Pre-Regularisation Service Can’t Be Retrospectively Excluded From Pension: Supreme Court Strikes Down UP Validation Acts
The Court held that regularisation under a duly formulated scheme obliterates the initial character of an employee’s appointment, and that the State cannot subsequently resurrect that status to deny service and retirement benefits available to regular employees.
Justice Dipankar Datta, Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has held that service rendered in a work-charged establishment or as a temporary, daily-wage or muster-roll employee cannot, after regularisation, be retrospectively excluded from qualifying service for pension merely through a new statutory definition or validation of earlier pension denials.
The Apex Court, accordingly, declared the Uttar Pradesh Qualifying Service for Pension and Validation Act, 2021, and the Uttar Pradesh Entitlement to Pension and Validation Act, 2025, unconstitutional.
The Court was hearing a batch of writ petitions, civil appeals and contempt proceedings concerning pension claims by employees who had initially served in work-charged, temporary, daily-wage, muster-roll or seasonal capacities before regularisation.
A Bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma observed: “… regularisation, once effected pursuant to a duly formulated scheme, marks the transition of an employee into the regular establishment and his integration in service while obliterating the birthmark of the initial appointment. The antecedent nature of such appointment, having ceased to bear legal relevance upon regularisation, cannot thereafter be resurrected as a ground to disentitle or curtail the service and retiral benefits stemming from the employee's status as a member of the regular establishment. Consequently, the initial source or character of appointment of the employees concerned cannot be pressed into service to deny them the service and retiral benefits otherwise admissible to them as regular employees.”
The Court further remarked: “… the retrospective exclusion of service rendered in a work-charged establishment or as temporary / daily-wage / muster-roll employee, upon regularisation of service, from the computation of qualifying service for pension cannot be sustained merely by introducing a new statutory definition or validating past denials of pension.”
Senior Advocates Y.S. Lohit, Vijay Hansaria, U.K. Uniyal, Manzoor Ali Khan Kacho and Pallav Shishodia appeared for different employees and petitioners. Attorney General R. Venkataramani and Additional Solicitor General Aishwarya Bhati represented the State.
Background
The employees had served various Uttar Pradesh departments, many of them since the late 1970s or 1980s, before being regularised. Their pension claims raised the question whether service preceding regularisation could be counted as qualifying service.
In Prem Singh, the Supreme Court read down Rule 3(8) of the Uttar Pradesh Retirement Benefits Rules, 1961, and held that service rendered in a work-charged establishment must be treated as qualifying service for pension. It restricted the pension arrears to three years. The State’s review petition was dismissed, and its curative petition was withdrawn.
Uttar Pradesh thereafter introduced a validating regime with retrospective effect. The 2021 Act redefined “qualifying service”, while the 2025 Act introduced the concept of a “substantive appointee”, restricted pension entitlement and purported to validate earlier denials notwithstanding judgments or orders.
The employees argued that the legislation merely restored, in different language, the exclusion invalidated in Prem Singh. The State maintained that the enactments altered the statutory basis of pension entitlement, validly operated retrospectively and distinguished work-charged service from regular service. It also sought reconsideration of Prem Singh and referred to the financial burden that compliance would impose.
Court’s Observations
New Definitions Did Not Remove The Constitutional Defect
The Court held that validating legislation must satisfy three requirements: legislative competence, removal of the defect identified by the earlier judgment and independent conformity with Part III of the Constitution. The validity of the enactments therefore depended upon whether they genuinely cured the defect identified in Prem Singh rather than merely supplying fresh language for the same exclusion.
Explaining the constitutional limit, the Court observed: “The power sanctified therein is, therefore, not the one to overrule the judgment as a judgment; it is a power to change the law so fundamentally that the defect upon which the judgment rested, no longer survives in the altered legal field.”
The 2021 and 2025 Acts changed the statutory descriptions governing pension eligibility but continued to exclude service rendered before regularisation. The expression “substantive appointee” did not explain why service accepted by the State and followed by regularisation should be disregarded solely for pension.
Final Judicial Mandamus Could Not Be Legislatively Nullified
The Court noted that Prem Singh had allowed the employees’ appeals, dismissed the State’s appeals and directed payment of admissible pensionary benefits. The judgment attained finality after the dismissal of review proceedings and withdrawal of the curative petition, creating an enforceable obligation between the parties.
