Repeated Physical Intimacy Does Not By Itself Prove Consent Where Circumstances Show Deception Or Coercion: Madras High Court

The Court was hearing an appeal filed by the accused against the judgment of the Fast Track Mahila Court, Nagercoil, which had convicted him for offences including repeated rape, voyeurism and criminal intimidation, and sentenced him to life imprisonment until natural death for the offence under Section 376(2)(n) IPC read with Section 90 IPC.

A Bench of Justice N. Anand Venkatesh and Justice K.K. Ramakrishnan observed:

“Mere submission or acquiescence cannot be equated with consent, particularly where the victim accompanies the accused for the purposes wholly unconnected with sexual intimacy, such as discussions relating to employment, marriage, or any other legitimate expectation engineered by the accused. The Court must also bear in mind the fundamental distinction between consent and mere submission. Consent is an informed, voluntary, and conscious act, whereas submission may result from helplessness, fear, coercion, intimidation, or a sense of inevitable compulsion. Where the evidence demonstrates that the victim remained with the accused or submitted to the sexual act because she was unable to extricate herself from his control, threats, or coercive circumstances, such conduct amounts to no more than passive submission or helpless resignation”.

The Bench further added:

“Mere non-resistance or acquiescence under such circumstances cannot, in law, be construed as voluntary consent. Therefore, the mere fact that the victim was subjected to repeated physical intimacy with the accused does not, by itself, establish that the relationship was consensual. The surrounding circumstances in which the acts occurred, the absence of free and informed choice, and the existence of coercion, deception, or intimidation must all be carefully evaluated before concluding that there was valid consent in the eyes of the law.”

Senior Counsel V. Kathirvelu appeared for the appellant, while G. Karuppasamy Pandian appeared for the State.

Background

The prosecution's case was that the accused contacted the victim through social media, gained her confidence by making representations of marriage and employment, subjected her to repeated sexual intercourse, clandestinely recorded intimate material, and later used the recordings to intimidate and sexually exploit her.

The accused challenged the conviction by arguing that the relationship was consensual, that the complaint was delayed, that there were omissions in the FIR, that the electronic evidence was inadmissible without a certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, and that the victim had been coerced by the investigating agency to lodge the complaint.

The State opposed the appeal, contending that the accused had used deception, false assurances, non-consensual recordings, and threats of publication to dominate and exploit the victim.

Court’s Observations

The Court examined Explanation 2 to Section 375 IPC and Section 90 IPC, and referred to decisions including Karthi alias Karthick v. State of Tamil Nadu (2013), Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra (2019), Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh (2019), Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019), and Pramod Kumar Navratna v. State of Chhattisgarh (2026).

The Court held that the Supreme Court has not laid down any universal rule that every intimate relationship arising from a promise of marriage must be treated as consensual. Instead, each case must turn on whether the relationship was genuinely voluntary or induced by deception, false promise, coercion, or intimidation.

The Court stated: “From the perusal of the precedents, it is clear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held that whether the prosecutrix had voluntarily consented to the sexual relationship with free will or whether her consent stood vitiated by deception, misconception of fact, coercion, intimidation or other circumstances recognised by law must be decided on the peculiar facts of the each case and the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not lay down any inflexible or universal proposition that every intimate relationship arising out of promise of marriage must necessarily be treated as consensual and each case must be decided on its own peculiar facts and circumstances.”

On the facts, the Court held that the victim had been induced to accompany the accused for discussions relating to employment and marriage, and not for any consensual intimate meeting. It found that her hesitation, resistance and objections negated any inference of free and voluntary participation.

The Court observed: “From reading of the evidence of the victim, more particularly the above portion of cross-examination, unmistakably establishes that the prosecutrix was placed in circumstances engineered entirely by the accused, which deprived her of a meaningful choice and to submit to his coercion. Our constitutional and legal framework unequivocally recognises every individual's bodily autonomy and sexual autonomy. Any physical relationship must be founded upon the free, voluntary, informed consent, and unequivocal consent of the person concerned. A physical act performed without such consent attracts the penal consequences contemplated under the criminal law.”

The Court further held that the accused had wrongfully restrained the victim, exploited her fear, and later used intimate recordings as instruments of blackmail.

