Letters Patent Bench Can Interfere With Writ-Court Decision Only For Glaring, Demonstrable Error: Supreme Court

The Court set aside a Madras High Court Division Bench judgment which had restored the removal from service of a Periyar University Deputy Registrar. It restored the Single Judge’s order after finding that the disciplinary charges rested on conjectures rather than evidence.

The Court was hearing an appeal against a judgment passed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Madras High Court. The Division Bench had reappreciated the disciplinary material and reversed the Single Judge’s decision interfering with the punishment.

A Bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Shree Chandrashekhar held: “... the Letters Patent Bench can interfere in the matter only where the findings are demonstrably erroneous and the mistake is glaring on the face of record. There must exist cogent grounds and such grounds are not projected on some minor mistake in the judgment under challenge. The Letters Patent Bench is not entitled to interfere with the decision of writ Court on mere showing of some error of fact or in law.”

The Court added: “If the decision rendered by the writ Court in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution is in furtherance of justice, equity and good conscience and is not against public policy then the Letters Patent Bench constituted under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of Madras High Court or similar provisions of the Letters Patent of other High Courts cannot exercise its appellate jurisdiction under the Letters Patent to interfere with the writ Court’s decision. Simply put, the Letters Patent Bench can not interfere with the decision rendered by the writ Court which is otherwise just and reasonable.”

Advocate M.P. Parthiban appeared for the appellant, while Senior Advocate Romy Chacko appeared for the respondents.

Background

The appellant was appointed Assistant Registrar of Periyar University in 2000 and later worked as Deputy Registrar. Following a complaint concerning his assets, the University constituted a One-man Commission headed by a retired judicial officer to inquire into several charges.

The Commission found three relevant charges proved. These concerned the alleged use of the appellant’s official position to obtain affiliation for a college managed by his wife, a house allegedly acquired in his mother’s name and the purchase of a car without permission. The University removed him from service in 2013.

The Single Judge interfered with the punishment after finding that the Commission’s conclusions were unsupported by material. In the University’s intra-court appeal, the Division Bench reappreciated the disciplinary material, reversed the Single Judge and restored the removal order.

Court’s Observations

Disciplinary Findings Cannot Rest On Conjecture

The Court held that an inquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function and must assess the evidence dispassionately rather than assume the role of a prosecutor. Although proof beyond reasonable doubt is unnecessary, some evidence must support the charges.

The Bench observed: “The findings recorded in the inquiry report must be supported by the materials on record. The Inquiry Officer while preparing his report should rely only on the evidence adduced during the domestic inquiry and he should not base his findings on mere conjectures and surmises. The decision of the Inquiry Officer should be based upon a conclusion that there is a preponderance of probability to hold the charges proved. This is also a bounden duty of the Inquiry Officer to record a just and reasonable decision.”

The Court found that the charge concerning the college affiliation was held proved merely because the appellant “could have” influenced the authorities. It noted that the other findings similarly rested on inferences drawn from his payment of loan instalments rather than evidence proving misconduct.

Writ Court Could Correct Findings Based On No Evidence

Referring to Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel (1976) and Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration (1984), the Court observed that a disciplinary finding unsupported by evidence is perverse and amenable to correction under Article 226.

The Bench held: “Therefore, a finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer not supported by any evidence is open to challenge in a proceeding for certiorari. It is then not a matter in the realm of appreciation of evidence but really of recording a finding contrary to the materials on record. The issue is a pure question of law and amenable to writ jurisdiction.”

The Court stated that the Single Judge had confined the inquiry to whether the disciplinary findings were perverse. It held that examining whether evidence existed to support a charge was different from acting as an appellate court and reappraising the sufficiency of evidence.

The Bench further noted that the availability of a statutory appeal did not create an absolute bar against Article 226 jurisdiction. It observed that exhaustion of an alternative remedy was a self-imposed restriction and that a writ court could intervene in an appropriate case involving the severe consequences of removal from service.

Letters Patent Appellate Power Is Not Unrestricted

The Court acknowledged that an appeal under Clause 15 is not equivalent to a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Referring to Asha Devi v. Dukhi Sao (1974) and Alapati Kasi Viswanatham v. A. Sivarama Krishnayya (1963), it noted that a Letters Patent Bench may examine questions of both fact and law.

However, the Court clarified that the existence of appellate power does not permit interference in every case or merely because another view is possible.

The Bench stated: “The jurisdiction of the Letters Patent Bench to examine a question of fact is not without fetters. The Letters Patent Bench can be justified in reopening a question of fact if it necessarily touches upon the merits of the case and is likely to have a bearing on the decision in the case. It may be argued that the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court is entitled to review findings of fact. But what is necessary to keep in mind is that there is an inherent limitation on exercise of powers by the appellate Bench.”

The Court added that a Letters Patent Bench should ordinarily refrain from interfering with discretion exercised by a writ court on relevant considerations. Although it exercises the same jurisdiction as a court of correction, due weight must be given to the Single Judge’s decision.

No Cogent Reason To Reverse Single Judge

The Court found that the Division Bench had reappreciated the entire disciplinary material and raised adverse inferences against the appellant despite the absence of evidence proving the charges.

The Bench concluded that the Single Judge had delivered a well-reasoned decision, which the Division Bench interfered with without any cogent or justifiable reason. It consequently held that no ground existed for exercising Clause 15 jurisdiction.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Madras High Court Division Bench judgment dated August 29, 2019. It restored the Single Judge’s decision in the appellant’s writ petition.

The Court made no order as to costs and disposed of the pending applications.

Cause Title: R. Saravanan v. Periyar University Represented By Its Registrar and Others (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1136)

Appearances

Appellant: Advocate M.P. Parthiban (AOR)

Respondents: Senior Advocate Romy Chacko; Advocates Akshat Singh and Ashwin Romy; Advocates-on-Record Anup Kumar and Kanika Kalaiyarasan

Click here to read/download Judgment