Automatic Revocation Of Will On Marriage U/S 69 Of Indian Succession Act Not Unconstitutional: Kerala High Court

The Court rejected the challenge that the provision’s differential application violated Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution, and also found no manifest arbitrariness or infringement of testamentary capacity.

The Court was hearing a suo motu civil reference and connected proceedings concerning whether Section 69, which does not apply to Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jainas, violated Part III of the Constitution and whether it directly conflicted with Section 20 of the Succession Act.

A connected original petition also challenged the Sub Court’s order making the reference under Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

A Bench of Justice Sathish Ninan and Justice P. Krishna Kumar observed: “As was noticed earlier, the object underlying Section 69 is to protect the new family. The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act sufficiently takes care of the same. This further fortifies our view regarding intelligible differentia and reasonableness of classification. Conspicuously there is no similar personal law for Christians imposing such obligation. Therefore, we find reasonableness in the classification and nexus with the object to be achieved, to over-rule the challenge against the provision as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.”

Senior Counsel T. Krishnanunni and Advocates Varghese C. Kuriakose, Dr Kuruvila Mathew and K. Shaj assisted the Court. Central Government Counsel K.S. Bharathan and Girish Kumar V. appeared for the Union of India, while Senior Government Pleader Resmi Nair appeared for the State.

Background

Section 69 provides that every will shall be revoked by the maker’s marriage, except a will made in exercise of a power of appointment in the circumstances specified by the provision. The Court noted that Section 69 is not included in Schedule III to the Succession Act and, by virtue of Section 57, does not apply to wills made by Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs or Jainas. Section 57 further contains a proviso affirming that marriage shall not revoke a Hindu will or codicil.

The Court also noted that although Section 70 applies to Hindu wills through Schedule III, the words providing for revocation by marriage are expressly omitted. It treated this as further evidence of a conscious legislative exclusion.

The reference raised two questions: whether Section 69’s restricted operation to Christians, Parsis and Jews violated Part III of the Constitution, and whether it directly conflicted with Section 20 of the Succession Act. The constitutional challenge also invoked manifest arbitrariness, testamentary freedom and international covenants, and relied on recommendations concerning abolition or modification of automatic revocation on marriage.

The separate original petition challenged the correctness of the reference order on the ground that the requirements of Section 113 CPC read with Order XLVI had not been satisfied.

Court’s Observations

Section 69 Protects The New Family From Survival Of An Earlier Will

The Court traced Section 69 through Section 56 of the Indian Succession Act, 1865 and the Indian Wills Act, 1838 to the rule contained in the English Wills Act, 1837. The Court observed that the rule proceeded on the premise that marriage fundamentally altered the testator’s circumstances, duties, obligations and familial priorities, raising an ordinary presumption that the testator would not adhere to a previously executed will.

The Court observed: “Evidently, the framers of the provision perceived the fact that, in the life of an individual, marriage creates a fundamental change in his life, circumstances and approach. New duties and obligations spring up. A fundamental change in the familial set up happens; priorities change. There is an ordinary presumption that he would not adhere to the Will if any, he had previously executed. Therefore, there was a wholesome purpose underlying such provision.”

Referring to the Law Commission of India’s 110th Report, the Court stated that the object of the revocation rule was to protect the new family of the testator against the accidental survival of an old will.

The Court further traced the Hindu exclusion to the Hindu Wills Act, 1870, and its Statement of Objects and Reasons. The Court stated that polygamy was then prevalent among Hindus, and marriage was consequently not considered such a change in the testator’s condition as would raise a presumption against adherence to an earlier will. The Court noted that the provision was also shaped by legislative caution in extending the then-foreign practice of testamentary succession to Hindus.

Personal-Law Obligations Sustained The Article 14 Classification

The Court observed that Section 69 was a pre-constitutional law and that the presumption attached to post-constitutional legislation could not automatically be extended to it. The Court applied the twin requirements of intelligible differentia and a rational nexus with the statutory object, referring to K. Thimmappa v. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, SBI (2001), D.S. Nakara v. Union of India (1983), State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara (1951), Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar (1958) and In re Special Courts Bill, 1978 (1979).

The Court also referred to Pannalal Bansilal v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1996) on gradual reform of personal laws and Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar (1996) for the proposition that non-uniform rules of succession providing differential treatment would not invariably violate Article 14.

The Court found that the historical distinction between Hindus and Christians satisfied the twin tests when the Constitution came into force. It then considered whether the basis of that classification had disappeared after the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 made monogamy the rule.

The Court relied on Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, Raghubar Singh v. Gulab Singh (1998), V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy (1977), and the Full Bench decision in Sulochana v. Anitha (2026) concerning a Hindu woman’s right to maintenance. The Court noted that the right arose upon marriage and was connected with the husband and his assets.

The Court contrasted this position with Section 20 of the Succession Act, which provides that marriage does not create an interest in a spouse’s property and from which Hindus are specifically exempted. The Court further stated that the Divorce Act enabled a maintenance claim only in proceedings relating to the marriage and found no similar personal law imposing such an obligation upon Christians.

The Court consequently held that the classification continued to possess an intelligible differentia and a rational nexus with Section 69’s object of protecting the new spouse and family.

Non-Extension To Hindus Did Not Invalidate The Provision

The Court rejected the contention that Section 69 became unconstitutional merely because its protection had not been extended to Hindus. The Court observed: “The mere fact that the statutory provision containing a laudable object as noted, was not extended to Hindus, by itself, shall not be a ground to hold it as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.”

On under-inclusion, the Court relied on State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd. (1974), Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Girish Kumar Navalakha (1975), Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v. Union of India (1984), Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra v. State of Orissa (2014), and In Re: Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 (2024).

