Mere Suspicion Should Not Be Allowed To Take The Place Of Proof Even In Domestic Enquiries: Supreme Court
|The Supreme Court observed that departmental authorities are obligated to provide a fair opportunity to the parties involved, and what constitutes a fair opportunity must be determined based on the facts and circumstances of each case.
The Supreme Court reiterated that mere suspicion should not be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries.
The Court reiterated thus in a Civil Appeal preferred against the Judgment of the Patna High Court, which allowed an Intra-Court Appeal arising from a Writ Petition presented before the High Court.
The two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra observed, "We do not consider that the Inquiry Officer was justified in the approach he adopted while conducting the inquiry. Findings had to be returned by him neither on his ipse dixit nor surmises and conjectures but on the basis of legal evidence. A Constitution Bench of this Court, speaking through Hon’ble P.B. Gajendragadkar, J., in Union of India v. H.C. Goel pointed out that in carrying out the purpose of rooting out corruption, mere suspicion should not be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries."
AOR Rohini Prasad appeared on behalf of the Appellant while AOR Samir Ali Khan appeared on behalf of the Respondents.
Case Background
The Appellant was appointed as a Constable in the Dog Squad of the Crime Investigation Department (CID) in 1973. He proceeded on earned leave for two days, with the intention of resuming his duties in 1988. Incidentally, an FIR was registered on the Complaint of the Informant against unknown persons giving rise to the case for the offences under Sections 392, 387, 420, 342, 419 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The FIR included a request for the formation of a raiding party to apprehend those who had extorted money from the informant by blackmailing him. A raiding party was formed, which proceeded to raid the Rajasthan Hotel in Patna and the accused was expected to arrive there to collect ₹40,000/- from the informant. Meanwhile, the Appellant was on his way to the office to resume his duties after completing his earned leave when the informant handed over the briefcase to the Appellant.
Subsequently, the Appellant was arrested and was brought to the Police Station. Thereafter, he was placed under suspension by his superior authority. Subsequently, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him and the Trial Court convicted him for the offences under Sections 384 and 411 of the IPC. He was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one year, however, he was acquitted of the charges under Sections 392 and 419 of the IPC. The Appellant challenged this and the Additional Sessions Judge acquitted him. Being aggrieved by the dismissal order, the Appellant approached the Deputy Inspector General of Police but his plea was dismissed. He then filed a Revision and as the same remained undecided, he filed a Writ Petition before the High Court. The Single Judge quashed the dismissal order and the Respondents appealed to the Division Bench, which set aside the Single Judge’s Order. Hence, the Appellant was before the Apex Court.
Reasoning
The Supreme Court in the above context of the case, said, “Although technical rules which govern criminal trials in courts may not necessarily apply to disciplinary proceedings, nevertheless, the principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous care should be taken to see that the innocent is not punished, applies as much to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held under statutory rules. This has, thus, been the well-settled position of law for decades and bearing such law in mind, we have no hesitation to hold that the reason for which the Inquiry Officer doubted the version of PW-2 in his cross-examination was not available to be assigned without first returning a finding attributing the fault for the delay to the appellant.”
The Court noted that while an acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle the accused to have an order of setting aside of his dismissal from public service following disciplinary proceedings, it is well-established that when the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in both the departmental inquiry and the criminal proceedings are identical or substantially similar, the situation assumes a different context. It added that in such cases, upholding the findings in the disciplinary proceedings would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive.
“Law is trite that while exercising its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not exercise powers that are available to an appellate court. It is the decision-making process that falls for scrutiny. Be that as it may, the High Courts can rectify errors of law or procedural irregularities, if any, that lead to a manifest miscarriage of justice or breach of the principles of natural justice. Law is also well-established that the standards for establishing a guilt in disciplinary proceedings differ from those applicable to criminal proceedings”, it observed.
The Court added that it is equally true that departmental authorities are obligated to provide a fair opportunity to the parties involved, and what constitutes a fair opportunity must be determined based on the facts and circumstances of each case.
“… the finding of the appellant being guilty of charge no.1 cannot be sustained following his acquittal in the criminal proceedings, which seem to have involved substantially similar or identical charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances”, it held.
The Court further reiterated that any action resulting in penal or adverse consequences must be consistent with the principles of natural justice and to sustain a complaint of natural justice violation, based on lack of opportunity for cross-examination, the party alleging the violation must show that prejudice was caused.
“… the disciplinary proceedings had not been conducted against the appellant in tune with principles of fairness as well as natural justice which severely prejudiced his defence. The impugned order, thus, is unsustainable”, it concluded.
The Court also directed the Respondents to pay a lumpsum compensation of ₹30 lakhs to the Appellant and provide the retiral benefits within three months.
Accordingly, the Apex Court disposed of the Appeal and imposed a cost of ₹5 lakhs on the Respondents.
Cause Title- Maharana Pratap Singh v. The State of Bihar & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 554)
Appearance:
Appellant: AOR Rohini Prasad
Respondents: AOR Samir Ali Khan, Advocates Pranjal Sharma, Kashif Irshad Khan, and Anil Verma.