Stay Of Civil Suit Does Not Automatically Bar Trial Court From Deciding Pending Temporary Injunction Application: Rajasthan High Court

The Court was hearing a writ petition challenging a Trial Court order dismissing an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, through which the plaintiff sought to stay proceedings on his temporary injunction application after the High Court had stayed further proceedings in the original suit.

A Bench of Justice Sanjeet Purohit observed: “… an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC is incidental / collateral to the main proceedings. The jurisdiction exercised by learned Trial Court while considering such application is interlocutory; its object is to preserve the subject matter of the suit and protect the rights of the parties pending final adjudication, and its determination does not constitute adjudication of the ultimate rights and liabilities of the parties in the suit. The consideration of such application, therefore, does not amount to continuation of the trial of the suit on merits”.

Accordingly, the Bench added: “a general order staying further proceedings in the original suit cannot, in the absence of language or circumstances indicating otherwise, be construed as automatically staying proceedings upon a pending application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC. Whether learned Trial Court can proceed with such application must depend upon the terms and scope of particular order of stay and whether consideration of the application would in any manner encroach upon the proceedings or issues which stand stayed before the superior Court.”

C.P. Soni, Advocate, appeared for the petitioner, while Jai Kishan Bhaiya, Advocate, represented the respondents.

Background

The plaintiff instituted a suit seeking partition and mandatory injunction and also filed an application for temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

During the suit, the plaintiff filed another application seeking forensic examination of a defendant’s disputed signatures. After the Trial Court rejected that application, he challenged the order before the High Court. A Coordinate Bench issued notice and stayed further proceedings in the original suit.

Before that stay was granted, the High Court had disposed of a separate writ petition by directing the Trial Court to decide the temporary-injunction application, which had remained pending for approximately three years, preferably within 30 days.

The plaintiff subsequently applied under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to stay the injunction proceedings as well, contending that the application formed part of the original suit. The Trial Court rejected the request because the High Court had not specifically stayed the injunction application and an earlier direction requiring its expeditious disposal remained operative.

Court’s Observations

The Court observed that the main suit and the temporary-injunction proceedings may draw upon common material, but their nature, purpose and adjudicatory scope remain distinct. The suit determines the parties’ ultimate rights and liabilities, while the injunction application preserves the property and protects their interests until final adjudication.

The Bench stated: “Proceedings under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, on the other hand, are interlocutory in nature and are intended to preserve the subject matter of the litigation and protect the rights of the parties pending such final adjudication.”

The Court clarified that the interrelationship between the suit and the injunction application does not make them co-extensive or render the progress of one dependent upon the other. It noted that the two proceedings are separately registered, independently considered and decided within their respective spheres.

The Bench explained: “It, therefore, follows that notwithstanding the interrelationship between the two proceedings, they are distinct in their nature and sphere of operation. They are registered separately, considered singularly and decided independently. Resultantly, they may be interconnected but are not interdependent.”

The Court distinguished Ravindra Bal Niketan Samiti, Sikar and Others v. Sushila Shrivastava and Another (1988) and Ayaz Master and Others v. Rehana Mirza and Others (2019). It observed that those decisions concerned the applicability of provisions relating to discovery and production of documents in temporary-injunction proceedings, and not the effect of an order staying the suit.

The Court relied upon Madanlal Agarwal v. Kamlesh Nigam (1975), Khemraj Ratanlal Sancheti v. Vasant Madhaosa Vyavhare (1980) and Bijay Kumar Agarwalla v. Ramakanta Das (1987). It observed that these decisions distinguished proceedings advancing the trial on merits from collateral or protective proceedings intended to preserve the dispute and keep the litigation alive.

The Bench held: “An order staying further proceedings in an original suit does not, by itself, operate as an absolute bar upon the jurisdiction of learned Trial Court to entertain and decide an interlocutory application arising in the suit.”

The Court observed that whether an interlocutory application may proceed during the subsistence of a stay depends upon the scope and terms of the stay, its object, the nature of the proceedings before the superior court and the effect of deciding the interlocutory application.

The Bench stated: “Where such interlocutory proceeding does not amount to a continuation of the trial on merits, does not encroach upon the subject matter of the proceedings pending before the superior Court, and does not conflict with the order of stay or the issues requiring consideration therein, its consideration cannot be said to be precluded merely by reason of the stay.”

Applying this test, the Court noted that the stay order referred only to further proceedings in the original suit and contained no express direction staying the temporary-injunction application. It found that deciding the injunction plea would neither determine the parties’ final rights nor encroach upon the issue pending before the Coordinate Bench concerning forensic examination of disputed signatures.

The Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the earlier direction to decide the injunction application had merged into or stood displaced by the subsequent stay order. It observed that the two orders arose from separate writ petitions and addressed distinct issues. Since the earlier order had neither been recalled nor stayed, its direction for expeditious disposal continued to operate.

The Court also relied upon Basanta Manjari Sawal v. Rupakanta Sahu, where the Orissa High Court applied the same principle to a temporary-injunction application; Rameshwar v. Vth Additional District Judge, Basti (1999), which made the scope and purpose of the stay order decisive; Surendra Sawhney v. Murlidhar (2008), which held that protective interlocutory applications do not constitute steps in the trial; and Amita Kaushish v. Sanjay Kaushish (1996), where the Supreme Court held that a stay of trial did not preclude the parties from seeking interlocutory relief.

The Court observed that these authorities collectively permit collateral or protective proceedings to continue when they neither touch the stayed trial nor conflict with the proceedings before the superior court.

The Court further stated that its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is supervisory rather than appellate. It found no jurisdictional error, patent illegality, perversity or manifest injustice in the Trial Court’s refusal to stay the injunction proceedings.

Conclusion

The Court upheld the Trial Court’s decision permitting the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to proceed despite the stay of further proceedings in the original suit.

It dismissed the writ petition as devoid of merit. The stay application and all other pending applications were also dismissed.

Cause Title: Badrilal v. Dhokalram & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026:RJ-JD:45420)

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