Political Criticism Cannot Be Silenced Through Omnibus Orders: Madras High Court Stays Notice Blocking VHP’s Post on X

The Court further directed the authorities to communicate with X Corp for the restoration and unblocking of all URLs covered by the impugned notice pending disposal of the writ petition.

The Court was hearing a writ petition filed by Vishwa Hindu Parishad North Tamil Nadu President P. Chockalingam is challenging a notice issued by the Cyber Crime Wing under Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, read with Rule 3(1)(d) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, directing the removal/blocking of multiple URLs on X/Twitter. The petitioner contended that the impugned notice was unconstitutional, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

A Division Bench of Justice L. Victoria Gowri and Justice N. Senthilkumar, while noting that “the impugned notice prima facie indicates that multiple URLs belonging to different users have been clubbed together under a common direction”, further held: “The constitutional infirmity in a blanket direction lies not merely in its width, but in its silence. When the State restricts speech, it must speak through reasons. A citizen’s liberty cannot be curtailed by a cryptic command. A content creator cannot be silenced by an omnibus formula. A political opinion cannot be removed merely because it is sharp, inconvenient, satirical, dissenting or unpalatable”.

The Court also observed: “Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India protects not only polite speech, agreeable speech or speech which is comfortable to those in power. It protects criticism, dissent, satire, political disagreement and robust public debate.”

Advocate Sunny Sheen appeared for the petitioner. Additional Government Pleader L.S.M. Hasan Fizal & Additional Public Prosecutor S. Raja Kumar appeared for the respondents.

Background

The petitioner challenged a notice issued by the Cyber Crime Wing directing the removal and blocking of multiple X/Twitter URLs purportedly under Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, read with Rule 3(1)(d) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021.

According to the petitioner, the impugned notice clubbed together multiple URLs belonging to different users under one common direction without separately analysing the content, context and constitutional status of each post. It was contended that the notice used broad expressions such as “provocative political remarks”, “disturbing public tranquillity” and “politically sensitive remarks” without disclosing how each post satisfied the threshold under Article 19(2) of the Constitution.

The petitioner further contended that affected users were neither informed of the allegations nor afforded any opportunity before issuance of the removal directions. It was also argued that directing removal within three hours, without disclosure of any imminent threat or emergency, was wholly disproportionate.

The State defended the notice, contending that it had been issued in the interest of law and order and public tranquillity and that the authorities were empowered to take preventive action where online content was likely to disturb public order or generate communal, political or social tension.

Court’s Observation

The High Court held that a prima facie reading of the impugned notice indicated that multiple URLs belonging to different users had been clubbed together under a common direction without post-wise analysis or individualised reasoning.

The Court observed: “At this stage, the notice does not appear to contain individualised reasons with reference to each URL. It does not disclose, at least on the face of it, the precise words, expressions, context or circumstances which render each post unlawful. It also does not indicate how each post satisfies the threshold of incitement to violence, public disorder or any ground falling within Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India”.

The Court reiterated that Article 19(1)(a) protects not merely agreeable or comfortable speech but also criticism, dissent, satire and political disagreement. The Bench observed that the constitutional value of free speech is tested most severely when the speech is inconvenient to authority.

Referring to Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), the Court reiterated the constitutional distinction between “discussion”, “advocacy” and “incitement”. The Bench observed that discussion and advocacy, however disagreeable or unpopular, remain protected speech and that State interference becomes constitutionally permissible only when such speech reaches the level of incitement.

The Court observed: “Discussion is the soul of democracy. Advocacy is the instrument of public persuasion. Incitement alone crosses the constitutional boundary.”

The Bench further observed that vague expressions such as “politically sensitive remarks” and “disturbing public tranquillity”, without particulars or post-wise analysis, are constitutionally fragile.

The Court observed: “Political sensitivity cannot be the measure of constitutional permissibility. A democracy cannot treat criticism as disorder, satire as sedition, dissent as danger or opinion as offence.”

The High Court also examined the statutory framework under the Information Technology Act, 2000. The Bench held that Section 79(3)(b) deals with intermediary liability and safe harbour protection and is not an independent reservoir of blocking power.

The Court observed that where the State seeks to block public access to information through a computer resource, the safeguards under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act and the Blocking Rules acquire constitutional significance.

The Bench observed: “The safeguards under the statute are not decorative formalities. They are the bridge between State power and constitutional liberty.”

The Court further noted that Section 69A requires reasons to be recorded in writing and held that reasons are essential to demonstrate the application of the mind and permit judicial review.

The High Court also found the direction requiring compliance within three hours to be prima facie disproportionate in the absence of any disclosed emergency or imminent threat.

The Bench observed: “Where the State invokes urgency, the urgency must be apparent either from the record or from the reasons. Otherwise, urgency becomes a cloak for bypassing procedural fairness.”

The Court ultimately held that the petitioner had raised substantial constitutional questions concerning the chilling effect on lawful political criticism and democratic discourse.

The Bench observed: “If democratic speech is to be restricted, the restriction must walk through the narrow constitutional doorway of Article 19(2), carrying with it the burden of legality, necessity, proportionality and reasons.”

Conclusion

The Madras High Court held that the impugned notice prima facie lacked individualised reasoning, failed to disclose post-wise application of mind and raised substantial constitutional concerns regarding restrictions on political speech and democratic discourse.

The Court accordingly stayed the operation of the impugned notice and directed the authorities to communicate with X Corp for restoration and unblocking of all URLs covered by the notice pending disposal of the writ petition.

The Court further directed the respondents to file a detailed counter-affidavit disclosing the statutory source of power, individual reasons for blocking each URL, the basis for invoking Article 19(2), compliance with Section 69A and the material justifying removal within three hours.

Cause Title: P. Chockalingam v. Additional Chief Secretary & Ors.

Appearances

Petitioner: Advocate Sunny Sheen for C. Gunasekaran

Respondents: L.S.M. Hasan Fizal, Additional Government Pleader; S. Raja Kumar, Additional Public Prosecutor

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