Mere Disclosure Of Transaction Does Not Bar Reopening Of Income Tax Assessment If True Nature Not Fully Disclosed: Supreme Court
The Court also held that the validity of reopening must be tested only on the reasons recorded under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and not on extraneous material later placed before the Court.
Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice K.V. Viswanathan, Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has held that mere intimation by an assessee of a transaction does not preclude the Assessing Officer from reopening assessment under Sections 147 and 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, if there is tangible material to prima facie indicate that primary facts regarding the true nature of the transaction had not been brought to the notice of the Assessing Officer.
The Court was hearing connected civil appeals concerning the validity of reopening of assessments under Sections 147 and 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the taxability of income accrued to the assessee from an Association of Persons under an agreement for development of a residential housing project.
A Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala & Justice KV Viswanathan observed: “… mere intimation by an assessee of a transaction does not preclude the Assessing Officer from reopening assessment if there is tangible material to prima facie indicate that primary facts regarding the true nature of the transaction had not been brought to the notice of the Assessing Officer by the assessee.”
The Bench added: “The majority in the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Calcutta Discount (supra) had observed that the duty of disclosing all the primary facts relevant to a question before the assessing authority lies with the assessee and merely producing account books and documents does not fulfil that obligation, unless the assessing authority’s attention is brought to particular items in the account books, or particular portions of the documents which are relevant”.
Senior Advocate Manisha T. Karia appeared for the assessee, while ASG Raghavendra P. Shankar appeared for the Revenue.
Background
The assessee had agreed with another entity to constitute an Association of Persons for developing a residential housing project. The assessee filed returns for the relevant assessment years, claiming that the amount received from the AOP was its share of profit and was not separately taxable in its hands.
The returns were selected for scrutiny assessment under Section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Thereafter, notices under Section 148 were issued for reopening of assessment on the ground that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment under Section 147 of the Act.
The reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer stated that material gathered during survey proceedings under Section 133A, including the AOP agreement, books of account, audited financial statements and related documents, indicated that the amount received by the assessee was not a share of profit but a 35% share of gross sale receipts, and was therefore taxable in its hands.
The assessee objected to the reopening, contending that the material relied upon by the Revenue had already been placed before the Assessing Officer during the original scrutiny assessment and that the reopening amounted to a mere change of opinion.
The High Court quashed the reopening for one assessment year, holding it to be based on a change of opinion, but upheld the reopening for another assessment year based on material derived from the AOP’s assessment. In the connected tax appeals, the High Court upheld the ITAT’s view that the amount received by the assessee from the AOP was a share of profit and not revenue. The matter thereafter reached the Supreme Court.
Court’s Observation
The Supreme Court first examined the statutory framework under Sections 147 and 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. It was observed that Section 147 empowers the Assessing Officer to assess or reassess income which has escaped assessment, subject to the statutory safeguards contained in the provision.
The Court noted that the power is not confined to cases of concealment by the assessee, but also extends to cases where, based on tangible material, the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment.
The Court observed that the expression “escaped assessment” includes cases where income chargeable to tax has been under-assessed, assessed at too low a rate, made the subject of excessive relief, or where excessive loss, depreciation allowance or other allowance has been computed.
The Court then clarified the meaning of “reason to believe” under Section 147. Referring to Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers P. Ltd. (2008), the Court held that the Assessing Officer need not finally ascertain escapement of income at the stage of reopening. The Court observed that the expression means cause or justification to suppose that income had escaped assessment.
At the same time, relying on Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kelvinator of India Ltd. (2010), the Court reiterated that reassessment cannot be used as a review. The Assessing Officer must possess tangible material having a live link with the formation of a belief that income has escaped assessment.
The Court rejected the assessee’s contention that disclosure of the AOP arrangement in the return and production of documents during scrutiny assessment necessarily barred reopening. Referring to Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer (1961), the Court observed that the duty to disclose primary facts lies on the assessee.
The Court quoted the Constitution Bench as holding that an assessee cannot say, “I have produced the account books and the documents: You, the assessing officer, examine them, and find out the facts necessary for your purpose: My duty is done with disclosing these account books and the documents”.
The Court further relied on M/s Phool Chand Bajrang Lal v. Income Tax Officer (1993), observing that subsequent information may justify reopening where the assessee had not made a full and true disclosure of material facts at the time of original assessment. The Court quoted the decision as holding that it would be a travesty of justice to allow an assessee to say, “you accepted my lie, now your hands are tied, and you can do nothing”.
The Court clarified that although the notices in the present case were issued within four years and the stricter requirement under the first proviso to Section 147 was not attracted, Explanation 1 to Section 147 remained relevant. It held that mere production of account books or other evidence does not necessarily amount to disclosure within the meaning of the Act.
On the facts, the Court found that the material obtained during survey proceedings, including the AOP agreement and statement recorded under Section 131, provided tangible material to prima facie indicate that the assessee’s receipts were in the nature of revenue share and not profit share. The Court therefore held that the reopening of assessment could not be treated as a mere change of opinion.
The Court also disapproved the High Court’s approach in relying upon AOP assessment orders, which were not part of the reasons recorded under Section 148. Referring to GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. ITO (2003), the Court held that the assessee is entitled to know the reasons for reopening and to file meaningful objections. The Court observed, “It is settled law that the validity of a reopening must be tested solely on the basis of the reasons recorded at the time of issuing the notice under Section 148.”
The Court then proceeded to examine the taxability of the amount received by the assessee from the AOP. It held that the interpretation of Clause 7 of the AOP agreement was a question of law, relying on Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (1962). The Court held that the High Court and ITAT erred in treating the interpretation adopted in proceedings concerning the AOP as a final finding of fact.
On a plain reading of Clause 7, the Court found that the assessee was entitled to 35% of the gross sale proceeds upfront, while the project expenses were to be borne from the remaining 65% share. The Court held that this structure indicated revenue sharing and not profit sharing.
The Court concluded that the amount received by the assessee from the AOP was taxable in the hands of the assessee. It was observed that the assessee’s own case was that the amount accrued strictly in accordance with Clause 7 of the AOP agreement, making the correct interpretation of the clause decisive for determining taxability.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court held that the reopening of assessments under Sections 147 and 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was valid. The Court set aside the High Court judgment, which had quashed reopening for one assessment year and upheld the High Court’s ultimate conclusion sustaining reopening for another assessment year, though it found the reasoning adopted by the High Court to be flawed.
The Court further held that the High Court and ITAT erred in treating the amount received by the assessee from the AOP as a share of profit. It held that Clause 7 of the AOP agreement showed revenue sharing, and that the amount received by the assessee was liable to be taxed in its hands.
Accordingly, the Revenue’s appeal concerning the reopening of assessment was allowed, the assessee’s appeal challenging the reopening was dismissed, and the Revenue’s appeal on taxability of the amount received from the AOP was allowed.
Cause Title: Sanand Properties P. Ltd. v. Joint Commissioner of I.T. Range 6 & Connected Matters (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 472)