of the panch witnesses turned hostile. If at all, the public prosecutor wanted to prove the contents of the panchnamas after the panch witnesses turned hostile, he could have done so through the evidence of the investigating officer. However, the investigating officer also failed to prove the contents of the panchnamas in accordance with law”, it also said.

The Court added that there is nothing on record by way of evidence relating to any discovery of fact is concerned i.e., no discovery of fact at the instance of the accused, relevant and admissible under Section 27 of IEA, has been established.

Implication of Section(s) 27 and 8 of the Indian Evidence Act

Moreover, the Court emphasised, “… we deem it necessary to sound a note of caution. While the conduct of an accused may be a relevant fact under Section 8 of the Act of 1872, it cannot, by itself, serve as the sole basis for conviction, especially in a grave charge such as murder.”

The Court explained that like any other piece of evidence, the conduct of the accused is merely one of the circumstances the Court may consider, in conjunction with other direct or circumstantial evidence on record and to put it succinctly, although relevant, the accused’s conduct alone cannot justify a conviction in the absence of cogent and credible supporting evidence.

Incorrect application of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC

The Court said, “A “sudden fight” implies mutual provocation and the exchange of blows on both sides. In such cases, the homicide committed is clearly not attributable to unilateral provocation, nor can the entire blame be placed on one side.”

The Court noted that for the application of Exception 4, it is not enough to show that there was a sudden quarrel and no premeditation and it must also be shown that the offender did not take undue advantage or act in a cruel or unusual manner.

Conclusion

The Court, therefore, was convinced that the Judgment passed by the High Court is not sustainable in law.

“The appellant is acquitted of all the charges, and he be set free forthwith if not required in any other case. The bail bonds stand discharged, if any. … The Registry shall circulate one copy each of this judgment to all the High Courts”, it directed and concluded.

Accordingly, the Apex Court allowed the Appeal and acquitted the accused.

Cause Title- Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 927)

Appearance:

Appellant: AOR Manjeet Chawla

Respondent: Standing Counsel Sugandha Jain and AOR Prabodh Kumar.

Click here to read/download the Judgment

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