Mortgage Taken By Lender To Secure Repayment Not Property Held "In Trust"; Sections 406 & 409 IPC Can’t Be Invoked On That Basis: Supreme Court
The Court also held that a Magistrate who calls for a police Action Taken Report and disagrees with it must briefly record reasons. It found that the High Court could not supply reasons that the Magistrate had not recorded.
Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Sandeep Mehta, Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has held that a lender taking mortgage security for repayment of its own loan does not receive the property in trust. In the absence of entrustment to the lender, the offences under Sections 406 and 409 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), are not attracted.
The Apex Court, accordingly, quashed an FIR alleging criminal breach of trust, cheating and conspiracy against L&T Finance Limited and Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited.
The Court was hearing appeals against a Delhi High Court judgment that had declined to quash a Magistrate’s order under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), and the resulting FIR arising from a dispute between landowners and a real-estate developer over revenue share and security furnished for project financing.
A Bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta observed: “A lender advancing a loan against security does not receive the security ‘in trust’. The relationship between a lender and a borrower, or between a lender and a third-party security provider, is that of creditor and debtor, not of trustee and beneficiary. There is another reason why Section 409 IPC cannot be invoked. The aggravation in that provision rests on entrustment received ‘in the way of his business as a banker’, that is, property placed with the banker in that capacity, such as a deposit or property held for a customer”.
The Bench further added: “A lender that takes a mortgage to secure repayment of its own loan does not receive the mortgaged property in that capacity; it holds the security for itself. Moreover, while a company can be prosecuted for offences requiring mens rea, the guilty mind is attributed to it through the individuals who control its affairs. The complaint does not identify any officer of L&T or EARC to whom any property was entrusted or who dishonestly dealt with it. It charges Section 409 IPC against two corporate lenders on the strength of a generic allegation of collusion. Section 409 IPC is, therefore, not attracted against either appellant.”
Senior Advocate Siddharth Dave and Senior Advocate Abhimanyu Bhandari appeared for the appellants. Additional Solicitor General Davinder Pal Singh represented the State, while Senior Advocate Amit Rawal appeared for the private respondents.
Background
The complainants had entered into arrangements with a developer for licensing and developing their land as a group-housing project. L&T sanctioned a ₹450 crore loan facility to the developer for four projects. The facility was secured by mortgages over the project lands and their receivables, including the licensed land belonging to the complainants.
The complainants executed documents acknowledging the mortgage of their licensed land. L&T subsequently enhanced the overall facility to ₹620 crore. The complainants alleged that the enhancement occurred without their consent, affected their claimed second charge and enabled the diversion of project receivables while their revenue share remained unpaid.
L&T later assigned the developer’s loan account and the underlying securities to Edelweiss. The complainants approached the Economic Offences Wing, alleging cheating, criminal breach of trust and conspiracy by the developer and the lenders. After a preliminary inquiry, the police concluded that the dispute concerned recovery of money and that no cognizable offence was disclosed.
The complainants thereafter moved the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the CrPC. The Magistrate directed the registration of an FIR under Sections 406, 409, 420 and 120B of the IPC. The Delhi High Court declined to quash the proceedings, holding that the allegations required investigation.
The appellants argued that mortgage security was not entrusted property, no representation had been made by either lender to the complainants and Edelweiss had entered the transaction only through the later assignment. The complainants maintained that L&T had accepted their land as cross-collateral, enhanced the facility despite their rights and that Edelweiss had acted with knowledge of the transaction documents. The State submitted that the investigation was at a nascent stage and that the allegations prima facie disclosed criminality.
Court’s Observations
Magistrate Had To Give Reasons For Disagreeing With Police Report
The Court held that the Magistrate was not bound by the Action Taken Report. However, the report was relevant material because the Magistrate had called for it and the police had examined the parties and transaction documents before concluding that no cognizable offence was disclosed.
The application preceded the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), and was governed by the CrPC. The Court nevertheless noted that Section 175(3) of the BNSS now expressly requires consideration of the police officer’s submission before a Magistrate orders an investigation.
The Court stated: “But if the Magistrate himself has called for the report, he must apply judicial mind to it and the consequential order must speak why he does not accept it.”
It found that the Magistrate referred only to the seriousness of the allegations against the builders and developers, without addressing the roles of L&T and Edelweiss or explaining the disagreement with the police. The High Court could not cure that defect by supplying reasons that the Magistrate had not recorded.
