Writ Maintainable Against Minority Aided School If Teacher’s Suspension Or Dismissal Violates Statutory Requirements: Patna High Court

The Court was hearing a writ petition filed by an assistant teacher of a minority aided school who challenged her suspension, withholding of salary and subsequent dismissal, primarily contending that the actions were taken without approval of the Director, Secondary Education, as required under the Bihar Non-Government Secondary Schools (Taking over of Management and Control) Act, 1981, as amended in 2011.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Alok Kumar Sinha observed: “In the present case also, the action complained of, as per the petitioner, required approval of Director, Secondary Education as per the statutory provisions contained in ‘the 1981 Act’, which was not done, therefore, interference in this case is being sought on the ground of breach of law and not on the basis of interference in discharge of “public duty”, thus not requiring the petitioner to establish direct nexus between action complained of and “public duty” being discharged by ‘the Respondent-7 School’.”

The Court further held: “Thus, where violation of statutory provision by a body discharging “public function” or “public duty” is complained of, the same would not come within the realm of private element, requiring direct nexus to be established between action complained of and the discharge of “public duty” by the body.”

Advocate Siddhartha Prasad appeared on behalf of the petitioner, and Advocate Sanjeev Ranjan appeared on behalf of the respondents.

Background

The petitioner was appointed as an assistant teacher in a minority aided school after a prescribed selection process, and her appointment was approved under Section 18(3)(b) of the 1981 Act. She claimed that teachers and staff of such institutions were governed by service rules framed under the statute and that the Director, Secondary Education, exercised regulatory and disciplinary control over the affairs of minority schools and their teaching and non-teaching staff.

The dispute arose after the petitioner was suspended by the school’s managing committee, and her salary was directed to be withheld. During the pendency of the writ petition, she was also dismissed from service. She challenged the actions, among other grounds, for want of approval by the competent government authority under Section 18(3)(d) of the 1981 Act as amended by the 2011 Amendment Act.

The school objected to the maintainability of the writ petition, arguing that the dispute arose from an ordinary contract of service with a minority aided school and therefore could not be examined under Article 226.

Court’s Observation

The Court first clarified that it was deciding the preliminary objection raised by the school before entering into the merits. It framed the question as whether a writ petition would lie at the instance of a dismissed or terminated employee against a school discharging public function or public duty if the action was also challenged for breach of statutory provisions governing service conditions.

The Court observed: “Taking note of the precise nature of objection raised by the Respondent no. 7-School and the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, the question that arises for consideration is: Whether a writ petition would be maintainable at the behest of a dismissed/terminated employee against a school discharging “public function” or “public duty”, if the action complained of, on an amongst other grounds is also assailed inter alia on the ground of breach of law/statutory provision governing the service condition of such an employee?”

The Court noted that the petitioner had specifically pleaded that both suspension and dismissal were passed without approval of the competent government authority.

The Court stated: “From the averments/pleadings made in the writ petition and in the interlocutory application, it transpires that, apart from various other grounds, the petitioner has challenged both the suspension and dismissal order on the specific ground that they have been passed without taking approval of the competent government authority, which, as per the petitioner, was/is a mandatory requirement under the statutory provisions of ‘the 1981 Act’ as amended by ‘2011 Amendment Act’. It is further the specific case of the petitioner that the service rules governing the teachers and non-teaching staffs of Respondent no. 7-School have been formulated in terms of the provisions of ‘the 1981 Act’ and the Director, Secondary Education (respondent no.3) exercises the regulatory control over the affairs of the minority school and disciplinary control over the teaching and non-teaching staffs of the school. Their appointments are also subjected to approval by the competent authority of the State Government, in accordance with the provisions of ‘the 1981 Act’.”

The Court found that the school did not specifically controvert the petitioner’s factual assertions regarding the statutory approval requirement. It also noted that while the school called the dispute contractual, it did not explain why a writ would not lie when the challenge was founded on alleged violation of statutory provisions.

