Criminal Law Can’t Be A Weapon For Retaliating Against Investigating Officers: Madhya Pradesh High Court Quashes Criminal Proceedings Against Police Officers

The Court was hearing a batch of petitions seeking the quashing of a common order passed by the Special Judge, Gwalior, taking cognisance against police officers on a private complaint alleging that, during the investigation of an employment-fraud case, they had extorted money from the complainant and his family members by threatening false implication and police encounter.

A Bench of Justice Rajesh Kumar Gupta, while setting aside the cognizance order and complaint proceedings, observed: “…this Court considers it appropriate to observe that criminal law cannot be permitted to become a weapon either for shielding official misconduct or for retaliating against investigating officers. Courts are duty-bound to protect honest public servants from vexatious prosecutions while simultaneously ensuring that genuine allegations of abuse of authority are investigated strictly in accordance with law. The criminal process must remain a vehicle for the administration of justice and not an instrument of oppression. Where jurisdictional limits are transgressed at the very threshold, constitutional courts are not merely empowered but obligated to intervene to preserve the sanctity of the criminal justice system.”

Senior Advocate M.P.S. Raghuvanshi appeared for some of the petitioners, while Advocate Chetan Kanungo appeared for the complainant, and Additional Advocate General Vivek Khedkar appeared for the State.

Background

The private complaint arose in the backdrop of an earlier police case concerning an alleged employment scam, where unemployed persons were allegedly induced to pay money on the false promise of Government jobs in the Railways. During the investigation, the agency allegedly found forged appointment letters, fabricated documents, electronic communications and financial transactions. The complainant’s brother was one of the principal accused in that case, and the complainant was later implicated on the basis of material collected during investigation.

The complaint against the police officers alleged that the investigating officer demanded illegal gratification for extending favour during investigation, that money was paid in several instalments, that the complainant and his relatives were detained at the police station, and that further money was brought from his residence through a police constable. It was also alleged that another amount was arranged through a third person, threats were given that the family would be falsely implicated, and CCTV footage of the police station was not preserved.

The Special Judge had earlier declined to direct registration of an FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC and directed that the matter proceed as a private complaint. After recording statements under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC and considering documents, correspondence regarding CCTV footage and records from the pending sessions trial, the Special Judge took cognizance against the petitioners.

The petitioners argued that the complaint was retaliatory, filed by an accused in the earlier crime to intimidate the investigating agency and derail the prosecution. They contended that the Special Judge had conducted a mini-trial at the cognizance stage, wrongly inferred robbery, disappearance of evidence and conspiracy, and ignored the requirement of sanction and procedural safeguards applicable to public servants.

The complainant and State opposed the petitions, submitting that the complaint contained specific allegations, dates, amounts, names and roles, and that at the stage of issuing process the Court was only required to see whether a prima facie case existed. They also relied on the alleged non-preservation of CCTV footage to support the complaint.

Court’s Observations

The Court began by examining whether the Special Judge remained within the statutory limits of Sections 200 and 202 CrPC. It noted that Chapter XV of the CrPC enables a Magistrate to ascertain whether sufficient grounds exist for proceeding, but does not permit a trial-like adjudication of guilt or disputed facts.

The Court referred to Chandra Deo Singh v. Prakash Chandra Bose (1963), Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi (1976), Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate (1998), Mehmood Ul Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad Tunda (2015) and Birla Corporation Ltd. v. Adventz Investments (2019), and held that the enquiry at the pre-process stage must remain limited to prima facie satisfaction.

The Court observed: “What particularly concerns this Court is that the Special Judge has repeatedly employed expressions indicating final conclusions rather than tentative satisfaction and the impugned order records findings to the effect that the complainant's allegations stand corroborated by surrounding circumstances, destruction of CCTV footage establishes complicity of superior officers, failure of the S.P. to preserve electronic evidence demonstrates participation in conspiracy, conduct of police officials supports the prosecution version and each of these observations involves adjudication of disputed questions of fact.”

The Court said that questions such as whether CCTV footage was intentionally destroyed, whether money was actually paid, whether the complainant was truthful, whether witnesses were reliable and whether conspiracy existed could be determined only after evidence at trial.

The Court further held: “It is trite that an order issuing process need not be elaborate. Equally, it should not become an adjudicatory judgment. The impugned order unfortunately falls into the latter category. Instead of recording prima facie satisfaction, it virtually adjudicates upon credibility, corroboration, conspiracy, destruction of evidence and culpability of each proposed accused. Such findings have the tendency of prejudging the issues which properly fall for determination by the Trial Court after recording evidence. Criminal jurisprudence does not countenance such premature adjudication.”

