Investigation Is Police’s Exclusive Domain; Courts Cannot Decide When It Must Stop Except In Exceptional Cases: Supreme Court
The Court also held that a prosecution statement that sufficient material existed to file a charge sheet could not be isolated from the rest of its extension application and treated as a declaration that the investigation was complete.
Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, Justice Shree Chandrashekhar, Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has held that investigating a crime falls within the police's exclusive domain and that courts cannot determine when it must stop, except in exceptional cases or where a statutory bar restricts further investigation.
Setting aside a Bombay High Court judgment granting default bail to accused persons in a UAPA case, the Court upheld the additional time granted to the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad to complete its investigation.
The Court was hearing an appeal by the State of Maharashtra and the Anti-Terrorism Squad against the Bombay High Court’s decision invalidating a second extension of time for filing the charge sheet and granting default bail to the accused under Section 43D of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, read with Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
A Bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Shree Chandrashekhar, while questioning “whether the High Court can curtail power of the police to investigate a crime and declare that the investigation in a particular case was complete”, observed: “The investigation of a crime is the exclusive domain of the police. It is not the jurisdiction of the Court to decide when the investigation in a case should stop. It must be left to the discretion of the investigating agency to decide the course of investigation and to proceed in its own manner. The Court cannot curtail the statutory powers vested in the police except in an exceptional case on facts or where there is a statutory bar to carry investigation by the police.”
Advocate Bharat Bagla appeared for the appellants. Senior Advocate Shadan Farasat represented the respondents.
Background
The Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad registered a case alleging offences under Sections 120B, 121A and 153A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Section 13(1)(b) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The allegations concerned activities intended to undermine India’s sovereignty and establish an Islamic State in the country.
During the investigation, the agency seized mobile phones, laptops, pen drives, tablets and hard disks. It claimed to have found material captioned “India-2047-Towards Rule of Islam in India”, provocative social-media material and recordings of mobile conversations.
As the initial 90-day period approached expiry, the Special Court granted the prosecution a 30-day extension for retrieving electronic evidence from the Forensic Science Laboratory and obtaining the necessary sanction. A second extension of 15 days was later sought because forensic reports concerning voice samples were awaited, bank accounts and alleged foreign donations were being verified, and electronic and financial information still required analysis and collation.
The second application stated that sufficient evidence was available to file a charge sheet. Relying principally upon that sentence, the Bombay High Court concluded that the investigation had been completed and that the extension had been sought only because sanction for prosecution was awaited.
The High Court held that sanction under Section 45 of the UAPA was required for taking cognizance and not for filing a charge sheet. It consequently invalidated the second extension and granted default bail to the accused. One of the respondents died while the State’s appeal was pending before the Supreme Court.
Court’s Observations
The Court reiterated that default bail is a facet of the right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. An accused acquires an indefeasible right to be released when the investigating agency fails to complete its investigation within the prescribed or validly extended period, provided the accused applies for release and is prepared to furnish bail.
Referring to Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab (2020) and the Constitution Bench decision in Sanjay Dutt v. State Through CBI, Bombay (1994), the Court noted that the right becomes enforceable upon the investigating agency’s default but operates within the statutory conditions governing it.
The Court explained: “First proviso to section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 read with section 43D of the UAPA create an indefeasible right in an accused person to seek an order for his release on bail and the Court is obliged under law to enlarge him on bail, if the investigating agency fails to complete the investigation within the maximum period prescribed or the extended period and the accused person moves an application for his release and is ready to furnish bail.”
Section 43D permits an extension from 90 to 180 days where the Court is satisfied with the Public Prosecutor’s report indicating the investigation’s progress and specific reasons for continued detention. The Court held that such a statutory extension could not be denied mechanically and required a balance between individual liberty and the investigating agency’s right to complete its investigation.
The Court held that the sentence stating that sufficient evidence was available to file a charge sheet could not be detached from the rest of the second extension application.
That application also referred to pending forensic examination of voice samples, verification of bank accounts and foreign donations, collection of further evidence and analysis of electronic information. The Court found that these statements demonstrated that investigative work remained incomplete.
