Absence Of Plausible Explanation By Accused Can Count Against Him Only After Prosecution Leads Evidence Capable Of Sustaining Conviction: Supreme Court

The Court was hearing a woman’s appeal against a Bombay High Court judgment reversing her acquittal and convicting her under Section 302 IPC for allegedly setting her daughter-in-law on fire. The Sessions Court had acquitted all four accused, while the High Court convicted the appellant and sentenced her to life imprisonment.

A Bench of Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar held: “The provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 would come into play only after the prosecution discharges its initial burden pointing to the involvement of the concerned accused. It is only when the prosecution has led evidence, which if believed would sustain a conviction that the absence of a plausible explanation by the accused could be a factor against such accused.”

Advocate Dilip Annasaheb Taur appeared for the appellant. Advocate Raman Yadav appeared for the State.

Background

The prosecution alleged that the appellant, her husband and her two sons had acted with common intention to pour kerosene on the victim and set her on fire. All four were charged under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, besides other offences.

Three dying declarations were placed on record. The Sessions Court found inconsistencies among them concerning the respective roles attributed to the accused. It also noted that the person who first reached the house, extinguished the fire and took the victim to hospital had not been examined.

The Sessions Court acquitted all the accused. On the State’s appeal, the High Court discarded two dying declarations but accepted the statement contained in the medico-legal papers. It also relied upon the defence statement indicating that the appellant alone was present with the victim and her failure to explain how the burn injuries occurred.

The High Court consequently convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC while maintaining the acquittal of the other three accused.

Court’s Observations

Conviction Was Based On A Charge Never Independently Framed

The Supreme Court noted that all four accused had been charged with murder in furtherance of their common intention under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. No independent charge under Section 302 had been framed against the appellant.

The Bench observed: “There was no independent charge framed under Section 302 of the Penal Code against any of the accused. Hence, to hold that the defence raised by the accused that as the appellant, A3 was alone present at home with the victim was sufficient to convict her under Section 302 of the Penal Code would amount to making out a new accusation with which the appellant was never charged. It would have been a different matter altogether if an independent charge under Section 302 of the Penal Code simplicitor was also framed against the appellant, A3.”

The prosecution’s case throughout was that all four accused had participated in the offence with a common intention. Convicting the appellant alone for the substantive offence, after maintaining the others’ acquittal and without an independent charge against her, caused prejudice in the circumstances.

The Court relied on Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra (1962), where a conviction of one accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC was found unsustainable after the other alleged participants were acquitted and the common-intention case failed.

Accepted Dying Declaration Required Corroboration

The Court independently examined the three dying declarations. The Sessions Court had rejected all of them because they were inconsistent, whereas the High Court accepted only the statement contained in the medico-legal papers.

Referring to Abhishek Sharma v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) (2023), the Court noted that multiple dying declarations must be voluntary, reliable and consistent. Where material inconsistencies exist, other evidence may be considered to corroborate their contents.

The precedent stated: “When inconsistencies are found between various dying declarations, other evidence available on record may be considered for the purposes of corroboration of the contents of dying declarations. The statement treated as a dying declaration must be interpreted in light of surrounding facts and circumstances. Each declaration must be scrutinized on its own merits.”

The person who first reached the house, extinguished the fire and took the victim to hospital was a material witness but was not examined. He was also present when the victim’s history was entered in the medico-legal papers.

The Court consequently held: “Thus, Exhibit-56 without any corroboration cannot be the sole basis to reverse the acquittal of the appellant and thereafter convict her alone.”

It also noted that the other two dying declarations, which attributed different roles to all four accused, had been rejected by both courts. That finding was not challenged by the prosecution.

Section 106 Could Not Fill Gaps In The Prosecution Case

The High Court had attached considerable importance to the appellant’s failure to explain how the victim suffered burn injuries when she was allegedly the only other person present in the house.

Relying on Anees v. State Government of NCT of Delhi (2024), the Supreme Court reiterated that Section 106 must be applied cautiously and does not modify the ordinary rule that the prosecution bears the burden of proving the accused’s guilt.

The precedent held: “Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked to make up the inability of the prosecution to produce evidence of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused. This section cannot be used to support a conviction unless the prosecution has discharged the onus by proving all the elements necessary to establish the offence. It does not absolve the prosecution from the duty of proving that a crime was committed even though it is a matter specifically within the knowledge of the accused and it does not throw the burden on the accused to show that no crime was committed. To infer the guilt of the accused from absence of reasonable explanation in a case where the other circumstances are not by themselves enough to call for his explanation is to relieve the prosecution of its legitimate burden. So, until a prima facie case is established by such evidence, the onus does not shift to the accused.”

Since the prosecution had not discharged its initial burden, the Court rejected the High Court’s reliance on Section 106.

Appellant Was Not Heard On Sentence

The Court identified a further procedural infirmity. After reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellant, the High Court did not hear her on the sentence to be imposed.

The Bench observed: “After reversing the appellant’s acquittal, the High Court ought to have heard her in this regard as required by Section 386(a) of the Code. The record indicates, however, that the appellant was not heard on the aspect of sentence.”

Since the Supreme Court found the conviction itself unsustainable, it said that nothing further turned upon this issue.

Trial-Court Acquittal Strengthened Presumption Of Innocence

The Court held that the Sessions Court’s assessment of the inconsistent dying declarations was neither illegal nor perverse. The trial-court acquittal had strengthened the appellant’s presumption of innocence.

The Bench stated: “The presumption of innocence in favour of the appellant was in fact enhanced by her acquittal by the Sessions Court. The view taken by the Sessions Court could not be said to be either perverse or illegal as held by the High Court. The dying declaration at Exhibit-56 was accepted by the High Court without any corroborating evidence being available. The judgment of the High Court, therefore, cannot be sustained.”

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashed the High Court judgment and acquitted the appellant of the offence under Section 302 IPC.

It directed that she be released immediately unless required in another case. All pending applications were also disposed of.

Cause Title: Sau. Kamalbai Waman Patil v. The State of Maharashtra (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1196)

Appearances

Appellant: Advocate Dilip Annasaheb Taur with Advocate Amol V. Deshmukh

Respondent: Advocate-on-Record Aaditya Aniruddha Pande; Advocates Raman Yadav, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Shrirang B. Varma and Deepsea Chakraborty

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