Disqualifying Candidates Facing Trial For Serious Offences Prevents Criminalization Of Politics: Rajasthan High Court Rejects Challenge To Municipalities Act

The Court held that the provision prescribes a condition of electoral eligibility and serves the legitimate legislative objective of preventing the criminalisation of politics and public administration. It added that the provision neither determines the candidate’s guilt nor substitutes a pending criminal trial with a finding of conviction.

A Division Bench of Chief Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal and Justice Munnuri Laxman observed: “The preliminary object and purpose underlying Section 24(iii) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009… is to disqualify a candidate from contesting municipal election, if he is under trial before competent court, which has taken cognizance for the offence and framed the charges against him of any offence punishable with imprisonment for five years or more. This legislative mandate and measure is to prevent the criminalization of politics and public administration.”

The Bench further observed: “This provision ensures that public institutions are not dominated or controlled by the individuals having criminal backgrounds. By establishing these essential safeguards, the statute preserves public confidence, upholds the rule of law and constitutional values and so also protect the public offices from criminal influence.”

Advocates Aman Maheshwari appeared for the petitioner. Senior Advocate and Additional Advocate General Rajesh Panwar & Additional Advocate General S.S. Ladrecha appeared for the respondents.

Background

The petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of Section 24(iii) under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and sought permission to contest a municipal election. He was facing a criminal trial in which charges had been framed under provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The petitioner contended that Section 24(iii) imposed a more onerous consequence upon an undertrial candidate than Section 24(i), which deals with disqualification following conviction. He argued that the provision violated the presumption of innocence and was arbitrary, discriminatory and disproportionate.

The State opposed the challenge and relied on the presumption of constitutionality and the earlier decisions upholding the corresponding disqualification provision. It also submitted that the petitioner’s nomination had, in fact, been rejected for failure to submit the requisite party-authorisation forms and not under Section 24(iii).

Court’s Observations

Condition Of Eligibility, Not Finding Of Guilt

The Court observed that Article 243V of the Constitution expressly empowers State legislatures to prescribe disqualifications for membership of municipalities. It held that the Rajasthan Legislature was, therefore, competent to prescribe the conditions contained in Section 24(iii).

Relying on K. Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan (2005), the Court stated that the right to contest an election is a statutory right and remains subject to the qualifications and disqualifications prescribed by the competent legislature.

The Court explained: “Thus, Section 24(iii) merely prescribes statutory condition of electoral eligibility; it does not adjudicate upon the guilt, or the innocence of the person concerned nor does it substitute a finding of conviction for pending criminal trial.”

The Court consequently rejected the contention that the provision infringed the petitioner’s personal liberty under Article 21. It observed that a statutory restriction upon eligibility to contest an election could not be equated with deprivation of life or personal liberty.

Objective Safeguards Against Arbitrary Disqualification

The Court held that Section 24(iii) does not disqualify a person merely because a complaint has been filed, an FIR has been registered or an accusation has been made. The provision operates only when a competent court has taken cognizance, framed charges and the alleged offence carries imprisonment of five years or more.

The Bench stated: “The legislation has not disqualified every person, against whom the complaint or FIR has been filed, nor it has been acted merely upon suspicion or accusation.”

The Court added that the provision contains a “double safeguard” because judicial scrutiny takes place both when cognizance is taken and when charges are framed. It held that these requirements constitute objective, identifiable and judicially verifiable criteria.

The Bench observed: “The provision provides double safeguard in the form of judicial scrutiny at two stages, i.e. at the stage of cognizance and at the stage of framing of charges.”

The Court held that the classification had a rational nexus with the objective of protecting local democratic institutions from persons facing trial for serious offences. It therefore found no violation of Article 14.

Referring to Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002), People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (2003) and Public Interest Foundation v. Union of India (2019), the Court stated that the participation of persons facing serious criminal charges in electoral politics affects public confidence in democratic institutions.

Earlier Decisions Bound The Court

The Court noted that in Shiv Ram v. State of Rajasthan (2000), the corresponding provision under the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 had been upheld because disqualification arose only after investigation and judicial application of mind at the stage of framing charges.

It further observed that the Full Bench in Narayan Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2003) had held that such disqualification concerns the pendency of a criminal trial at the relevant time and does not depend upon the trial ultimately resulting in conviction.

The Court added that Yogendra Nandwana v. State of Rajasthan (2005) had rejected challenges based on Articles 14 and 21, the presumption of innocence and the absence of a comparable disqualification for elections to Parliament or State legislatures.

Relying on Niemla Textile Finishing Mills Ltd. v. Second Punjab Industrial Tribunal (1957), Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Shambhu Nath Mukherji (1977), Kesho Ram & Co. v. Union of India (1989) and Union of India v. Major S.P. Sharma (2014), the Court held that the constitutional validity of a pari materia provision, once examined and upheld, could not be repeatedly reopened on different grounds before a Bench of the same strength.

Distinct Grounds Of Disqualification

The Court rejected the comparison between Sections 24(i) and 24(iii). It explained that the two clauses operate at different stages and address distinct circumstances: one follows conviction, while the other regulates electoral eligibility during the trial of a serious offence after charges have been framed.

Relying on Javed v. State of Haryana (2003), the Court also held that disqualification provisions governing municipal elections could not be invalidated merely because identical restrictions had not been prescribed for elections to Parliament or State legislatures. The Court observed that laws enacted by different legislatures under distinct constitutional sources could not be mechanically compared for alleging discrimination.

Conclusion

The Court dismissed the constitutional challenge to Section 24(iii) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009. It also noted that the petitioner’s nomination had been rejected for the independent reason that the requisite party-authorisation forms had not been submitted.

The Court dismissed the writ petition while granting the petitioner liberty to challenge the election through an election petition after the electoral process.

Cause Title: Budh Dan v. State of Rajasthan and Others (Neutral Citation: 2026:RJ-JD:43445-DB)

Appearances

Petitioner: Advocates Aman Maheshwari, Akansha Mehta and Pulkit Sharma

Respondents: Senior Advocate and Additional Advocate General Rajesh Panwar, assisted by Advocates Ayush Gehlot and Rakesh Sharma; Advocate Ravindra Jala for Additional Advocate General S.S. Ladrecha

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