The Supreme Court refused to interfere with the judgment of the Allahabad High Court, which had upheld the constitutional validity of Section 9(1)(c) of the Delimitation Act, 2002, and had held that courts could not direct the State to provide a roster for rotation in reservation of seats for SC/ST in Assembly/Parliamentary constituencies, as it was for the Parliament to consider the issue.

It observed that the Court could strike down or read down a provision but could not rewrite the statute to introduce rotation, and disposed of the Special Leave Petition, granting liberty to the petitioner to approach the public representatives to build consensus on the issue.

The Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V Mohana ordered, "The petitioner’s case was that the reservation of legislative assembly seats for members of SC/ST should be on a rotational basis, and that such reservation should be given by applying the principle of rotation. If such a course is followed, then 191 Kadipur Assembly Constituency, which has been reserved for SC candidates since 2002, and any other constituency where the SC population is the largest, can be reserved. The High Court has turned down the petitioner’s claim, observing, inter alia, that though ideally rotation ought to be followed, such an exercise is within the ambit of Parliament. We see no ground to take a view different from the High Court’s. The petitioner may approach the public representatives to build consensus with a view to persuading them to follow the rotation principle, which the petitioner relies upon on the basis of the reservation made by the Delimitation Commission in 2008. The petition is disposed of."

Justice Bagchi has observed, "Because the panchayat is governed by Part IX. But we are dealing with Articles 330 and 332, the Representation of the People Act and delimitation. We cannot rewrite the Constitution or the statute. We can strike down a provision. We can read down a provision. But we cannot rewrite it by saying “introduce rotation in respect of reservation.”

The petitioner’s counsel submitted that the constituency in question had remained reserved for Scheduled Castes for seven decades, and that, on the data annexed, the same three or four families had been elected for the last 75 years.

It was contended that the right to vote was thereby rendered illusory and diluted, and that the principle of rotation ought to be adopted. Reliance was placed on the report of the Delimitation Commission, which itself noted a public demand for rotation, and on the Commission’s guidelines.

Counsel clarified that the petitioner had no caveat with Section 9(1)(c) and only prayed that it be slightly modified. Reliance was also placed on the 2010 judgment of this Court under Articles 243D and 243T concerning panchayats.

Justice Bagchi observed that the High Court had found legislative competence and that the provision was not manifestly arbitrary.

He said, "9(1)(c) is not governed by 330. 330 determines the number of seats in the Assembly. Let us say there is 25% Scheduled Caste population; one-fourth will be reserved. Correct? Now, which one-fourth? 330 is silent on that. The Delimitation Act, for the first time, gives guidance: where the majority of that community, or that group, is residing, reserve that. That is actually a furtherance of a democratic principle, that the representative must have an identity. However, it has an underlying issue, which you may argue: that the legislature is then thinking that we are voting on caste lines. Now, that is for the legislature to decide; it cannot be made out to be arbitrary. The only place where 9(1)(c) is not governed is the panchayat, no? 243D and 243T. 330 is not a problem here. The problem is: what is the philosophy of fixing a constituency on the majority of a caste? Your argument on rotation is not very persuasive."

The Petitioner submitted that the High Court’s reasoning, that a majority community would in any case be elected, showed that there was something wrong with the rotation, or rather non-rotation, policy.

Justice Bagchi observed that it was a wrong idea that a majority community would vote along community and caste lines. He held that the High Court could not judicially pronounce on a democratic choice that was for the voters to make. The petitioner’s right to vote was neither impeached nor taken away, and he could vote for his community; however, an argument that he could not vote for his community would not be countenanced. Further, the right to contest was not restricted to a constituency, and the petitioner had 543 constituencies to choose from among the non-reserved constituencies.

The CJI Kant observed that in a political democracy with multiple political parties having different ideologies, voters were expected to vote for the party and not for the candidate. The party that represented the ideology became irrelevant, and this too defeated the petitioner’s argument. The CJI further observed that unless the petitioner pursued the Bill in the Assembly, the Court was not inclined to interfere.

CJI said, "The other issue is that, in a political democracy where there are multiple political parties with different kinds of ideologies, the voters are expected to vote for the party, not for the candidate. You may like or dislike a particular political ideology, so who is representing that ideology becomes irrelevant. You vote for that ideology. So that also defeats your argument. We are not going to... unless in the Assembly you pursue this Bill. The amendment is done; constituency reservation is shifted."

The Petitioner referred to the report of the Delimitation Commission, at page 253, and read that the Commission had drawn the boundaries of the constituencies reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes strictly in accordance with the constitutional and statutory provisions, that some Scheduled Caste constituencies had continued to be reserved for more than two to three decades, and that there was a public demand that the principle of rotation be adopted.

He submitted that in the petitioner’s case, the constituency had remained reserved for seven decades. Justice Bagchi observed that rotation was not permissible under the Delimitation Act.

He also submitted that the right to vote was illusory, as the voter lacked the freedom to vote for someone else, and that, on the data annexed by the petitioner, the same three or four families had been elected for the last 75 years, without even any upliftment of the community. He clarified that the petitioner had nothing against those families.

Justice Bagchi observed that this did not become a constitutional question, and that it was a matter of choice for the legislature and the constitutional authorities to take appropriate decisions on rotation and the representation of different categories. It did not impair the right to vote.

When the Counsel submitted that the right to vote was diluted, Justice Bagchi held that dilution was not an infraction of a legal right, and that there was a difference between an infraction of a legal right and a limitation of options while exercising that right, which was part of the constitutional and legislative framework.

Justice Bagchi said, "9(1)(c) is your focus. How do you select the seats? 9(1)(c) brings in the same layer: the proportion of the castes in relation to the entire population of a particular constituency as a determining factor. There is no rational nexus in this...The reason we are saying nexus is Article 14. Yes, Article 14, unreasonableness, because the only thing we have to examine is manifest arbitrariness. And I will establish Article 14 violations. There is nothing unreasonable in this choice."

CJI Kant added, "The problem is that you are dialling the wrong number. This is a good season for protests, dharna, sloganeering. We are saying to the petitioners that they can muster some strength and raise their voice, saying that the time is right now for the legislature, the Parliament, to revisit this issue. But it can only be done by the legislature."

Justice Bagchi then asked where the statutory framework for rotation was, and whether, in the absence of such a framework, the Court could mandate the authorities, the Delimitation Commission or the State, to rotate the seats reserved for SCs, as in the case of municipalities.

He observed that the petitioner had made a representation and that the Court could request the authority to consider it.

CJI Kant observed that the petitioner should approach the Government for amendment of the law.

The Court held that it saw no ground to take a view different from that of the High Court. It permitted the petitioner to approach the public representatives to build consensus and persuade them to follow the rotation principle on which he relied, based on the reservation made by the Delimitation Commission in 2008. The petition was accordingly disposed of.

Cause Title: Jagdish Singh v. Union of India and Ors.[SLP(C) No. 37437/2026]

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