It observed: “The Courts have a duty to interpret the language used in the document to assign a true meaning of the expression used thereunder, if the plain literal meaning of the expression does not depict the correct position. A sentence in an order or a judgment cannot be lifted out of its context and interpreted in a manner that defeats the logic behind the decision by the Court. A document has to be read as a whole and not in piecemeal. Some stray statement made in the application seeking extension of time to file the charge sheet cannot be stretched too far.”
The Court clarified that the prosecution had not stated that the investigation was complete and that filing of the charge sheet was being withheld merely because sanction was awaited. Possession of sufficient material to file a charge sheet did not prevent the police from collecting further evidence or completing pending analysis.
Referring to The King Emperor v. Khawaja Nazir Ahmad (1944) and State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha (1980), the Court reiterated that investigating cognizable offences is the statutory function of the police. That function ordinarily concludes upon submission of the police report, subject to the power of further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The Court explained that a charge sheet must provide a summary of the material collected, the allegations against the accused and the manner in which the evidence allegedly connects them to the offences.
It observed: “It is, therefore, necessary that the investigating agency submits a report to the Court after full and complete investigation. This is the case set up by the investigating agency that it needed further time for analysing the data retrieved through the Forensic Laboratory. The investigating agency sought time to analyse how the data retrieved from the mobile phones, computers and other electronic gadgets seized from the accused persons connect them with the terrorist activities intended to undermine the sovereignty and integrity of India.”
The Court added that the agency was required to explain how the movement of money through the accused persons’ bank accounts connected them with the alleged terrorist activities. Analysis of data received from the Forensic Laboratory formed part of the investigation and could not be postponed until after filing the charge sheet.
The Court agreed with the legal proposition that sanction under Section 45 of the UAPA is required when the Court takes cognizance and that a charge sheet may be filed without the sanction order.
It observed: “There is no doubt and the legal position is very clear that the requirement of producing sanction for prosecution comes at the stage of cognizance and a charge sheet can be forwarded to the Court without a sanction order from the appropriate Government.”
Referring to Judgebir Singh v. National Investigation Agency (2023) and Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain v. State of Maharashtra (2013), the Court noted that obtaining sanction is separate from investigation. Delay in sanction does not make an otherwise complete charge sheet defective or entitle the accused to default bail where the final report has been filed within time.
However, the Court found that this principle did not resolve the present dispute because the investigation itself was continuing. The prosecution required time to analyse forensic and financial material before submitting a complete report to the Government and the Court.
The Supreme Court held that the Bombay High Court concentrated on whether sanction could justify an extension while overlooking the prosecution’s case that forensic and financial analysis remained pending.
The Court observed: “However, the High Court bestowed its consideration to an aspect which was not germane to deciding the legality of second extension of time granted to the prosecution for filing the charge sheet. The entire discussion on sanction for prosecution was off-route. The High Court took a detour bypassing the gist of the prosecution’s case for extension of time to file the charge sheet.”
The Court found it unrealistic to conclude that the Anti-Terrorism Squad’s investigation was complete when scientific data, voice samples, bank statements and other electronic evidence were still being analysed. It held that the High Court had committed a serious error by construing a solitary sentence in the extension application as an admission that the investigation had concluded.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court set aside the Bombay High Court judgment and upheld the Special Court’s order granting the prosecution a further 15 days to file the charge sheet. The accused persons’ default-bail application was consequently dismissed.
The surviving respondent was directed to surrender within 30 days, with liberty to apply for regular bail. The State’s appeal was allowed, and all pending applications were disposed of.
Cause Title: State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Momin Moiuddin Gulam Hasan @ Moin Mistri & Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1021)
Appearances
Appellants: Advocates Bharat Bagla, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, AOR, and Shrirang B. Varma
Respondents: Senior Advocate Shadan Farasat, with Advocates Shaikh Saipan Dastgir, Rizwan Ahmad, AOR, Himanshu Gupta, Shivam Yadav and Varisha Sharma