The Court stated that the legislature could address parts of a mischief, recognise degrees of harm and introduce reform gradually without every under-inclusive classification being struck down.

Section 69 Did Not Curtail Testamentary Capacity

The Court distinguished John Vallamattom v. Union of India (2003), in which the Supreme Court struck down Section 118 of the Succession Act, and this Court’s decision in Preman v. Union of India (1998) concerning the same provision. The Court found that Section 118 curtailed the right to bequeath property for religious or charitable purposes, whereas Section 69 did not prevent a testator from executing a fresh bequest at any time.

The Court observed: “Section 118 totally curtailed the right of a testator to bequeath the property. However, that is not the case with Section 69. The testator is free to execute bequest in respect of his property anytime. Therefore, there is no curtailment of his rights.”

The Court also rejected the contention that Section 69 infringed the freedom to deal with one’s property, holding that the provision did not impinge upon a person’s testamentary capacity.

Section 69 Did Not Violate Article 15 Or Suffer From Manifest Arbitrariness

The Court referred to John Vallamattom (2003) and Nain Sukh Das v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1953) on the individual nature of the guarantee under Article 15. Referring also to Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra (1952), the Court stated that discrimination involved unfair, unfavourable or prejudicial treatment.

The Court held: “We have already held that Section 69 has a laudable object and is in no way unfair, unfavourable or prejudicial. Therefore, for the afore reason also, there is no violation of Article 15.”

The Court considered Khalsa University v. State of Punjab (2024) and Anurag Krishna Sinha v. State of Bihar (2026), which were invoked to challenge Section 69 for manifest arbitrariness, and Nair Service Society v. State of Kerala (2007), which was relied upon to characterise it as suspect legislation. The Court rejected both challenges.

Referring to State of Andhra Pradesh v. Dr. Rao V.B.J. Chelikani (2024), the Court stated that a classification was justified so long as it was not palpably arbitrary and that courts should not demand exactness or apply doctrinaire tests.

Law-Reform Recommendations Did Not Warrant Striking Down Section 69

The Court considered the argument based on the United Kingdom Law Commission’s 2025 recommendation to abolish revocation of wills by marriage or civil partnership. It also noticed that the Law Commission of India had recommended in its 110th Report that wills made in contemplation of marriage be saved from automatic revocation, but Parliament had not taken a positive step on the recommendation.

The Court observed: “Presently, we are concerned with the constitutionality of Section 69 and we do not think that the considerations as above are reasons to strike down the Section as violative of Part-III of the Constitution.”

The Court also rejected the challenge founded on international covenants guaranteeing equal protection, relying on its preceding Article 14 analysis.

Section 69 Does Not Conflict With Section 20

The Court rejected the argument that Section 69 conflicted with Section 20(1), which states that marriage does not create an interest in the spouse’s property or disable a person from dealing with their own property.

The Court held: “Section 69 does not provide for creating any interest in the property consequent on the marriage nor does it restrict the power of disposal of the spouse. The effect of Section 69 is only that any disposition prior to marriage will stand revoked and, if not otherwise dealt with, his assets would devolve on the new family on his demise. It is only a spes successionis for the new family, who would be his legal heirs.”

The Court further noted that the original petition separately questioned whether the Sub Court had satisfied Section 113 CPC and Order XLVI before making the reference. Since the constitutional challenge to Section 69 had already been decided in the connected writ petition, the Court held that adjudicating the correctness of the reference order had become academic and declined to examine it.

Conclusion

The Court rejected the challenge to Section 69 of the Indian Succession Act as violative of Part III of the Constitution. It held that the provision did not violate Articles 14 or 15, did not suffer from manifest arbitrariness, did not curtail testamentary capacity and did not conflict with Section 20 of the Act.

The Court answered the referred questions accordingly. It declined to decide the separate challenge to the Sub Court’s reference order because the issue had become academic, and ordered the civil reference, writ petition and original petition in those terms.

Cause Title: Suo Motu Civil Reference To Examine The Validity Of Section 69 Of The Indian Succession Act, 1925 (Neutral Citation: 2026:KER:77525)

Appearances

Petitioners: Advocates K. Shaj, Beena N. Kartha, Arun Chand, Bharat Vijay P., Kevin James, Akash Joshi, Gopika Gopal, Ren Shibu, Shehroon Patel A.K., Issac Melvin B.O., Riya Philo Johnson, Alvin Joseph, Gishma P.S., Sajie Shankar and Mary Helen A.G.; Advocates Varghese C. Kuriakose, P.J. Jose and Seenu Sadique

Respondents: Central Government Counsel Girish Kumar V.; Advocates K. Shaj, Sajju S., Renjit George, Beena N. Kartha, Arun Chand, Varsha K.A., Gopika Gopal, Ren Shibu, Nikhil Krishna A.S., Shehroon Patel A.K., Issac Melvin B.O., Riya Philo Johnson, Alvin Joseph, Joel Kenneth Johnson, Sajie Shankar, Febin Fathima, Ishma T.B. and Monsu Joseph George; Advocate Dr Kuruvila Mathew; Senior Counsel T. Krishnanunni; Central Government Counsel K.S. Bharathan; Special Government Pleader Resmi G. Nair; Advocates Nivedhitha Prem V., K. Shaj, Thareeq Anver, Meena A., Vinod Ravindranath, M.R. Mini, Ameera Jojo, Mariya Joseph, Ananthakrishnan A. Kartha, Anish Antony Anathazhath, Stephen V. Thomas, Beena N. Kartha, Arun Chand, Bharat Vijay P., Kevin James, Akash Joshi, Minu V.A., Gopika Gopal, Archana P.P., Ren Shibu, Shehroon Patel A.K., Issac Melvin B.O. and Alvin Joseph

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