The Court noted: “These aforesiad factual assertions facts have not been specifically controverted in the Counter Affidavit filed by ‘the respondent no.7 School’. In the Supplementary Counter Affidavit, apart from stating that the suspension order was approved by District Education Officer vide Letter dated 11.06.2024, though no document evidencing such approval has been brought on record, no denial has been made to the petitioner’s categorical assertion that the dismissal order has been passed without seeking the approval of the competent government authority. It is also pertinent to note that although an objection has been raised by ‘the Respondent-7 School’ stating that writ would not be maintainable in respect of a dispute arising out of oridinary contract of service, but no submission has been made to explain as to why a writ would not be maintainable when the challenge is founded not merely on the breach of contract of service, but also on the alleged violation of statutory provisions governing the petitioner’s service conditions.”

The Court examined the precedents relied upon by the school, including Shri Vidya Ram Misra v. Managing Committee, Shri Jai Narain College (1972), Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002), Trigun Chand Thakur v. State of Bihar (2019), St. Mary’s Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava (2023), Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma (2024), and Dileep Kumar Pandey v. Union of India (2025).

It distinguished Shri Vidya Ram Misra (1972), holding that the cause of action there arose solely from breach of a contractual clause and not breach of a statutory provision.

The Court also held that Pradeep Kumar Biswas (2002) and Trigun Chand Thakur (2019) did not answer the school’s objection because the issue here was not whether the school was “State” under Article 12, but whether a writ could lie where statutory breach was alleged.

The Court held that St. Mary’s Education Society (2023), far from helping the school, supported the petitioner’s case. It relied on the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court between ordinary service disputes and cases where removal is regulated by statutory provisions.

The Court highlighted: “From the aforesaid pleadings made by the petitioner, it is clear that case of violation of statutory provisions governing the service condition is being sought to be agitated in the writ petition, which would be permissible against ‘the Respondent-7 School’ discharging “public function” or “public duty” - i.e. imparting education, even if the action complained of has no direct nexus to the discharge of “public duty”. This aspect of the law is very well settled and has been reiterated in St. Mary’s Education Society case (Supra) in paragraph 75.4, which is quoted herein below for needful:”

The Court also referred to Marwari Balika Vidyalaya v. Asha Srivastava (2020), where removal requiring government approval was held to be outside the realm of a purely private element if action was taken dehors mandatory provisions.

The Court further relied on Ramakrishna Mission v. Kago Kunya (2019), observing that while purely private contracts are generally outside writ jurisdiction, an exception exists where a contract of service is governed or regulated by statutory provisions.

The Court stated that Army Welfare Education Society (2024) and Dileep Kumar Pandey (2025) did not dilute the settled proposition that a writ would lie when the action complained of is challenged for breach of law and not merely breach of a covenant of contract.

Rejecting the school’s objection, the Court held the writ petition maintainable at the present stage, but confined the petitioner to the statutory-breach ground. It made clear that if the petitioner failed to establish a violation of the 1981 Act on the merits, the Court may not finally entertain the writ.

The Court concluded: “Thus, for the reasons as explained herein above, this Court rejects the objection raised by ‘the Respondent no.7 School’ regarding maintainability of the writ petition and holds that since in the present writ application, the actions complained of, on an amongst other grounds have also been assailed on the ground of breach of statutory provisions contained in ‘1981 Act’ as amended by ‘2011 Amendment Act’, therefore, this writ application is held to be maintainable for the present against ‘the Respondent No.7 School’ which is undisputedly discharging ‘public function’ or ‘public duty’ by imparting education. It is made clear that while prosecuting the case on merit, the petitioner will be allowed to assail the impugned orders strictly on the ground of alleged breach of statutory provisions of ‘1981 Act’ as amended by ‘2011 Amendment Act’ and on no other ground(s). It remains to be seen whether the petitioner while arguing the case on merit is able to establish the breach of statutory provision, as alleged by him or not. If the petitioner is unable to, then this Court may not finally entertain this writ application.”

Conclusion

The Patna High Court rejected the preliminary objection to maintainability and held that the writ petition could proceed, but only on the question whether the suspension and dismissal violated statutory provisions of the 1981 Act as amended by the 2011 Amendment Act. The matter was directed to be listed for further consideration of the interlocutory application, with liberty to the respondents to file replies.

Cause Title: Abha Rani v. The State of Bihar

Appearances

Petitioner: Siddhartha Prasad, Advocate, with Sumit Kumar, Advocate

Respondents: Standing Counsel (20), with Md. Zeeshan Kalim, AC to SC (20), and Prasad Verma, AC to SC 20, Sanjeev Ranjan, Advocate, with Shristi Singh, Advocate, and Aditi Sahay, Advocate

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