The Karnataka High Court, while upholding the constitutional validity of the Karnataka Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2023, and the Karnataka High Court (Amendment) Act, 2023, held that it cannot be faulted for confining specific first appeals to the High Court, particularly those arising from orders, judgments, and decrees passed by Bengaluru City Civil Judges exercising original jurisdiction.

The Court emphasized that Article 14 of the Constitution of India permits reasonable classification, finding sufficient justification for excluding appeals arising from the courts of the Bengaluru Urban District.

It noted a clear structural distinction between the Senior Civil Judges functioning in other districts under the 1964 Act and the judges operating under the Bangalore City Civil Court Act, 1979, and the Karnataka Small Cause Courts Act, 1964, clarifying that in Bengaluru, it is judges in the cadre of District Judges who function as City Civil Judges.

While affirming that the state legislature possesses full competence to alter appellate forums under "administration of justice," the Court applied the doctrine of reading down to the retrospective provision enacted under Section 4 of the Civil Courts Amendment Act.

The Division Bench of Chief Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Justice CM Poonacha held, "There is a clear distinction between the Courts of Senior Civil Judges functioning in the districts under the 1964 Act and the judges functioning under the Bangalore City Civil Court Act, 1979 and the Karnataka Small Cause Courts Act, 1964. In Bengaluru, it is Judges in the cadre of District Judges who function as the City Civil Judges exercising original jurisdiction in the Bengaluru City Civil Court. Thus, the High Court Amendment Act cannot be faulted for confining the first appeals that lie to the High Court and the appeals arising from orders, judgments and decrees passed by City Civil Judges in exercise of original jurisdiction. It is well settled that Article 14 of the Constitution of India permits reasonable classification and as noted above, there is sufficient reason for excluding appeals arising from Courts of the Bengaluru Urban District."

Senior Advocate K.N. Phanindra, Senior Advocate Vivek Reddy, Senior Advocate D.R. Ravishankar appeared for the Petitioner/Appellants, while Additional Advocate General Kiran V. Ron appeared for the Respondents.

The Court held, "The view that the legislative amendments introduced by impugned legislations are applicable to the pending proceedings is established for two reasons. First, the forum of appeal is a matter of procedural law, and thus, unless the legislative intent appears otherwise, the said provisions would be presumed to apply retrospectively and govern the pending proceedings. Second, that Section 4 of the Civil Courts Amendment Act expressly provides that the amendments shall come into force retrospectively from 28.08.2007."

Brief Facts

The appellants and the writ petitioner preferred a writ petition, respectively, before the Karnataka High Court, challenging the constitutional validity of the Karnataka Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2023, and the Karnataka High Court (Amendment) Act, 2023. These legislations collectively removed the pecuniary limits for appeals from the decrees and orders of Senior Civil Judges to the District Court and directed that all First Appeals to the High Court be heard by a Single Judge.

The controversy arose because the amendments to the Karnataka Civil Courts Act, 1964, were given retrospective effect from a prior date, leading to the transfer of pending Regular First Appeals from the High Court to the competent District Courts. A learned Single Judge had partly upheld the legislation but made it prospective, against which a writ appeal was filed. Due to reservations expressed by another Single Judge regarding that decision, the matter was referred to a Larger Bench.

Contentions of the Parties

The Petitioner/Appellants submitted that the impugned legislation violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India as it was manifestly arbitrary, irrational, and lacked a saving clause. It was contended that the retrospective application of the amendments was harsh and onerous because it would technically divest the High Court of its jurisdiction over all Regular First Appeals decided since the retrospective effective date, thereby rendering past concluded judgments null and void.

It was also submitted that the right of an appeal and the specific forum to pursue it were vested substantive rights that accrued to a litigant on the date of the institution of the suit, and such rights could not be destroyed retrospectively.

It was averred that the State Government enacted the legislations without any prior mandatory consultation on the administrative side with the High Court, which interfered with the independence of the judiciary and violated the principles of constitutional governance.

Per contra, the Respondent-State submitted that the State Legislature possessed full legislative competence under the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India to enact laws affecting the general jurisdiction of the courts. It said that the impugned legislations were enacted following the suggestions made by the High Court in a prior judicial precedent and after obtaining a concurring opinion from the Law Commission of Karnataka to reduce the heavy pendency of cases and provide "justice at the doorstep".

