POCSO Proceedings Cannot Ordinarily Be Quashed Solely On Settlement Even For Comparatively Less Grave Offence: Kerala High Court

It was, however, clarified that the High Court may nevertheless exercise its inherent jurisdiction in an appropriate case after independently examining the allegations and the materials on record.

The Court was hearing an intra-court reference made by a Single Judge concerning the extent of the High Court’s inherent power under Section 482 of the CrPC, or Section 528 of the BNSS, to quash POCSO proceedings on the basis of a settlement. The reference arose from conflicting Single-Judge decisions on whether cases involving offences of comparatively lesser gravity could be terminated on that ground.

A Division Bench of Justice Raja Vijayaraghavan V. and Justice K.V. Jayakumar observed: “In the light of the above discussion, we answer the reference by holding that criminal proceedings involving offences under the POCSO Act cannot ordinarily be quashed in exercise of the inherent powers of this Court solely on the basis of a settlement or compromise between the accused and the victim or the victim's family, even where the offence is alleged to be of comparatively lesser gravity.”

Advocate Swarna Thomas appeared for the accused, while Senior Public Prosecutor Raji P. Mathews appeared for the State.

Background

The accused taught at a religious institution attended by the victim, who was 17 at the time of the alleged repeated sexual assault. The case invoked Section 354A(1)(i) of the IPC and Sections 7, 8, 9(l), 9(f) and 10 of the POCSO Act.

The accused approached the High Court seeking to quash the proceedings. An affidavit from the victim was initially produced, but the Court declined to terminate the case on that basis. After attaining majority, the victim filed another affidavit stating that the complaint had arisen from a mistaken impression, that she had been ill-advised by persons inimical to the accused and that the pending proceedings were affecting her future prospects. She stated that she had no serious objection to quashing the case.

Noticing conflicting decisions, the Single Judge referred the legal question to a Division Bench. The accused relied on Ayyub Malik v. State of Uttarakhand (2026) and Harmeet Singh v. State of GNCT Delhi (2026) to contend that the POCSO Act did not impose an absolute bar against quashing and that a genuine settlement could be considered in cases of comparatively lesser gravity.

The State argued that inherent powers could not defeat legislation protecting children from sexual abuse. It submitted that serious offences affecting society could not ordinarily be quashed merely because the parties had settled.

Court’s Observations

Settlement Cannot Convert POCSO Offence Into Private Dispute

The Bench held that POCSO offences implicated the larger public interest in ensuring that children could grow in an environment free from sexual abuse. It observed: “The prosecution of such offences cannot be treated as a matter which the victim or her family is at liberty to terminate at will by entering into a private arrangement with the accused.”

Drawing on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012), Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014), Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat (2017) and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan (2019), the Court said that non-compoundability was not an absolute bar, but serious offences with a societal impact could not become private disputes through compromise.

Comparatively Lesser Gravity Is Not An Independent Ground For Quashing

The Court held that describing a POCSO offence as comparatively less grave could not, by itself, justify terminating the prosecution. The statutory scheme did not recognise a distinction under which less aggravated forms of sexual assault could be compounded or concluded at the victim’s instance.

It observed: “The fact that an offence may fall under Sections 7 and 8, as distinguished from more aggravated forms of sexual assault, does not automatically render the dispute a private one capable of being settled between the parties.”

The relevant considerations included the nature of the alleged act, the child’s age, the relationship between the accused and the victim, the surrounding circumstances and any position of trust or authority occupied by the accused.

Referring to State of Madhya Pradesh v. Madanlal (2015), Shimbhu v. State of Haryana (2014) and Ramji Lal Bairwa v. State of Rajasthan (2024), the Bench noted that the Supreme Court had rejected negotiated settlements in grave sexual-offence cases and restored a POCSO prosecution quashed solely on compromise.

Victim’s Settlement May Be Affected By Pressure Or Dependence

Relying on Gopal Lodhi v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2026), the Court observed that pressure, social circumstances, economic dependence or inducement could influence a victim’s settlement, particularly where the accused occupied a position of authority.

The Court held: “It is precisely for this reason that the Court cannot abdicate its responsibility by accepting a settlement at face value.”

It said that inherent powers had to be exercised independently after considering the nature of the allegations, the investigation material and the larger interests of justice.

Inherent Power Survives For Independent Merits Review

The Bench distinguished Ayyub Malik and Harmeet Singh because those decisions involved subsisting matrimonial relationships, the birth of children and continued cohabitation. No comparable circumstance existed in the present case, which concerned allegations against a teacher at the institution where the child studied.

The Court clarified that inherent jurisdiction survived where an independent examination of the first information report, final report and investigation material showed that the essential ingredients were absent or that the allegations were frivolous, vexatious, inherently improbable or an abuse of process.

It emphasised: “A settlement may form part of the factual background, but it cannot, by itself, constitute the legal foundation for quashing a prosecution involving offences under the POCSO Act.”

The power had to be exercised on the merits and within the parameters governing inherent jurisdiction, rather than merely because the victim or her family had agreed to a settlement.

Conclusion

The Division Bench answered the reference by holding that POCSO proceedings cannot ordinarily be quashed solely on settlement, even where the alleged offence is comparatively less grave. However, the Single Judge could exercise inherent jurisdiction if an independent examination showed that the proceedings were frivolous, vexatious, inherently improbable or an abuse of process. That power had to be exercised within the Supreme Court’s parameters and not merely on settlement.

The Division Bench did not decide the quashing petition on its merits. It directed that the matter be placed before the Single Judge for consideration in light of the principles stated in the reference order.

Cause Title: Ummer v. Station House Officer and Others (Neutral Citation: 2026:KER:85738)

Appearances

Petitioner: Cibi Thomas, Swarna Thomas and Anusree K., Advocates

Respondents: Ambika Devi, Special Public Prosecutor; Raji P. Mathews, Senior Public Prosecutor; K. Praveen Kumar, Advocate

Click here to read/download Judgment