Handwriting Expert’s Report Cannot Be Relied Upon To Prove Authorship Of A Document Unless Such Expert Is Examined: Supreme Court
The Court acquitted a man of abetting his wife’s suicide after finding that the authorship of the letters relied upon by the prosecution was not proved through legally admissible evidence. It further held that the letters did not establish abetment even if their authorship were assumed.
The Supreme Court has held that a handwriting expert must be examined before such an expert’s report can be relied upon to attribute the authorship of a disputed document to a person.
The Apex Court clarified that since handwriting comparison is not a perfect science, the opinion must be tested through cross-examination and cannot be admitted under Section 293 CrPC, corresponding to Section 329 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
The Court was hearing an appeal against a Rajasthan High Court judgment affirming the appellant’s conviction under Section 306 IPC and the sentence of ten years’ rigorous imprisonment for allegedly abetting his wife’s suicide.
A Bench of Justice Sandeep Mehta and Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya held: “… if, at all, the prosecution wishes to rely upon the report of a handwriting expert in order to prove and attribute the handwriting on a particular document to that of another person, it is essential to examine the handwriting expert in evidence because handwriting comparison is not a perfect science and may be the subject matter of different interpretations. Hence, testing the opinion of the handwriting expert on the rigour of cross-examination is essential before the report can be relied upon.”
The Bench added: “Such reports are not admissible under Section 293 CrPC (corresponding to Section 329 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) and hence, have to be proved as any other report by examining the expert in evidence.”
Senior Advocate Sushil Kumar Jain appeared for the appellant, while Additional Advocate General Sansriti Pathak appeared for the State.
Background
The prosecution alleged that the appellant had harassed his wife and sent her four letters containing abusive language and threats. She had been residing at her parental home for more than two years amid pending matrimonial and domestic-violence proceedings when she died from burn injuries.
The prosecution treated the death as suicide and relied principally on the four letters to establish abetment. To attribute them to the appellant, it produced a handwriting expert’s report comparing the letters with an application allegedly given by the appellant to the investigating officer and a pocket diary produced by his brother.
No specimen handwriting of the appellant was obtained during the investigation, and the expert was not examined during the trial. The Trial Court nevertheless convicted the appellant under Section 306 IPC, and the High Court affirmed the conviction.
The appellant maintained that the death was accidental. Contemporaneous records referred to a fire, an electrical short circuit and a gas cylinder. The deceased’s sister initially stated that she had been alone at home when a sudden fire broke out, while the inquest statements of her father and brother did not allege suicide. The complaint that led to the abetment case was lodged around 15 days later.
Court’s Observations
Comparison Writings Were Not Reliably Proved
The Court observed that the evidentiary value of a handwriting opinion depended not only upon the similarities identified by the expert but also upon proof that the comparison writings were genuinely authored by the person concerned.
The Bench held: “The evidentiary value of the expert opinion would, therefore, depend not merely upon the similarities identified by the expert between the disputed and comparison writings, but also upon the prosecution establishing the authenticity and authorship of the writings used as standard of comparison. In the absence of reliable proof that the comparison writings were indeed authored by the appellant, the expert’s opinion, by itself, would not conclusively establish that the disputed letters were written by him.”
The Court found that the investigating officer had not obtained the appellant’s specimen handwriting. The documents used for comparison were themselves only allegedly attributable to him, and their authorship had not been reliably proved.
Handwriting Opinion Required Examination And Cross-Examination
Relying on Magan Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab (1977), the Court reiterated that handwriting identification was not infallible and that expert opinion had to be approached cautiously. A conviction could not safely rest solely upon such opinion without adequate corroboration.
The Court also relied on Patel Babubhai Manohardas v. State of Gujarat (2025), which considered the effect of relying upon a handwriting report without examining its author.
Quoting that decision, the Bench noted: “One of the questions which fell for consideration in that case was whether the opinion of a handwriting expert can be admitted in evidence without examination of the handwriting expert. In this connection, this Court took the view that when the trial court chose to rely on the report of the handwriting expert, it ought to have examined the handwriting expert in order to give an opportunity to the accused to cross-examine the said expert. In that case, it was found that there was nothing on record to show that the accused persons had admitted to the report of the handwriting expert.”
As the handwriting expert was admittedly not examined, the Court held that the letters’ authorship had not been established through legally admissible and reliable evidence.
Section 313 Omission Could Not Substitute Proof
The Trial Court and the High Court had relied upon the appellant’s alleged failure to specifically deny authorship of the letters in his statement under Section 313 CrPC. The Supreme Court held that such an omission could not relieve the prosecution of its burden.
The Bench observed: “It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the prosecution must stand on its own legs and establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It cannot derive strength from any perceived weakness in the defence or treat the failure of the accused to furnish a specific denial as a substitute for proof of an incriminating circumstance. The statement of the accused under Section 313 CrPC is required to be considered in its entirety, and any omission to specifically deny a particular circumstance cannot, by itself, establish the authorship of a disputed document.”
The Court consequently found that both courts had erred in relying upon the disputed letters without satisfactory proof of their authorship.
Letters Did Not Establish Abetment Even If Assumed Genuine
The Court also examined the contents of the letters on the assumption that they had been written by the appellant. While they contained abusive, derogatory and threatening expressions, they also repeatedly sought reconciliation, withdrawal of the pending cases and resumption of cohabitation.
The Bench held: “We feel that the contents of the letters, even if admitted to be in the handwriting of the accused, were not such which could have constituted the necessary ingredients of abetment as defined under Section 107 IPC. Admittedly, the deceased had left the company of the appellant and was living at her father’s house for the last more than 2 years of the incident. She had instituted litigation against the appellant and was pursuing the same actively. Hence, the letters by themselves cannot be construed to be the instigating material which was the immediate cause for the victim to have committed suicide.”
The Court found the evidence insufficient to establish a reliable causal connection between the letters, their time of delivery and the death. It concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove instigation or abetment beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court additionally noted that no charge under Section 498A IPC had been proposed; if the letters had caused mental harassment of such gravity as to compel the deceased to end her life, such a charge was essential.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Trial Court and High Court judgments and acquitted the appellant of the charge under Section 306 IPC.
Since the appellant was already on bail, the Court directed that he need not surrender and discharged his bail bonds. Pending applications were disposed of.
Cause Title: Goverdhan v. The State of Rajasthan (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1190)
Appearances
Appellant: Senior Advocate Sushil Kumar Jain; Advocate-on-Record Pratibha Jain
Respondent: Additional Advocate General Sansriti Pathak; Advocate Shagufa Khan; Advocate-on-Record Saurabh Rajpal