The Court explained: “A mandamus is not merely a declaratory pronouncement of general law capable of being altered like any other statute upon which it rests; it is a specific, enforceable command addressed to a named party enjoining it to do a particular thing for the benefit of a specific set of persons, thereby operating in personam.”
The validating enactments were constitutionally infirm insofar as they sought to extinguish the operative effect of that final adjudication without removing its legal foundation.
Retrospective Classification Violated Article 14
The Court accepted that the State may distinguish among modes of appointment and kinds of establishments. That general power did not answer whether an employee’s real, continuous and accepted service could be discarded for pension after regularisation.
It also held that combining the absence of substantive appointment with past or present membership of a contributory or employees’ provident fund did not make the classification constitutional without a rational connection to the pensionary consequence imposed.
The Court observed: “The existence of different establishments may, at best, justify the different appointment systems existing for different categories. However, sans a rational connection, it does not explain why the entire period of service should be discarded for pension after the employees have subsequently entered the regular establishment.”
It found no rational nexus between the exclusion and the object of the pension scheme. The retrospective deeming provision could not validate pension denials founded upon a classification that independently violated Article 14.
Regularisation Obliterated Initial Employment Status
The Court identified three consequences of regularisation under a duly formulated scheme: it confers substantive status, erases the initial appointment’s birthmark and prevents that vanished status from later being revived to deny retiral benefits. A retrospective distinction based upon the earlier status would create a class within a class.
It added: “Also, pension not being a bounty, such deprivation of a vested right to pension, which is a facet of Article 21, and classification based on a vanished birth-mark would be arbitrary and discriminatory.”
Financial Burden Could Not Defeat Pension Rights
Rejecting the State’s apprehension that the claims could impose a burden running into thousands of crores, the Court held that legal entitlements could not be subordinated to discretionary spending priorities.
It stated: “The public exchequer exists not merely to finance projects reflecting the priorities of a particular dispensation, but also to fulfil the State's obligations under law. Fiscal considerations may inform the manner and mechanism of compliance; they cannot become a ground for indefinitely proroguing the same.”
Relief Extended Beyond Association Members
The Court observed that an association may invoke writ jurisdiction for a common cause when duly authorised. It prospectively suggested that, subject to applicable High Court rules, an association litigating for its members should append a list identifying those on its membership roll when the petition is instituted and disclose later additions.
The pension directions were not confined to association members. The Court clarified: “Be that as it may, since the directions proposed to be issued in this judgment are to operate in rem, and not confined inter partes, the entitlement to the benefits flowing therefrom shall not be contingent upon an employee being a member of the Association. Every employee falling within the ambit of this judgment shall, irrespective of such membership, be entitled to its benefit.”
Conclusion
The Supreme Court struck down both validating Acts and directed that eligible employees’ pension claims be considered under Prem Singh. Retired employees covered by the judgment may submit claims with complete service particulars, and the competent authority must decide each claim within six months.
The Court additionally directed that before rejecting a claim that appears unacceptable, the authority must grant a hearing and pass a reasoned order. Where a claim is accepted, it must provide a chart identifying every payment and the head under which it was made.
Pensionary benefits, including those concerning employees who died after Prem Singh, were ordinarily restricted to three years preceding the institution of the proceedings in that case. The restriction will not apply to claims by heirs or legal representatives of employees who retired and died before Prem Singh, provided they establish their status through unimpeachable proof.
The Court did not award interest initially. If payment is not released within the prescribed period, the State must pay simple interest at 9% per annum until payment.
The writ petitions and employee appeals in Groups I and II were allowed, while the State’s appeals in Group III were dismissed. The connected miscellaneous application and pending applications were disposed of.
The Court also gave the State a final six-month opportunity to pay amounts due to the contempt petitioners under Prem Singh, with 9% annual interest upon default. It disposed of the contempt proceedings but clarified that any further failure could constitute aggravated contempt, leaving responsibility for future non-compliance open.
Cause Title: Uttar Pradesh Ground Water Department Non-Gazetted Employee Association (Registered) and Another v. The Chief Secretary and Others (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1252)
Appearances
Petitioners: Y.S. Lohit, Vijay Hansaria, U.K. Uniyal, Manzoor Ali Khan Kacho and Pallav Shishodia, Senior Advocates
State: R. Venkataramani, Attorney General for India; Aishwarya Bhati, Additional Solicitor General