The Orissa High Court has held that a Children’s Court cannot try a child as an adult merely based on the preliminary assessment and transfer order passed by the Juvenile Justice Board, and that it must independently determine under Section 19 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, whether there is a need to try the child as an adult.

Accordingly, the Court set aside the conviction and sentence imposed upon an appellant who was approximately 17 years old at the relevant time. It found that the omission of the Section 19 determination was a fundamental defect affecting the legality of the adult trial itself.

A Bench of Justice Sibo Sankar Mishra observed: “The submission of the learned Additional Government Advocate that the use of the expression ‘may’ in Section 19 renders the exercise discretionary cannot be accepted. The discretion contemplated by the provision is as to the course to be adopted after the Children’s Court applies its mind to the question whether the child needs to be tried as an adult. It cannot mean that the Children’s Court is free to dispense with the statutory determination altogether.”

The Court added: “Such an interpretation would render the safeguard under Section 19 ineffective and would reduce the carefully structured two-stage mechanism into a single-stage procedure controlled entirely by the Juvenile Justice Board.”

Advocate Debidutta Mohapatra appeared for the appellant. Additional Government Advocate Ashok Kumar Apat appeared for the State, while Advocate Samvit Mohanty assisted the Court as Amicus Curiae.

Background

The Court was hearing an appeal against a judgment convicting the appellant under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, read with Sections 450, 376(2)(i) and 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The prosecution case arose from allegations that the appellant had repeatedly sexually assaulted a child. The judgment noted that the appellant was approximately 17 years old during the relevant period and was consequently dealt with as a child in conflict with law.

The Juvenile Justice Board undertook a preliminary assessment under Section 15 of the 2015 Act and transferred the matter to the Children’s Court for trial as an adult. The High Court found, however, that the Children’s Court thereafter proceeded to frame charges and conduct the adult criminal trial without passing an order reflecting its independent determination under Section 19.

The appellant had been sentenced to 15 years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹20,000 for the offence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. A separate sentence of five years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹5,000 had been imposed under Section 450 IPC. The High Court noted that he had already remained in custody for more than 12 years.

The Amicus Curiae contended that the adult trial was vitiated because the safeguards under Sections 15 and 19 had not been followed. Reliance was placed on Barun Chandra Thakur v. Master Bholu (2023), Ajeet Gurjar v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2023) and X v. State of Bihar (2026).

The State maintained that the preliminary assessment had been conducted and argued that any omission by the Children’s Court was merely procedural. It further contended that the conviction should not be disturbed and that, at most, the nature of the treatment or sentence could be modified.

Court’s Observations

Two-Stage Statutory Safeguard

The Court explained that the 2015 Act envisages two distinct stages before a child can be subjected to an adult criminal trial. It observed that the Juvenile Justice Board must first undertake a preliminary assessment under Section 15 and, upon transfer of the case, the Children’s Court must independently apply its mind under Section 19.

The Court held that the Board’s transfer order does not automatically result in an adult trial. The Children’s Court must determine whether the child needs to be tried as an adult or whether it should itself conduct an inquiry as a Juvenile Justice Board.

The Court stated: “Thus, the legislative scheme does not contemplate an automatic conversion of the Board’s recommendation into an adult criminal trial.”

Referring to Barun Chandra Thakur v. Master Bholu (2023), the Court observed that the Supreme Court had recognised the preliminary assessment by the Board and the subsequent determination by the Children’s Court as distinct stages. It added that Ajeet Gurjar v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2023) treated the inquiry under Section 19(1)(i) as a substantive safeguard and not an empty formality.

Independent Determination Was Absent

After examining the proceedings, the Court found no order demonstrating that the Children’s Court had independently considered whether the appellant ought to face an adult trial. It held that the subsequent framing of charges could not substitute the determination expressly required under Section 19.

The Court observed: “There is no indication of an independent assessment by the Children’s Court as to whether, notwithstanding the opinion of the Board, the appellant ought to face an adult trial or whether the Children’s Court itself ought to proceed as a Board. The absence of such determination cannot be regarded as a mere irregularity.”

The Court further held that the omission affected the Children’s Court’s jurisdiction to conduct an adult trial: “The Children’s Court, therefore, did not merely commit an error while conducting an otherwise valid trial; it failed to undertake the statutory exercise which was a condition precedent to its assuming jurisdiction to try the child as an adult.”

Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 Applied

The Court rejected the contention that the case should be governed by the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000. It noted that the prosecution had alleged repeated conduct extending beyond January 15, 2016, when the 2015 Act came into force.

Relying on Sri Ganesh v. State of Tamil Nadu (2017), the Court held that where repeated sexual offences are alleged, juvenility must be examined with reference to the date of the last alleged incident. It added that the victim’s pregnancy could not conclusively determine when the alleged conduct had last occurred.

The Court consequently held that the proceedings were correctly initiated under the 2015 Act. It clarified, however, that once the appellant entered that statutory framework, both the Board and the Children’s Court were required to comply scrupulously with its safeguards.

The Court observed: “The question before this Court, therefore, is not merely whether the evidence adduced during the trial was sufficient to establish the alleged offence, but whether the appellant could lawfully be subjected to an adult criminal trial in the first place.”

Gravity Of Allegations Cannot Displace Safeguards

The Court acknowledged the gravity of the allegations and the fact that the alleged victim was a child. It nevertheless held that the seriousness of an offence could not authorise a court to disregard safeguards enacted for children in conflict with law.

The Court underscored: “The more serious the consequence of transferring a child into the adult criminal justice system, the greater the need for strict compliance with the statutory safeguards governing such transfer.”

It clarified that its decision did not rest upon a finding that the allegations were insignificant, but upon the legal conclusion that the appellant had undergone an adult trial without fulfilment of the statutory preconditions.

Conclusion

The Court held that non-compliance with Section 19 was fundamental and struck at the legality of the adult trial. It consequently set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, acquitted the appellant of the charges and allowed the appeal.

Cause Title: PS v. State of Odisha (Neutral Citation: 2026:OHC:169)

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