Demand & Acceptance May Be Inferred From Evidence: Kerala High Court Directs CBI Court To Complete Trial In 2014 Bribery Case
The Court found that the witness statements, the alleged handling of the bribe money and the positive phenolphthalein test disclosed, at the least, a strong suspicion requiring trial.
Justice A. Badharudeen, Kerala High Court
The Kerala High Court has held that, although demand and acceptance of illegal gratification are indispensable ingredients of corruption offences, their proof may be inferred from the evidence considered in toto.
The High Court refused to discharge an Income Tax officer from a CBI case alleging a conspiracy to demand and accept a ₹10 lakh bribe and directed the Special Court for CBI to complete the trial within four months.
The Court was hearing a criminal revision petition filed by the second accused against a Special Court for CBI order dismissing his application for discharge under Section 239 of the CrPC. The prosecution alleged offences under Section 120B of the IPC and Sections 7 and 13(1)(d), read with Section 13(2), of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
A Bench of Justice A. Badharudeen observed: “The legal position clarified and settled in Neeraj Dutta (supra) that demand and acceptance of illegal gratification are sine qua non to find commission of offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act is the law of the land. However, in Neeraj Dutta (supra), the Apex Court held that proof of the ingredients to be inferred from the evidence in toto.”
Senior Advocate B. Raman Pillai appeared for the revision petitioner, while Standing Counsel Sreelal N. Warrier appeared for the CBI.
Background
The prosecution case arose from a CBI trap arranged after an allegation that another Income Tax officer had demanded ₹10 lakh to reduce the tax and penalty exposure of a company from ₹50 lakh to ₹1 lakh. The CBI alleged that the revision petitioner, who was then an Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, had joined the other officer and the company’s auditor in a conspiracy to demand and accept the money.
The trap was conducted at the revision petitioner’s official residence. According to the prosecution material, the other officer accepted the bag containing the money and handed it to the revision petitioner, who opened it, checked the currency bundles and placed it on a concrete shelf. The hand washes of both officers allegedly tested positive for phenolphthalein.
After the CBI filed its final report, the revision petitioner sought discharge. He argued that the complaint, the first information report and the entrustment mahazar did not attribute any demand to him. He maintained that his presence at the trap location and the alleged recovery were insufficient to establish demand, knowing acceptance or conspiracy.
The CBI acknowledged that its case did not involve a direct demand by the revision petitioner. It contended, however, that the other officer had demanded and accepted the bribe pursuant to a conspiracy involving the revision petitioner and the auditor, who later became an approver. It relied upon witness statements, the recovery mahazar, photographs, the chemical examination report and other trap material.
The Special Court rejected the discharge application.
Court’s Observations
Discharge Depends On Prima Facie Material And Strong Suspicion
The Court referred to Sajjan Kumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2010) while examining the limited scrutiny permissible at the stage of discharge. It observed that the court may sift the record to determine whether a prima facie case exists, but cannot conduct a roving inquiry into the reliability and ultimate probative value of the material as though deciding the trial.
The Court held: “The law is well settled on the point, as held in Sajjan Kumar (supra), when the prosecution materials in toto would show prima facie the ingredients for the offences alleged to be committed by the accused persons or the materials otherwise would show a strong suspicion regarding the involvement of the accused person, discharge plea cannot be considered restraining trial when the prosecution can prove the allegation based on the evidence to be adduced during trial.”
It noted that questions concerning the genuineness and credibility of the complainant, the approver and the other witnesses had to be tested when they were examined at trial. At the discharge stage, the Court had to determine whether the materials, taken at face value, disclosed the alleged offences or raised a strong suspicion of the revision petitioner’s involvement.
Trap Material Prima Facie Supported Acceptance
The Court acknowledged that the initial complaint, the first information report and the entrustment mahazar did not refer to a demand made by the revision petitioner. It nevertheless examined those documents with the subsequent statements and the recovery material instead of treating that omission as conclusive.
The complainant’s statement alleged that the revision petitioner opened the bag, looked inside, checked the bundles with his right hand and placed it on the shelf. The Court also noted that the post-trap procedure recorded positive phenolphthalein results from the hands of both accused officers.
It observed: “The positive result of the phenolphthalein test on the hands of the petitioner would prima facie substantiate this statement of CW1, which is supported by the statements of CW4 and CW28 (approver) as discussed above.”
The Court further noted that the trap took place at the revision petitioner’s official residence. The prosecution material stated that the other officer had asked the approver and the complainant to bring the money there because he was not residing in the government accommodation allotted to him.
Demand And Acceptance Assessed From Evidence In Toto
Applying Neeraj Dutta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) (2023), the Court reiterated that demand and acceptance were essential, but their proof could be inferred from the evidence in toto. It considered the statements of the complainant’s brother and the approver, both of which attributed a role to the revision petitioner.
The Court observed: “Here, based on the statements of CW1, CW4 and CW28, the prosecution alleges conspiracy between the first and second accused to demand and accept illegal gratification, which could be decipherable from the discussions hereinabove.”
Whether the revision petitioner had participated in the demand and accepted the money remained a matter of proof at trial.
The Court concluded: “Thus, it appears that prima facie, the involvement of the revision petitioner necessitating trial of the revision petitioner could be found from the prosecution records or atleast a strong suspicion regarding the involvement of the petitioner could be found from the prosecution materials, discussed hereinabove and considered by the learned Special Judge.”
Conclusion
The High Court held that the prosecution record disclosed prima facie involvement, or at least a strong suspicion of involvement, sufficient to require the revision petitioner to stand trial. It dismissed the criminal revision petition, upheld the rejection of his discharge application and vacated the interim stay.
Since the criminal case had been pending from 2014, the Court directed the Special Court for CBI to expedite and complete the trial within four months of receiving the order. The Registry was directed to forward a copy of the order to that court for compliance and information.
Cause Title: Vincent Joseph Chowalloor v. State represented by Inspector of Police, CBI/SPE, Cochin (Neutral Citation: 2026:KER:84142)
Appearances
Petitioner: B. Raman Pillai, Senior Advocate; Balakrishnan M., A.L. George and T.K. Vipindas, Advocates
CBI: Sreelal N. Warrier, Standing Counsel