Mortgage Security Was Not Entrusted Property
The Court explained that entrustment of property or dominion over it is indispensable to criminal breach of trust. Section 409 of the IPC additionally requires entrustment in the accused’s capacity as a public servant or in the course of business as a banker, merchant, broker, agent or another enumerated capacity.
Explaining the nature of entrustment, the Court observed: “The expression ‘entrusted’ connotes that the property is handed over to, or placed under the dominion of, the accused for a purpose.”
The licensed land had not been placed in either lender’s possession or dominion for any purpose of the complainants. L&T held the mortgage to secure repayment of its own loan, while Edelweiss subsequently acquired the debt and securities by assignment.
It consequently held that Sections 406 and 409 of the IPC were not attracted against either appellant.
No Deception Or Dishonest Inducement By Lenders
The Court found no representation by L&T to the complainants, much less a false representation that had induced them to deliver property or alter their position. The loan had been sanctioned before the MoU, and L&T’s alleged involvement in suggesting changes to its draft showed, at most, awareness of the arrangement.
The Court added: “Whatever may be the merit of such allegations against RDL, on which we express no opinion, they do not give rise to even a barest suggestion that L&T deceived or induced the complainants.”
Edelweiss had acquired the debt and securities after the loan sanction, mortgage, facility enhancement and issuance of no-objection certificates. It could neither have possessed a dishonest intention at the inception of transactions to which it was not a party nor induced the complainants in relation to them. The Court also found no facts from which an agreement to commit an offence could be inferred.
The Court further noted that the complaint mechanically invoked criminal breach of trust and cheating on the same facts, without identifying which facts established lawful entrustment and which established dishonest inducement at the inception. Although it did not rest its conclusion on this ground alone, it treated the indiscriminate invocation as indicating an attempt to give criminal colour to a commercial grievance.
Regulatory Allegations Did Not Establish IPC Offences
The complaint alleged that the project operated without the required separate account, that project receivables were diverted and that no-objection certificates facilitated sales. The Court held that the relevant obligations under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, were imposed primarily upon the promoter and were enforceable through that statute’s regulatory machinery.
It also noted that Section 80 of the Act permitted cognizance of an offence under the statute only upon a written complaint by the Authority or an officer authorised by it.
Distinguishing earlier proceedings concerning housing loans under subvention schemes, the Court said: “Nothing in those orders lays down that every lender to a real estate developer is, by reason of the developer’s default, exposed to criminal prosecution at the instance of any party aggrieved against the developer.”
It held that alleged violations of the real-estate law could not, by themselves, sustain the prosecution of lenders for offences under the IPC without the specific ingredients of those offences.
Commercial Remedies Did Not Bar Prosecution, But No Offence Was Disclosed
The Court clarified that the existence or invocation of civil remedies does not justify quashing where the allegations independently disclose a criminal offence. It added: “The core question is not merely whether civil remedies exist or have been availed, but whether the allegations disclose the commission of any offence against the appellants.”
The complainants’ grievance concerned unpaid revenue share, contractual covenants and the priority of their claimed security. They had pursued insolvency, arbitral and statutory remedies and had offered to withdraw proceedings against the developer and lenders in exchange for a quantified payment.
Considering the delayed criminal complaint and the absence of the ingredients of any offence, the Court held that continuing the investigation against the appellants would amount to an abuse of process.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the Delhi High Court’s common judgment. It also set aside the Magistrate’s order insofar as it directed registration and investigation against L&T and Edelweiss and quashed the FIR and all consequential proceedings against the appellants, their officers and employees.
The Court confined its findings to the two appellants and expressed no opinion on the allegations against the developer or other persons. Proceedings against the remaining accused were directed to continue in accordance with law.
It also clarified that the judgment did not determine the parties’ civil rights or claims and that the complainants remained free to pursue available civil, arbitral and statutory remedies, including claims concerning their asserted security interest. Pending applications were disposed of, with no order as to costs.
Cause Title: Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited v. State of NCT of Delhi & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1236)
Appearances
Appellants: Siddharth Dave and Abhimanyu Bhandari, Senior Advocates
Respondents: Davinder Pal Singh, Additional Solicitor General; Amit Rawal, Senior Advocate