Justice Sanjeev Narula, Delhi High Court
Secretary Of ‘Akademi’ Is Employer U/S 2(G) Of POSH Act: Delhi High Court Directs LCC To Proceed With Sexual Harassment Complaint
|The Delhi High Court remarked that such a controversy could well have been avoided had the Akademi, as a premier cultural institution, acted with the degree of openness and responsibility the law demands.
The Delhi High Court held that the Secretary of ‘Akademi’, an institution financed by the Central Government through Ministry of Culture is an employer under Section 2(g) of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act).
The Court held thus in a Writ Petition filed by a woman employed on probation at the Akademi, alleging that she was subjected to sexual harassment at the hands of its Secretary.
A Single Bench of Justice Sanjeev Narula observed, “In view of the foregoing, the Secretary is held to be an “employer” within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the POSH Act. Consequently, the complaint of sexual harassment against the Secretary would lie only before the LCC and the ICC would lack jurisdiction to entertain or inquire into any such complaint. Furthermore, the termination of the Petitioner’s services is found to be vitiated by illegality and mala fides.”
The Bench remarked that such a controversy could well have been avoided had the Akademi, as a premier cultural institution, acted with the degree of openness and responsibility the law demands.
Senior Advocate Ritin Rai appeared for the Petitioner/Complainant while Senior Advocate Geeta Luthra appeared for the Respondents/Akademi and others.
Case Background
The Petitioner/Complainant was appointed on probation as Editor (English) in the Akademi in February 2018. She stated that from the outset, her professional journey was marred by persistent sexual harassment at the hands of the Secretary. She alleged that the harassment took multiple forms, including unwelcome physical and sexual contact, sexually explicit remarks, and acts amounting to sexual assault. She further stated that these advances were accompanied by threats of adverse consequences if she resisted demands for sexual favours. In addition, she contended that she was singled out and harassed on account of her ethnicity, being an Assamese woman. Hence, she lodged a complaint before the Local Complaints Committee (LCC), which found a prima facie case to proceed, holding that the post of ‘Secretary’ fell within the definition of ‘employer’ under Section 2(g) of the POSH Act.
Consequently, the LCC recommended interim relief to the Petitioner in the form of three months’ paid leave. She then approached the High Court, alleging non-compliance of LCC’s directions and seeking enforcement of its recommendations. By interim orders, the inquiry pending before LCC was stayed. During the pendency of writ proceedings, the Akademi issued an Office Memorandum (OM), terminating the Petitioner’s services and shortly thereafter, discontinued the payment of her salary. In the meantime, the Akademi filed a separate Writ Petition, challenging the jurisdiction of LCC. However, the Petitioner alleged that the Akademi’s Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) lacked jurisdiction. After a multiple rounds of litigation, the case was before the High Court.
Reasoning
The High Court in the above context of the case, noted, “The proceedings have remained pending since 2020, with the LCC’s proceedings itself under stay. In such circumstances, to exclude the additional reliefs on a narrow technical plea would defeat the cause of justice. This Court therefore finds no merit in the objection, which stands overruled.”
The Court was of the opinion that the term ‘employer’ under Section 2(g) cannot be construed in a narrow, formalistic manner and hence, the POSH Act provisions must be given a purposive interpretation, lest the very mischief it seeks to remedy is left unchecked.
“Even assuming, arguendo, that the Akademi does not fall within Section 2(g)(i), the Secretary would still come within the sweep of Section 2(g)(ii), which defines “employer” as any person responsible for the “management, supervision and control” of the workplace. The Explanation deliberately widens the scope of “management” to include those entrusted with administration and policy implementation. On the record, the Secretary is expressly recognised as the principal executive officer of the Akademi and is responsible for its day-to-day administration. His position therefore squarely answers the test under clause (ii)”, it said.
The Court observed that under the statutory framework, the ICC has no authority to entertain a complaint against the Secretary, who qualifies as an ‘employer’ under Section 2(g) and any report or recommendation issued by the ICC in relation to such a complaint is, accordingly, without authority of law and non est.
“Viewed cumulatively, these circumstances demonstrate that the Petitioner’s termination was not a bona fide exercise of administrative discretion but a classic case of colourable exercise of power. An ostensibly lawful authority, to discharge a probationer, was invoked for an impermissible and retaliatory purpose: to stifle a legitimate complaint of sexual harassment and shield the Secretary from scrutiny. This amounts to malice in law. Equally, the sequence of coercion, retaliatory steps, and procedural improprieties establish malice in fact. The Discharge OM is, therefore, unsustainable and liable to be set aside”, it added.
The Court reiterated that the allegations of sexual harassment must be assessed in their full context and not in isolation.
“The impugned order is a colourable exercise of power, effected through a procedure unknown to law, and based on irrelevant and stigmatic material, all without affording the Petitioner any opportunity of hearing. It thus stands vitiated as arbitrary, violative of natural justice, and unsustainable in law”, it held.
The Court further said that when confronted with a complaint of sexual harassment against its own Secretary, the Akademi could have easily agreed to independent examination by the LCC, thereby reinforcing institutional confidence in its processes and upholding the statutory framework of the POSH Act; instead, it chose to resist such scrutiny through technical objections and, simultaneously, terminated the services of the Complainant during the pendency of proceedings.
“The Akademi’s assertion that the Petitioner continues to draw salary as a probationer without discharging duties ignores that this situation is a direct consequence of the Akademi’s own conduct. Rather than accommodating her in another branch office or providing a work environment free from hostility, the Akademi elected to treat her as an adversary. The statute itself contemplates interim measures, including paid leave, to protect the dignity and security of a complainant. Accordingly, the consequences of present arrangement which affords the Petitioner salary without work, cannot be attributed to the Petitioner”, it also remarked.
Conclusion
The Court observed that institutions such as the Akademi shoulder not only administrative obligations but also a responsibility to exemplify the creation of safe and dignified workplaces.
“Rather than perceiving the LCC’s role as intrusive, the Akademi could have treated it as an opportunity to ensure transparency and restore faith among its employees and the public at large. … The Akademi’s approach in this case serves as a reminder that statutory bodies must not be seen as protecting individuals in positions of power at the expense of those who seek justice”, it emphasised.
The Court, therefore, held and concluded that the LCC had jurisdiction to inquire into the Petitioner’s complaint and that the termination of her services was vitiated by mala fides and non-compliance with the principles of natural justice.
Accordingly, the High Court disposed of the Petition, quashed the impugned Order, directed that the complaint shall proceed before the LCC in accordance with law, reinstated the Petitioner to her post, and directed Akademi to immediately release her salary and clear outstanding arrears within four weeks.
Cause Title- X v. Akademi and Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:7501)
Appearance:
Petitioner: Senior Advocate Ritin Rai, Advocates Shreya Munoth, Sitamsini Cherukumalli, and Khush Aalam Singh.
Respondents: Senior Advocate Geeta Luthra, Advocates Abhishek Aggarwal, Prashansika Thakur, Ishita Agarwal, Ashish K. Dixit, Shivam Tiwari, Urmila Sharma, Deepika Kalra, Tushar Sannu, and Pravin Kr. Bansal.