The Court then considered the scope of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS. Referring to R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (1960), State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992), Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander (2012) and Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021), it observed that the High Court is competent to examine whether the order taking cognizance suffers from jurisdictional error, non-application of mind or abuse of criminal process.

The Court stated: “A criminal complaint cannot be permitted to proceed merely because allegations have been levelled, the Court must examine whether the essential ingredients of the alleged offences are disclosed. An order issuing process must demonstrate judicial application of mind and cannot be founded upon conjectures or assumptions. Criminal law cannot be permitted to become a weapon for wreaking vengeance or exerting pressure in collateral disputes.”

Applying this standard, the Court found that the Special Judge relied on records from another pending criminal case, including recovery memos, investigation papers and materials yet to be tested in trial. It held that such material could not be treated as substantive evidence in an independent private complaint.

On Section 392 IPC, the Court noted that robbery requires foundational ingredients flowing from Sections 390 and 392 IPC, including dishonest removal of movable property accompanied by instant fear of death, hurt or wrongful restraint. It held that the Special Judge had not analysed how those ingredients were satisfied.

The Court clarified that whether the allegations could constitute extortion, criminal intimidation, abuse of official position, corruption or any other offence was not the issue before it; the question was whether robbery was prima facie disclosed.

On conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC, the Court held that there must be material indicating an agreement or meeting of minds. Referring to Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration) (1988) and State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (2005), it found that the complaint contained no foundational allegation of meeting, communication, prior arrangement, sharing of alleged illegal gratification or concerted design.

The Court observed: “Administrative inaction, negligence, delay in acting upon a complaint, or even erroneous exercise of supervisory powers cannot, by themselves, constitute proof of a criminal conspiracy. To accept such a proposition would expose every supervisory authority to criminal prosecution whenever disciplinary action is not initiated against a subordinate officer.”

On Section 201 IPC, the Court held that non-preservation of CCTV footage could not automatically amount to causing disappearance of evidence. Referring to Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh (2021), it observed that non-compliance with CCTV preservation directions may attract appropriate consequences, but cannot by itself prove criminality.

The Court stated: “Non-compliance with those directions may, in an appropriate case, invite departmental action, administrative accountability or other legal consequences. However, mere non-preservation of footage does not automatically establish the commission of an offence under Section 201 IPC nor does it prove participation in the substantive offences alleged in the complaint.”

The Court also considered whether sanction under Section 197 CrPC was required. It noted that every allegation arose out of investigation of the earlier crime, including threats, interrogation, detention, recovery proceedings and interactions with the complainant.

Relying on Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari (1956), P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim (2001), Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2016) and D. Devaraja v. Owais Sabeer Hussain (2020), the Court held that where there exists a reasonable nexus between the alleged act and official functions, sanction cannot be brushed aside merely because the allegations are serious.

The Court further held that the Special Judge had not followed the safeguards under Section 223 BNSS for complaints against public servants. Though reports were called from superior police authorities and considered, the petitioners were not given an opportunity to explain the circumstances before cognizance was taken.

The Court observed that the hearing requirement was not an empty formality, but a procedural safeguard intended to protect public servants from unwarranted criminal prosecution arising from acts alleged to have been committed in discharge of official duties.

Conclusion

The High Court allowed all the petitions and quashed the common order by which cognizance had been taken against the petitioners under Sections 392, 201 and 120-B IPC and Sections 11/13 of the MPDVPK Act. It also quashed the complaint case and all consequential proceedings, including the issuance of process and summons against the petitioners.

The Court clarified that it had not examined the truthfulness of the allegations made by the complainant and had expressed no opinion on the merits of the earlier employment-fraud case or the pending sessions trial, which would proceed independently in accordance with law. It further clarified that the judgment was confined only to the legality of the cognizance order and the complaint proceedings arising from it.

Cause Title: Rajesh Singh Chandel v. Anoop Rana And Others (Neutral Citation: 2026:MPHC-GWL:23163)

Appearances

Petitioners: Senior Advocate M.P.S. Raghuvanshi with Advocates Vijay Kumar Jha and B.K. Sharma; Advocates Prashant Sharma and Atul Gupta

Respondents: Advocates Chetan Kanungo and Nischal Raje for the complainant; Additional Advocate General Vivek Khedkar for the State

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