Rape & POCSO Convicts Not Absolutely Barred From Open-Air Camps; Individual Assessment Required: Rajasthan High Court
The Court held that such prisoners have no automatic right to admission and that the Advisory Committee may impose conditions to protect other inmates, particularly children, and revoke the placement upon breach.
The Rajasthan High Court has held that prisoners convicted under Section 376 IPC or the POCSO Act are not absolutely ineligible for transfer to an Open Air Camp.
However, the Court added, they have no automatic right to admission and must undergo an individualised, reasoned assessment by the Prisoners Open Air Camp Advisory Committee.
The Court was answering a Full Bench reference arising from conflicting Division Bench decisions on whether Rule 3(d) of the Rajasthan Prisoners Open Air Camp Rules, 1972 completely bars prisoners convicted under Section 376 IPC or the POCSO Act from transfer to an Open Air Camp.
A Full Bench comprising Chief Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal, Justice Sameer Jain and Justice Praveer Bhatnagar held: “A prisoner convicted under Section 376 IPC or POCSO Act is not totally ineligible for transfer to an Open Air Camp. However, such a prisoner has no automatic right to admission in Open Air Camp, and the nature and gravity of the offence including the age of the victim and the facts of the case are legitimate considerations for the Advisory Committee and the Advisory Committee must make an individualised, reasoned assessment of institutional conduct, reformative potential, risk and readiness for reintegration, and record its reasons for transfer to Open Air Camp, in line with direction C(i) in the matter of Suhas Chakma (supra), and where the Advisory Committee finds such a prisoner suitable, it may impose condition to protect other inmates, particularly children, and may revoke the placement on breach.”
Advocate Anshuman Saxena appeared for the petitioners. Government Advocate-cum-Additional Advocate General Rajesh Choudhary appeared for the State authorities.
Background
Rule 3 of the 1972 Rules provides that specified classes of prisoners shall “ordinarily” not be eligible for transfer to Open Air Camps. Rule 3(d) includes prisoners convicted under Section 376 IPC, while Rule 4 prescribes the affirmative conditions governing admission.
Certain Division Benches had taken the view that Rules 3 and 4 did not impose an absolute prohibition. Other Division Benches had treated prisoners convicted under Section 376 IPC or the POCSO Act as ineligible because their presence could cause apprehension among inmates’ families, particularly regarding the safety of children.
A Single Judge consequently referred the question to a Larger Bench. The issue before the Full Bench was whether the word “ordinarily” created a rebuttable exclusion permitting exceptions after examining an individual case or an effective prohibition based upon the nature of the offence.
Court’s Observations
‘Ordinarily’ Does Not Create An Absolute Prohibition
The Court examined the meaning attributed to “ordinarily” in Kailash Chandra v. Union of India (1961), Krishan Gopal v. Shri Prakashchandra (1974), Union of India v. Majji Jangamayya (1977), Union of India v. Vipinchandra Hiralal Shah (1996), Commissioner of Customs v. J.D. Orgochem Ltd. (2008) and Union of India v. Hemraj Singh Chauhan (2010).
The Full Bench observed that the expression ordinarily identifies the normal rule while preserving room for exceptional cases. It could not be treated as surplusage or replaced with an absolute declaration that the specified prisoners would never be eligible.
The Court held: “On the basis of aforesaid analysis, we are of the considered opinion that Rule 3(d) read with Rule 4 of the Rules of 1972, neither there is absolute prohibition for admitting a prisoner to the Open Air Camp, nor there is an unrestricted entitlement to be admitted in Open Air Camp for a convict under Section 376 IPC or POCSO Act. The word ‘ordinarily’ must be given operative meaning. Rule 3(d) establishes the normal position that the specified category of prisoners is not eligible.”
The Court added that an applicant covered by Rule 3(d) must demonstrate special or exceptional circumstances justifying a departure from the ordinary exclusion.
No Automatic Admission But A Right To Consideration
The Court distinguished the absence of an automatic right to admission from the complete denial of consideration. It held that the Advisory Committee could not reject an application solely because the conviction fell under Rule 3(d).
The Full Bench observed: “A prisoner falling under Rule 3(d) of the Rules of 1972 cannot claim admission to an Open Air Camp as a matter of right, merely because the word ‘ordinarily’ is neither absolute nor mandatory. Conversely, the authority cannot refuse even to consider the case solely by stating that the conviction falls under Rule 3(d). As such, Rule 3(d) creates an ordinary exclusion, but it does not totally eliminate consideration of an exceptional case. The prisoner must establish special or exceptional circumstances sufficient to justify departure from the ordinary rule, and the competent authority must record a reasoned decision on the relevant factors.”
The Court clarified that the exception must remain exceptional. The nature and gravity of the offence, particularly where the offence was committed against a child, were legitimate considerations while determining whether the ordinary exclusion should be relaxed.
Advisory Committee Must Undertake A Reasoned Assessment
The Court observed that Rule 6 contemplated selection rather than automatic transfer, while Rule 14 entrusted the assessment to an Advisory Committee consisting of correctional, prison, governmental, psychological and probation authorities.
Relying on Suhas Chakma v. Union of India (2026), the Full Bench held that the Committee must consider institutional conduct, demonstrated reformative potential, risk and readiness for social reintegration through a transparent and reasoned procedure.
The Court stated: “The discretion contemplated under Rule 14 by consideration of application for grant of admission to the Open Air Camp must be exercised consistently with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The principle of non-arbitrariness requires that relevant considerations be taken into account and irrelevant considerations be excluded. Article 14 does not create a fundamental right to admission to an Open Air Camp.”
The Court added that Article 14 nevertheless required the discretion under Rules 3, 6 and 14 to be exercised rationally, consistently and on relevant material. A rejection based only on the statutory provision under which the prisoner was convicted would risk depriving the word “ordinarily” of effect.
Referring to Rama Murthy v. State of Karnataka (1997) and Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1978), the Court further observed that Open Air Camps serve the reformative objectives of self-discipline, social readjustment and reintegration, while incarceration does not extinguish a prisoner’s constitutional personhood and dignity.
Conclusion
The Full Bench answered the reference by holding that prisoners convicted under Section 376 IPC or the POCSO Act are not totally ineligible for transfer to Open Air Camps but possess no automatic right to admission.
It overruled the contrary decisions in Rajendra @ Goru v. State of Rajasthan (2022), Bhag Singh @ Bhagirath v. State of Rajasthan (2022) and Vipin @ Vinkesh @ Vika v. State of Rajasthan (2023). The connected matters were directed to be placed before the appropriate Division Bench for determination in accordance with the law declared by the Full Bench.
Cause Title: Gangaram v. State of Rajasthan and Others (Neutral Citation: 2026:RJ-JP:40987-DB)
Appearances
Petitioners: Advocates Anshuman Saxena, T.C. Swami, Pankaj Gupta, Vishram Prajapati, Jai Lodha, Govind Rawat, B.R. Choudhary, Dheeraj Singhal and Tarun Agarwal
Respondents: Government Advocate-cum-Additional Advocate General Rajesh Choudhary; Advocates Aman Agarwal, Gaurav Gupta and Neha Goyal