The State submitted that the right to an appeal was a substantive right, but the selection of the forum of appeal was a matter of procedural law, which carried a presumption of retrospective application to pending proceedings.

It was submitted that the retrospective clause was intentionally enacted to harmonise the legislation with a prior amendment act and to ensure that the enormous backlog of pending appeals could be transferred to the District Courts for speedy disposal.

The State said that the absence of a saving clause did not mean that concluded proceedings would be reopened or rendered null, as it was never the legislative intent to affect final judgments, and the court could interpret the law to apply retrospectively only to pending cases.

Observations of the Court

The Court observed that the constitutional validity of a primary legislation could only be challenged on the limited grounds of a lack of legislative competence, a violation of fundamental rights, or manifest arbitrariness, and that courts must exercise great judicial restraint without questioning the wisdom or efficacy of the legislature.

The Court affirmed that the State Legislature had absolute competence to define the frontiers of the jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court and subordinate courts under the ambit of the "administration of justice".

The Court noted that while prior consultation with the High Court on the administrative side was highly apposite, the absence of such a consultation did not vitiate the enactment since there was no express constitutional or statutory requirement for it.

The Court held that the law governing the forum of appeal fell squarely within the realm of procedural law; hence, amendments altering the forum applied retrospectively and governed pending actions unless a contrary intention emerged from the statute.

The Court observed, "In view of the above, the question whether the forum of appeal is a matter of procedural law is no longer res integra. Once we find that the law regarding the forum of appeal is a matter of procedural law, it would follow that, unless the legislation indicates to the contrary, the law amending the forum of appeal must be presumed to apply retrospectively. Thus, the change in the forum of appeal would also apply to all pending appeals. It would be incongruous that the pending appeals follow a procedure separate from those that are preferred after the enactment of the impugned legislations."

The Court invoked the rule of purposive interpretation and the doctrine of reading down, observing that courts were not powerless to iron out creases or modify structural language to prevent manifest absurdity, injustice, or an unintended outcome that would otherwise invalidate the statute.

"Our jurisprudence is rich with instances where Courts have opted not to strike down statutory provisions. Instead, judicial interpretations have sought to align these provisions with the legislation's underlying objectives. This approach often involves adding clarifying words or imposing necessary restrictions to ensure that the law fulfils its intended purpose. By doing so, the judiciary demonstrates a commitment to the principle of harmonious construction, allowing the spirit of the law to prevail over its literal wording. This practice not only preserves legislative intent but also reinforces the role of the Courts in shaping the legal framework,ensuring that statutory provisions serve their rightful purpose", it was observed.

The Court concluded that it was never the legislative intent to nullify or reopen final judgments delivered in First Appeals since the retrospective effective date.

The Court said, "The retrospective operation of the amendments is thus confined to pending appellate proceedings, which shall be governed by the amended provisions from the current stage till the disposal of the appeals. This is in conformity with the legislative intent, as is unmistakably discernible from (i) the rationale for enacting the impugned legislations; (ii) the opinion of the Karnataka Law Commission; and (iii) the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the impugned legislations. Consequently, the pending proceedings will continue from the stage at which they are transferred to the competent court. The proceedings already conducted prior to the enactment of the impugned legislations and as continued by virtue of the interim order dated 03.07.2024, passed by this court, shall not be construed as non-est, illegal or a nullity."

The Court concurred with the observations of the Single Judge that the retrospective effect given to the amendments under the Civil Courts Amendment Act had to be regarded as a mistake on the part of the legislature and was arbitrary and unreasonable, leading to confusion and absurdity, as well as being repugnant to other provisions of the Act.

Therefore, the Court read the retrospective provision of the Civil Courts Amendment Act restrictively to mean that it applied to all appeals pending on that date or instituted thereafter, while explicitly saving and preserving all concluded past proceedings and judgments.

Cause Title: Smt Narayanamma v. State of Karnataka [WP No. 17588 of 2024 C/W WA No. 200260 of 2025]

Appearances:

Petitioner/Appellants: Senior Advocate K.N. Phanindra, Senior Advocate Vivek Reddy, Senior Advocate D.R. Ravishankar, Advocate Rohith R. Kumar

Respondent: Additional Advocate General Kiran V. Ron, Additional Government Advocate Niloufer Akbar

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