The Court found the victim’s testimony natural, cogent and consistent. It held that no material contradiction was elicited in cross-examination and that her conduct was consistent with a woman deceived, isolated, overpowered and later threatened.

The Court noted: “The evidence, therefore, unmistakably establishes that the victim was continuously subjected to sexual exploitation through deception, abuse of trust and criminal intimidation. The successive acts of sexual intercourse were not isolated incidents but formed part of one continuing transaction motivated by a common design. The conduct of the accused squarely answers the description of rape by deception, followed by rape through coercion and sexual extortion.”

Relying on State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (1996), State of U.P. v. Pappu (2005), and Ganesan v. State (2020), the Court reiterated that a conviction can rest on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence.

The Court rejected the argument that the delay in lodging the complaint weakened the prosecution's case. It held that the victim had remained under fear because the accused threatened to publish her intimate photographs and videos on social media.

The Court observed: “While examining such an issue, the Court must place itself in the position of the victim and assess her conduct from the standpoint of an ordinary person subjected to similar circumstances, rather than from the detached perspective of a third party. A victim of repeated sexual exploitation coupled with persistent threats of exposure cannot be expected to immediately rush to the police in breakneck speed. Human conduct varies according to circumstances, and hesitation or delay in reporting sexual offences is often the natural consequence of fear, shame, trauma and social stigma. Therefore, this Court finds no unnaturalness in the conduct of the victim.”

The Court also held that an FIR is not expected to contain every minute detail and that omission to mention every instance of sexual intercourse was not fatal in the peculiar circumstances.

The Court rejected the defence objection based on the absence of a Section 65B certificate. It found that the Apple MacBook containing incriminating material was recovered, scientifically examined, and produced as the original electronic device. The Court relied on Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020) to hold that where the original electronic device is produced, a Section 65B certificate is not required in the same manner.

The Court held: “This Court, therefore, finds that the prosecution has established the authenticity, genuineness and continuity of the electronic evidence through the seizure mahazars, the disclosure statement of the accused, the scientific examination, the forensic reports and the oral evidence of the expert witnesses. No material has been produced by the defence to suggest any tampering, fabrication or manipulation of the electronic records.”

The Court also rejected the plea of morphing, observing that the video appeared to be a natural and continuous recording and that mere theoretical suggestions of manipulation could not displace scientifically supported electronic evidence.

The Court noted that the accused did not offer any explanation under Section 313 CrPC or by defence evidence as to how the offending videos and photographs came to be stored in his personal laptop.

The Court held that once the prosecution established foundational facts, Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act applied to facts especially within the accused’s knowledge. It also held that Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act strengthened the prosecution's case once intercourse was proved and the victim stated that she had not consented.

The Court found no mitigating factor warranting a reduction of sentence. It noted that the accused had used deception, manipulation, intimidation and non-consensual recordings as a continuing method of sexual exploitation.

The Court held: “Courts cannot permit such an offender to exploit women seeking employment by luring them with false promises of love and career opportunities, only to subject them to repeated sexual abuse and blackmail through non-consensual recordings. The conduct of the accused reveals a high degree of premeditation, cruelty, and moral depravity. In these circumstances, no mitigating factor is found warranting any reduction of the sentence imposed upon the accused.”

Conclusion

The Court accordingly dismissed the appeal and confirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the Fast Track Mahila Court, Nagercoil.

In a separate concurring postscript, Justice N. Anand Venkatesh highlighted the psychological burden placed on investigators, prosecutors, defence counsel and judges who are required to view graphic digital evidence in sexual offence cases.

The Court stated: “The machinery of justice cannot treat its human beings like unfeeling computers. If we continue to ignore the mental and neurological toll of this digital age, we will end up with burnt-out, traumatised, and emotionally numbed investigators, lawyers, and judges.”

The Court called for institutional responses such as psychological screening, counselling, decompression protocols, rotation of personnel handling graphic material, training on vicarious trauma, and secure procedures to minimise unnecessary exposure.

Cause Title: Suji @ Kasi v. State

Appearances

Appellant: Senior Counsel V. Kathirvelu

Respondent: G. Karuppasamy Pandian, Counsel for State of Tamil Nadu, Criminal Side

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