Property Inherited U/S 8 HSA Doesn't Automatically Assume Coparcenary Property Character; Inheritance Is Individual & Statutory In Nature: Supreme Court

The appeal before the Apex Court was filed by the original defendant challenging the final judgment of the Bombay High Court overturning the judgment in the First Appeal, which was directed against the judgment in the suit for partition and separate possession. The respondent was the fourth plaintiff, and the suit was decreed in terms of a judgment dated October 20, 1995.

The Division Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Augustine George Masih explained, "Once again, employing the means of a simple illustration-suppose ‘A’ dies intestate after 1956 leaving behind his son ‘B’. ‘B’ inherits ‘A’s property under Section 8. Under Mitakshara doctrine, ‘B’s son ‘C’ would automatically acquire a birthright in that property, and ‘B’ would hold it as karta of the joint family consisting of himself and ‘C’. However, since the property devolved through Section 8 succession, ‘B’ takes the property as his separate property. ‘C’ acquires no right in it by birth merely because it once belonged to ‘A’. This is in accordance with Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar, where Sabhyasachi Mukherji J.,(as he then was) who was also the author of the decision in Chander Sen (supra), reiterated that property inherited under Section 8 does not automatically assume the character of coparcenary property. It was held that descendants of the heir do not acquire rights in such property by birth because the inheritance is individual and statutory in nature."

“Accordingly, in the context of Section 8, the question of karta-ship ordinarily does not arise merely because the property has come from a paternal ancestor. The heirs succeed as tenants-in-common with definite and separate shares, and the property devolves by succession rather than by survivorship.”

AOR Ashok Kumar Gupta II represented the Appellant, while AOR Sandeep Sudhakar Deshmukh represented the Respondent.

Factual Background

The four plaintiffs, including the present respondent, had filed suit for partition and separate possession claiming to be 4/5th owners of the property of late Dajiba, being the successors-in-interest as his daughters, along with Darubai, who was the wife of Dajiba. This dispute ongoing for more than half a century, was a dispute between a step-mother and her daughters. The suit property was a land and two houses located in the village of Sapti. The Civil Court decreed the suit, holding the plaintiffs to be entitled to their claim. The defendant’s reasoning that she had agreed to sell a part of the suit property, as ‘karta’ to one Dattatraya, out of legal necessity for the marriage of one of the plaintiffs, was rejected.

The First Appellate Court reversed the findings and held the legal necessity ground to be established along with the defendant’s right to manage the property, and so, the judgment of the Civil Court was interfered with, inasmuch as the sale to Dattatraya was concerned. In the Second Appeal filed by the plaintiff respondent, the judgment of the Civil Court came to be restored. It was in such circumstances that the appeal came to be filed.

Reasoning

Highlighting the difference between joint tenancy and tenancy-in-common, the Bench stated that in a joint tenancy, all co-owners together constitute ownership. It is governed by the rule of survivorship. “When one joint tenant dies, his interest automatically accrues to the surviving co-owners, and not on his own progeny. What this means is that while the joint tenancy subsists, none of the co-owners have a separate inheritable share”, it added.

The Bench explained that in tenancy-in-common, each co-owner possesses a distinct, undivided share in the property. Physical possession may remain joint, the ownership of each co-owner is identifiable and notionally separate. “Survivorship has no place in this form of devolution. Upon the death of one co-owner, his share devolves upon his own heirs according to the law of succession. To illustrate, suppose ‘A’ dies intestate leaving behind ‘B’ and ‘C’ as his heirs, under Section 8 read with Section 19 of the HSA, ‘B’ and ‘C’ inherit the property as tenants-in-common. Each acquires a definite share. If ‘B’ later dies, ‘B’s share will devolve upon ‘B’s own legal heirs and will not automatically pass to ‘C’. The difference in the two systems determines the nature of property inherited by a son from his father”, it stated.

The Bench thus clarified that in the context of Section 8, the heirs succeed as tenants-in-common.

Coming to the facts of the case, the Bench held that upon the death of Dajiba, Darubai and her four stepdaughters became tenants-in-common with definite and separate shares, to the tune of 1/5th each. “When each of them has separate and identifiable shares, in the considered view of this Court, there arises no question of the defendant acting as karta to sell off a part of the property on account of legal necessity, be it for whatever reason, for she only had the right to do whatever she wished with the 1/5th share of the property that vested with her”, it noted.

Thus, dismissing the appeal, the Bench concluded the matter by saying, “We only hope that with the finality that accompanies the above conclusion, the long-standing dispute between the parties can, in true effect, be put behind them, by the parties and they can truly move on to a better, more peaceful tomorrow for all those involved.”

Cause Title: Darubai & Anr. v. Kamalabai & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 613)

Appearance

Appellant: AOR Ashok Kumar Gupta II

Respondent: AOR Sandeep Sudhakar Deshmukh, Advocates Nishant Sharma, Ankur Savadikar, Kartik Sharma

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