Victim’s Survival After Vehicle Was Allegedly Driven At Him Doesn’t Rule Out Mens Rea For Attempt To Murder: Karnataka High Court

The Court was hearing a petition under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of a charge sheet for offences under Sections 279, 307, 353, 427 and 506 IPC arising from an incident during a special traffic-police operation against drunken driving.

A Bench of Justice M. Nagaprasanna observed: “The allegation against the petitioner is not merely that he drove his vehicle in a rash and negligent manner, but that, in an endeavour to evade the checking undertaken by the traffic police, he allegedly propelled his vehicle towards the complainant, who was discharging his official duty, thereby causing injuries which the medical records classify as grievous. A motor vehicle, when driven in such a manner towards a human being, is capable of becoming an instrument of death. The distinction between an injury and a fatality, in circumstances of this nature, may rest upon nothing more than the slender thread of providence. The fact that the complainant survived the incident cannot, by itself, dilute the gravity of the act alleged or efface the intention or knowledge that may be gathered from the manner in which it was committed.”

“The requisite mens rea, under Section 307 of the IPC, is not to be inferred merely because the act was capable of causing death; it must be discerned from the cumulative effect of the surrounding circumstances”, the Bench added.

Advocate Sunil Kumar S. appeared for the petitioner. State Public Prosecutor-I B.N. Jagadeesha appeared for the State.

Background

The complainant, a Head Constable attached to the HAL Airport Traffic Police Station, alleged that he was deployed on special duty to detect and prevent drunken driving when the petitioner attempted to evade checking.

According to the complaint, the petitioner did not stop his car when intercepted but drove it towards the Head Constable, ran over him and damaged the department’s drunken-driving detection equipment. The investigation culminated in a charge sheet, of which the jurisdictional Magistrate took cognisance.

The petitioner submitted that the prosecution had invoked serious offences without material establishing the intention or knowledge required for attempted murder. He also disputed the allegation of grievous injury and argued that neither assault nor criminal force intended to deter the complainant from performing his official duty was established.

The State submitted that the incident could not be treated as an ordinary traffic violation because the petitioner allegedly drove recklessly towards a uniformed public servant while attempting to escape checking. It argued that the gravity of the conduct had to be assessed from the circumstances and the consequences that the act was capable of producing.

Court’s Observations

Fatal Or Grievous Injury Not Essential For Section 307 IPC

The Court observed that Section 307 IPC focused upon the intention or knowledge accompanying the overt act and the circumstances in which it was committed, rather than only the resulting injury.

The Bench explained: “The gravamen of the offence lies not in the nature or magnitude of the injury ultimately inflicted, but in the intention or knowledge that animates the act and the circumstances in which it is perpetrated. Neither the infliction of a fatal injury nor the causing of grievous hurt is an indispensable prerequisite for attracting the offence of attempt to murder.”

The Court relied on Surender Kumar v. State of Haryana (2026), in which the Supreme Court held that the seriousness of the injuries or the possibility that they could have caused death was not a necessary ingredient of Section 307 IPC. The determining question was whether the act was accompanied by the intention or knowledge contemplated by the provision.

The Court also referred to Abhishek v. State of Rajasthan (2026), which held that intention or knowledge must be inferred from the totality of the circumstances, including the weapon used, the manner of the attack and the surrounding conduct.

Referring to Abhishek, the Court noted that the Supreme Court had also recognised the trial court’s power under Section 216 CrPC to alter the charge to Section 308 IPC or another appropriate lesser offence if the evidence ultimately failed to establish Section 307 IPC.

Medical Material Disclosed Grievous Injury

The Court observed that the medical material contradicted the petitioner’s contention that the complainant had not suffered a serious injury. The wound certificate mentioned ten abrasions over different parts of the body, swelling and tenderness of the knee, and a displaced, multi-fragmented fracture of the fibular head.

The Bench stated: “The medical records, therefore, unmistakably demonstrate that the incident was not one which merely resulted in superficial abrasions or transient bodily discomfort, but one which occasioned a fracture, an injury falling within the statutory contours of grievous hurt. The contention that the complainant had suffered no serious injury must, therefore, be tested against this contemporaneous medical material, which speaks to the contrary.”

The Court added that the medical evidence was supported by the statements of witnesses collected during the investigation.

Intention Or Knowledge Was A Matter For Trial

The Court clarified that the mens rea required under Section 307 IPC could not be inferred merely because an act was capable of causing death. It had to be determined from the cumulative effect of the surrounding circumstances.

The Bench held: “In the case at hand, the allegation of the vehicle having been deliberately driven towards the complainant, the attempt to evade lawful interception, the statements of the eyewitnesses and the injuries actually occasioned constitute material from which the requisite intention or knowledge may, prima facie, be inferred.”

The Court consequently held that the Section 307 accusation was not so devoid of foundational ingredients that it could be extinguished at the threshold. Whether the petitioner possessed the required intention or knowledge would have to be finally determined by the trial court.

Other Charged Offences Also Required Trial

The Court also found prima facie material supporting the remaining charges. It observed that the alleged manner of driving warranted trial under Section 279 IPC, while driving the vehicle towards a police official to evade checking supplied the foundational ingredients of criminal force against a public servant under Section 353 IPC.

The Court further held that the alleged damage to departmental equipment and the vehicle’s glass required examination under Section 427 IPC. It observed that the words allegedly uttered by the petitioner, when read with the conduct immediately following them, also raised a triable accusation of criminal intimidation under Sections 503 and 506 IPC.

Quashing Jurisdiction Could Not Replace Trial

The Court observed that its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC could not be used to meticulously assess the evidence before the prosecution had an opportunity to prove its case.

The Bench emphasised that the petitioner retained the presumption of innocence and that the prosecution would have to prove every ingredient beyond reasonable doubt. However, a trial-worthy accusation could not be terminated merely because the accused disputed the allegations.

Conclusion

The High Court rejected the petition and refused to quash the proceedings under Sections 279, 307, 353, 427 and 506 IPC.

The Court clarified that its observations were confined to deciding the petition under Section 482 CrPC and did not constitute findings upon the petitioner’s guilt. It directed the trial court to decide the case independently on the evidence, without being influenced by the observations in the order.

Cause Title: Ramanjalu v. State of Karnataka and Another

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