Justice N. Anand Venkatesh, Justice K. K. Ramakrishnan, Madras High Court

The Madras High Court has held that the percentage of burn injuries suffered by a deceased person is not determinative of the admissibility or reliability of a dying declaration. The Court observed that the decisive consideration is whether the declarant was mentally fit and capable of making the statement, and not the extent of burn injuries sustained.

The Court was hearing a criminal appeal challenging the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court in a prosecution under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act and the Indian Penal Code, where the prosecution's case substantially rested upon the dying declaration recorded by the Judicial Magistrate.

A Division Bench of Justice N. Anand Venkatesh and Justice K.K. Ramakrishnan observed: “The percentage of burn injuries is not determinative of the admissibility or reliability of a dying declaration.”

The Bench further held: “The decisive test is not the extent of the injuries, but whether there is reliable evidence to show that the deceased was mentally fit and capable of making the declaration”, and that “only where there is evidence that the declarant was unconscious or otherwise incapable of making a statement, the dying declaration is liable for rejection.”

Senior Advocate Gopalakrishna Laxmana Raju, assisted by Advocate S.G.L. Rishwanta, appeared for Appellant, while the respondents were represented by Additional Public Prosecutor A. Thiruvadikumar.

Background

The prosecution's case rested substantially upon a dying declaration recorded by the Judicial Magistrate after the victim sustained extensive burn injuries and was admitted to the hospital. The Trial Court convicted the accused under the provisions of the POCSO Act and IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life.

Before the High Court, the appellant contended that the dying declaration could not be relied upon since the victim had allegedly sustained 100% burn injuries and was therefore not in a fit mental condition to make a coherent and voluntary statement. It was further argued that the declaration was surrounded by suspicious circumstances and the possibility of tutoring.

The State, on the other hand, argued that there was no legal bar against basing a conviction solely upon a dying declaration if it inspired confidence and was found to be voluntary and truthful.

Court’s Observation

The High Court extensively examined the principles governing dying declarations under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act and reiterated that such declarations constitute an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence.

The Court referred to several Supreme Court decisions, including Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay (1958), Nallapati Sivaiah v. SDO (2007), Atbir v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi) (2010), Kamal Khudal v. State of Assam (2022), Lakhan v. State of M.P. (2010), Uttam v. State of Maharashtra (2022) and Dharmendra Kumar v. State of M.P. (2024).

The Bench observed: “A truthful and voluntary dying declaration can form the sole basis for conviction without the necessity of corroboration.”

The Court further observed: “A dying declaration recorded by a Judicial Magistrate stands on a higher evidentiary footing, owing to the presumption of procedural sanctity and absence of external influence.”

The High Court noted that the Judicial Magistrate had specifically recorded satisfaction regarding the mental fitness of the declarant before recording the statement. The attending doctor had also certified that the declarant was conscious and in a fit state of mind.

The Court observed: “The statement appears to be voluntary and free from any embellishment or artificial implication.”

Addressing the specific argument regarding extensive burn injuries, the Bench reiterated that there is no absolute legal principle that a person suffering severe burns cannot make a valid dying declaration.

The Court quoted the Supreme Court’s observation in Vijay Pal v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2015): “It is worthy to note that there cannot be an absolute rule that a person who has suffered 80% burn injuries cannot give a dying declaration.”

The High Court further referred to Mafabhai Nagarbhai Raval v. State of Gujarat (1992), where the Supreme Court accepted a dying declaration made by a person suffering 99% burns, and State of M.P. v. Dal Singh (2013), where reliance was placed on a declaration made by a person suffering 100% burns.

The Bench also rejected the allegation of tutoring and observed that the sequence in which the police officer and Judicial Magistrate recorded the statements reflected procedural fairness and transparency.

The Court observed: “The explanation offered by P.W.12 for the discontinuation and resumption of recording is natural, reasonable, and in accordance with established procedure.”

The High Court further noted that there were no material contradictions between the statements recorded by the Judicial Magistrate and the police officer and that both statements substantially corroborated each other.

The Court additionally examined the admissibility of electronic evidence and referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020), observing that where the original electronic device itself is produced, the requirement of a certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act may not arise.

Conclusion

The Madras High Court held that the dying declaration in the present case was voluntary, truthful and reliable and that the prosecution had proved the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court found no infirmity in the findings of the Trial Court and consequently dismissed the criminal appeal while confirming the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant.

Cause Title: M. Vigneshwaran v. The State (Neutral Citation: 2026:MHC:1796)

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