Immaterial Whether Advantage Is Sought For Another Person Or Directly Or Through Third Party: Supreme Court Restores Corruption Case Against Police Officer

The Supreme Court set aside a judgment of the Karnataka High Court that had quashed an FIR against a Police Sub-Inspector under Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, for lack of direct demand and acceptance.

It was observed that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution by conducting a premature mini-trial and evaluating evidentiary matters at the threshold stage of a quashing petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Court emphasized that under Explanation 2 to Section 7, a public servant can act as the main instrumentality in the background without receiving the bribe personally, holding that a veiled direction to "do something for those boys" constitutes a prima facie solicitation and an "attempt to obtain" an undue advantage for another person. Accordingly, the Bench revived the FIR and all consequential proceedings, directing the trial court to proceed in accordance with law.

The Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh observed, "The Respondent No. 1’s implicit yet unmistakable direction to the Complainant to provide illegal gratification to his subordinate police officials as disclosed in the records thus falls squarely within the scope of “attempt to obtain” an “undue advantage” “for another person,” as contemplated by Explanation 2(i) to Section 7 of the PC Act. The fact that the Respondent No. 1 may not personally have received or even intended to receive any part of the illegal gratification is entirely immaterial to the establishment of the offence at the stage of prima facie inquiry, by reason of the express statutory language of Explanation 2 to Section 7 of the PC Act."

AOR Nishanth Patil appeared for the Appellant, whereas AOR Sharanagouda Patil appeared for the Respondents.

Brief Facts of the Case

The State, through the Lokayukta Police, challenged a judgment of the Karnataka High Court which had quashed an FIR registered against a Police Sub-Inspector (Respondent No. 1) under Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The High Court quashed the proceedings on the ground that the core ingredients of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification were missing.

The prosecution case arose when Respondent No. 1 seized the Complainant’s vehicle and mobile phone under suspicion of illegal rice transportation. When the Complainant sought the return of his property, Respondent No. 1 allegedly directed him to a private individual (Accused No. 3), who demanded a bribe of ₹50,000 on the officer's behalf. Later, Respondent No. 1 instructed his subordinate Constable (Accused No. 2) to release the vehicle while telling the Complainant to "do something" for his staff. The Constable subsequently demanded a negotiated bribe of ₹3,000.

Following a formal complaint, the Lokayukta Police registered an FIR and laid two traps. Respondent No. 1 was absent during both operations, but the bribe money was ultimately recovered from another co-accused inside the officer's premises.

Contentions of the Appellant

The Police contended that the High Court erred by conducting a mini-trial at the nascent stage of investigation, thereby usurping the statutory powers of the investigating agency. It said that Section 7 criminalizes even an "attempt" to obtain an undue advantage, and under Explanation 2, it is immaterial whether the bribe is demanded directly or orchestrated through subordinates or third parties.

Contentions of the Respondent-Accused 

It was submitted that the FIR was a retaliatory, malicious measure because Respondent No. 1 had previously implicated the Complainant in a criminal case involving the illegal transportation of ration rice.

He said that the demand and acceptance are sine qua non for the offence. Respondent No. 1 was absent during both traps, the phenolphthalein test was negative, and no recovery was made from him. It was also argued that vague statements do not constitute a legal demand, and the investigation failed to establish any direct link between the officer and the alleged demands made by others.

Observations of the Court

The Court observed that the extraordinary and discretionary power to quash a First Information Report (FIR) under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) must be exercised sparingly and with immense circumspection. It was held that at the threshold stage of considering a quashing petition, a court is not permitted to examine the merits of the allegations or evaluate the evidence that would ultimately be led at the trial. The limited judicial inquiry at this preliminary juncture is restricted to ascertaining whether the allegations in the FIR, taken at their face value, prima facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence.

The Court noted that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by conducting what effectively amounted to a premature mini-trial. Instead of confining itself to the contents of the FIR, the High Court erroneously proceeded to evaluate evidentiary matters—such as the outcome of the trap proceedings, the absence of personal recovery from the public servant, the negative result of the phenolphthalein test, and the findings of a parallel departmental enquiry. The Court clarified that sifting through evidence, assessing probabilities, and weighing the credibility of witnesses are functions exclusively reserved for the trial court.

The Court parsed Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, along with its accompanying Explanation 2, to determine the essential ingredients of the offence. It was observed that the legislative intent behind the provision was significantly expanded by Explanation 2. The statute does not restrict the beneficiaries of corruption to the accused public servant alone, but expressly includes "another person." Furthermore, the law explicitly criminalizes a mere "attempt to obtain" an undue advantage, clarifying that actual physical exchange or receipt of a bribe is not a prerequisite for prosecution.

The Court emphasized that under the expansive mandate of Explanation 2, it is entirely immaterial whether a public servant solicits or attempts to obtain an undue advantage directly or through a third party. A public servant can remain in the background as the main instrumentality without being directly in the limelight or receiving the money personally. The Court held that a veiled or implicit direction by a superior officer to a complainant to "do something" for his subordinates or to "make those boys happy" constitutes a clear solicitation and an "attempt to obtain" an undue advantage for another person.

The High Court's narrow interpretation—requiring a direct, personal, and express demand by the public servant for himself—was termed a grave error. The Court warned that validating such a restrictive view would create a pernicious loophole in anti-corruption jurisprudence, enabling senior officials to orchestrate bribery collections through subordinates while maintaining personal deniability, thereby rendering Explanation 2 completely redundant.

"Mere demand or solicitation, therefore, by a public servant may amount to commission of an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act. The word ‘attempt’ is to imply no more than a mere solicitation, which, again, may be made as effectually in implicit or in explicit terms...", the Court held.

Regarding the departmental enquiry report that allegedly exonerated the co-accused subordinates, the Court held it to be wholly irrelevant, pointing out that the exoneration of subordinate staff in administrative proceedings cannot automatically absolve the principal accused in a criminal investigation.

"As even an attempt to obtain an undue advantage, made through the specific demand attributed to Respondent No. 1 to the effect that the Complainant should ‘Do something for those boys’ falls prima facie within the ambit of Section 7(a) of the PC Act read with Explanation 2 thereto, inasmuch as Section 7, expressly includes the ‘attempt to obtain’ an undue advantage and is not confined to actual obtainment, and Explanation 2 makes it clear that it is immaterial whether the advantage is sought for another person or directly or through a third party.", it was observed.

Finally, addressing the plea of malicious prosecution, the Court held that the existence of prior hostility or disputes between the public servant and the complainant is a matter of evidence to be tested during cross-examination at trial. Pre-existing animosity does not render the FIR inherently improbable or absurd, especially when corroborative material like recorded telephonic conversations exists.

Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, revived the FIR and all consequential proceedings, and directed the trial court to proceed in accordance with law, while clarifying that its observations were limited strictly to the prima facie maintainability of the case.

Cause Title: The State by Lokayuktha Police v. K Rangayya & Anr. [Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 574]

Appearances:

Appellant: Advocate on Record Nishanth Patil, Advocate Arijit Dey, Advocate Bhumi Agrawal, Advocate Abhishek Gupta, Advocate Awanish Gupta.

Respondents: Advocate on Record Supreeta Sharanagouda, Advocate Sharanagouda Patil, Advocate Yash S Tiwari, Advocate Kotresh.

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