Assign Specific Division Bench For Hearing Writ Petitions Under Articles 226, 227 Arising From Orders Of Statutory Tribunals: Supreme Court To High Courts

The Apex Court left it to the High Courts to frame the precise modalities suiting local conditions.

The Division Bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu clarified, “Ordinarily, a Single Judge nominated to hear matters under Article 226 has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 227, and vice versa. However, where the rules of the high court so permit, a particular Judge may be nominated by the Chief Justice to hear combined petitions under Articles 226 and 227. However, if the jurisdiction under Article 226 is correctly invoked and an order is passed by the writ court affecting the rights of the parties to the proceedings, and the rules of the relevant high court permit an intra-court appeal to be carried from the decision of the Single Judge to a Division Bench, we see no reason why an intra-court appeal may not lie at the instance of the affected party (who could either be the petitioner or the respondent).”

Highlighting how ‘bench-hunting’ has assumed alarming proportions over the last couple of decades, the Bench suggested, “To curb bench-hunting and to remove this anomaly, we commend to the consideration of the high courts the need to frame appropriate rules/introduce practice guidelines. One possible course following L. Chandra Kumar (supra), which could be an effective way to maintain consistency and certainty, is to assign a specific Division Bench for hearing writ petitions/applications under Article 226 and Article 227, respectively, arising from orders of statutory tribunals. We, however, leave it to the wisdom of each high court to take a call and frame the precise modalities suiting local conditions.

AOR Siddharth Krishna Dwivedi represented the Appellant while Additional Advocate General Padmesh Mishra represented the Respondent.

Factual Background

The Appellant, a resident of Bikaner, intended to engage in the operation of a stage carriage in the State of Rajasthan. Acting in pursuance of a notice issued by the Government of Rajasthan, applications for stage carriage permits were made by the appellant for three routes, viz. Bikaner – Suratgarh, Suratgarh – Ganganagar and on the joint route, i.e., Bikaner – Suratgarh and Suratgarh – Ganganagar. The application for permit on the route Bikaner – Ganganagar was rejected by the State Transport Authority on the ground that he had already been granted a permit. The route did not, however, find reflection in the order of the STA. An appeal carried by the appellant before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan under Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1989 yielded no positive result.

The STAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the STA’s order. The ground assigned was that the appellant had not surrendered the “previously issued permit” and “therefore, could not be issued a second permit”. The route on which the STA “previously issued permit” to the appellant was also conspicuous by its absence in the order of the STAT. The appellant approached the Rajasthan High Court invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226. A Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, and the review also came to be dismissed. The Single Judge reiterated that the appellant having offered a single vehicle which was considered for grant of permit on a different route, the finding arrived at in the said order need not be disturbed. The Division Bench held the intra-court appeal to be not maintainable in light of Rule 13411 of the Rules of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, 1952 and dismissed the same, leading to the filing of the appeal before the Apex Court.

Reasoning

The Bench explained that where Certiorari and Mandamus are prayed by a litigant, the writ court may not only quash the impugned decision but also command the manner of exercise of discretion, and in exceptional cases, itself grant the relief that the authority ought to have granted. The Bench held that the orders made by a tribunal constituted by a law, which has Article 323A of the Constitution as its source, can be challenged before the high courts under Article 226 of the Constitution. “On the other hand, if the tribunal is one over which the relevant high court exercises jurisdiction under Article 227 too, a petition seeking exercise of the power of judicial superintendence could also be maintainable thereagainst. If the rules of the relevant high court permit, a combined application could also be instituted”, it added.

The Bench also added, “By extension, orders made by tribunals constituted by law enacted in terms of Article 323B would similarly be amenable to challenge either under Article 226, or Article 227, or both (if the rules so permit). The same logic would apply even to orders of statutory tribunals (like the STAT under the MV Act) and it can be challenged in writ proceedings under Article 226 or even in proceedings under Article 227 or both, subject to the rules permitting it. It is vital to remember that exercise of discretion under Article 226 cannot, however, be refused merely because the tribunal’s order could also have been challenged under Article 227.”

The Bench held that the finding of the Division Bench (that the intra-court appeal was not maintainable) was indefensible. “The question framed, thus, stands answered by holding that the impugned judgment is legally untenable, being contrary to established principle”, it held.

The Bench also explained that as per Section 72 of the MV Act, a permit may be granted in accordance with the application or with such modification as the transport authority deems fit. However, it added that when an application is made by an applicant for a permit on a route which is part of a notice inviting applications for grant of permits on specific routes, strong reasons should be available for not granting the permit on the route applied for.

The Bench noted that the decision of the STA did not record any reason for rejection of the appellant’s application and held that the order of the Single Judge was unsustainable in law. Holding that the order of the STAT also suffered from the vice of non-consideration of all the relevant factors calling for interdiction, the Bench set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench, the said order of the Single Judge and the order of the STAT. “Appellant’s appeal before the STAT, i.e., Appeal No.168/2019 shall stand revived”, it ordered.

Cause Title: Ajit Singh v. State of Rajasthan (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 733)

Appearance

Appellant: AOR Siddharth Krishna Dwivedi, Advocates Pradhuman Singh Rathore, Mini Kaushik, Rishabh Srivastava

Respondent: Additional Advocate General Padmesh Mishra, AOR S. Udaya Kumar Sagar

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