Judicial Officer Can’t Be Subjected To Disciplinary Proceedings Merely Because Orders Passed By Him Are Wrong: Gujarat High Court Summarizes Legal Principles

The Gujarat High Court has summarized the legal position with respect to the disciplinary proceedings against the Judicial Officers.

The Court was hearing a Writ Petition preferred against the notification issued by the State on the basis of the recommendation made by the High Court, imposing the punishment of dismissal under the provision of Rule 6(8) of the Gujarat Civil Services (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules, 1971.

A Division Bench of Justice A.S. Supehia and Justice R.T. Vachhani summarised the following points –

a) The judicial officer cannot be subjected to disciplinary proceedings merely because judgments/order passed by him/her are wrong.

b) If the High Courts were to initiate disciplinary proceedings based on a judicial order, there should have been strong grounds to suspect officer's bona fides and the order itself should have been actuated by malice, bias or illegality.

c) In case a judicial officer passes orders which are against settled legal norms but there is no allegation of any extraneous influences leading to the passing of such orders then the appropriate action which the High Court should take is to record such material on the administrative side and place it on the service record of the judicial officer concerned, and can be taken into consideration while considering career progression of the judicial officer concerned.

(d) Unless there are clear-cut allegations of “misconduct”, extraneous influences, gratification of any kind, etc., disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated merely on the basis that a wrong order has been passed by the judicial officer or merely on the ground that the judicial order is incorrect, or the judicial officer has been negligent in ignoring any fact. The allegations of extraneous influences, corrupt practice are required to be proved by persuasive evidence, and not on surmises and conjectures.

(e) Mere suspicion cannot constitute “misconduct”. Any 'probability' of misconduct needs to be supported with oral or documentary material, even though the standard of proof would obviously not be at par with that in a criminal trial. While applying these yardsticks, the High Court is expected to consider the existence of differing standards and approaches amongst different judges.

(f) Mere suspicion cannot constitute "misconduct". Any 'probability' of misconduct needs to be supported with oral or documentary material, more particularly when, there was no allegation of illegal gratification against the judicial officer.

(g) If in every case where an order of a subordinate court is found to be faulty a disciplinary action was to be initiated, the confidence of the subordinate judiciary will be shaken and the officers will be in constant fear of writing a judgment so as not to face a disciplinary enquiry and thus such approach will have a deleterious effect on their independence and boldness.

Advocate Vaibhav A. Vyas appeared for the Petitioner while Advocate P.R. Abichandani appeared for the Respondents.

Facts of the Case

The Petitioner was appointed as a Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate (First Class) in 1996. Thereafter, he was promoted to the post of Civil Judge (Senior Division) in 2005. A chargesheet was issued to the Petitioner while he was serving as an Additional Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Anjar, alleging that he had granted an ex-parte mandatory injunction in 2007 to the Plaintiffs (owners of the tankers) of Special Civil Suit, despite being fully aware that a criminal complaint was filed by a person regarding the theft of oil from two tankers involving such tankers, was pending.

It was further alleged that the Petitioner ignored an Application filed by a person seeking to be joined as a party Respondent and instead, he compelled the Defendant of Special Civil Suit to hand over possession of the tankers to the Plaintiffs. Thus, it was alleged that the Petitioner committed corrupt practice and dereliction of his duty, which tantamount to grave misconduct unbecoming of a Judicial Officer, in violation of the provisions contained in Rule 3 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1971. By the impugned notification issued by the Legal Department on the recommendation of the High Court, the Petitioner was dismissed from service with immediate effect. This was under challenge in the Writ Petition.

Court’s Observations

The High Court in view of the above facts, held, “The foregoing authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court, when applied to the facts of the present case, lead to only one inescapable conclusion—that the impugned order of dismissal is not founded on any legally admissible evidence and rests entirely on the ipse dixit, conjectures, and surmises of the Disciplinary Authority. In fact, this is a classic case of no evidence.”

The Court said that none of the parties to the proceedings were aggrieved by the Orders passed by the Petitioner in the discharge of his judicial functions.

“… the accusation of extraneous consideration or corrupt practice emerging from anonymous complaint cannot be ignored merely because all the parties to the proceedings have accepted the decision of the Court. There may be cases, where the parties to the proceedings may have acted in sync or in connivance to obtain an order, and none of them may take risk to challenge the order/decision”, it further noted.

The Court added that in such cases, the High Court cannot remain mute spectator, and allow the misconduct to be perpetuated by sitting idle on any complaint even anonymous, if the allegations prima facie appear to be true.

“Thus, after scaling the merits of the matter upon an overall evaluation of the material on record, and having regard to the settled principles of law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, we are of the considered opinion that the initiation of disciplinary proceedings, the findings in this regard, and impugned order of dismissal, are unsustainable in law, and demands interference by this Court”, it also observed.

The Court, therefore, declared the disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner as unfair and unjust and directed the Respondent to reinstate the Petitioner as an Additional Senior Civil Judge and JMFC and issue posting order at any place, which may include the last place from where he was dismissed.

“The petitioner shall not insist to be posted on a particular place of his choice. … It will be open for the respondent no.2 to pass an order for reviving the Departmental Inquiry D.I. No.12 of 2008 and any further order, if necessitated, may be passed. Appropriate order of reviving D.I. No.12 of 2008 shall be passed within a period of 06 (six) weeks from the date of receipt of the writ of the order of this Court. … The petitioner shall be reinstated within a period of 06 (six) weeks from the date of receipt of the writ of the present order”, it concluded.

Accordingly, the High Court partly allowed the Writ Petition and quashed the notification imposing punishment of dismissal.

Cause Title- M.J. Indrekar v. State of Gujarat - through Secretary and Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2025:GUJHC:36828-DB)

Appearance:

Petitioner: Advocate Vaibhav A. Vyas

Respondents: Advocate P.R. Abichandani and AGP Shruti R. Dhruve.

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