Coparcenary Right Under Amended Section 6 Of Hindu Succession Act Cannot Vest In Daughter Who Died Before Its Commencement: Karnataka High Court

The Court was hearing a civil revision petition challenging a trial court order dismissing an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for rejection of a plaint seeking partition, separate possession and declarations that certain sale deeds were not binding.

A Bench of Justice Lalitha Kanneganti observed: “The recognition of coparcenary status by birth does not mean the amendment operated retrospectively to vest a statutory right in a daughter who had died before its commencement. Birth is the foundation of the right, but the substituted Section 6 became operative as on 09.09.2005. The fact that the right is traced to birth cannot be understood as conferring a right under the amendment upon a person who was no longer alive when the provision came into force.”

Senior Advocate Dhyan Chinnappa appeared for the petitioners. Advocate H. Sunil Kumar appeared for respondent-plaintiffs 2 to 5.

Background

The plaintiffs instituted a suit seeking partition and separate possession of ancestral properties. They also sought declarations that sale and release deeds concerning the properties were not binding upon them.

They claimed through their mother, who had died before the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 came into force. The petitioners, who were defendant Nos. 4 and 5 in the suit, applied for rejection of the plaint, contending that the plaintiffs could not claim coparcenary rights through a daughter who was not alive when substituted Section 6 became operative.

The trial court dismissed the application. It held that evidence was required to determine the plaintiffs’ entitlement and that the limitation issue involved mixed questions of fact and law.

The petitioners challenged that decision before the High Court. The issue was whether the children and grandchildren of a daughter who died before the 2005 amendment could claim coparcenary rights under amended Section 6.

Court’s Observations

Daughter Must Have Been Alive When Amendment Commenced

The Court considered the conflicting decisions that preceded Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020). Prakash v. Phulavati (2016) had required both the daughter and her father to be alive when the amendment commenced, while Danamma v. Amar (2018) recognised daughters’ rights despite the father’s earlier death.

The larger Bench in Vineeta Sharma removed the requirement that the father must have been alive on September 9, 2005, because a daughter’s coparcenary right was founded on birth. However, the present Court held that Vineeta Sharma did not similarly dispense with the requirement that the daughter must have been alive on that date.

Referring to Vineeta Sharma, the Court quoted: “In our opinion, the daughters should be living on 9-9-2005. In substituted Section 6, the expression ‘daughter of a living coparcener’ has not been used. Right is given under Section 6(1)(a) to the daughter by birth.”

The Court held that the father’s survival and the daughter’s survival were distinct requirements and could not be treated as if the Supreme Court had rejected both.

Birth-Based Right Did Not Make Amendment Retrospective

The Court explained that recognising coparcenary status by birth did not mean that substituted Section 6 operated during the lifetime of a daughter who died before its commencement.

The Bench held: “The recognition of a right by birth cannot be read independently of the commencement or the statutory provision. The amended Section 6 did not operate during the lifetime of a daughter who died before 09.09.2005. Consequently, a coparcenary right arising solely under the amendment could not have vested in her before her death.”

Daughters born before or after the amendment could claim coparcenary rights by birth, but the statutory declaration of that right operated from September 9, 2005. A person who was no longer alive on that date could not acquire a right solely under the amended provision.

Coordinate-Bench Interpretation Was Inconsistent With Vineeta Sharma

The plaintiffs relied on Channabasappa v. Parvatevva (2023), where a coordinate Bench had held that legal heirs of a daughter who died before September 9, 2005 could claim an equal share in subsisting coparcenary property.

The Court found that this interpretation did not give effect to the express observation in Vineeta Sharma that the daughter should have been alive when the amendment commenced.

It observed: “The interpretation adopted in Channabasappa’s case referred supra, insofar as it recognizes a right under amended Section 6 in favor of the descendants of a daughter who died before 09.09.2005, is therefore inconsistent with the express observation in paragraph No.80 of Vineeta Sharma’s case referred supra. Under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is binding upon all Courts. Where an interpretation adopted by this Court is inconsistent with the declaration by the Supreme Court, the latter must prevail.”

The coordinate-Bench interpretation could not, therefore, override the daughter-survival requirement stated in Vineeta Sharma.

Descendants Could Not Inherit A Right That Never Vested

Applying the principle to the case, the Court noted that the plaintiffs’ mother had died before the amended provision came into force. No coparcenary right under substituted Section 6 had vested in her during her lifetime.

The Bench stated: “Her children and grandchildren cannot claim through her a right that she did not acquire during her lifetime. The mere fact that the plaintiffs are descendants of a daughter of the family does not, by itself, confer upon them a right to partition under the amended provision.”

The Court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ entitlement had to arise from a legally recognised interest that had vested in their predecessor. Since no such right had vested in their mother during her lifetime, the subsequent institution of a suit could not create it.

Once the plaintiffs were found unable to claim partition under amended Section 6, the Court considered it unnecessary to examine the sale and release deeds. Their validity would become relevant only after the plaintiffs established an enforceable interest in the properties.

Plaint Disclosed No Legal Right To Partition

The Court reiterated that an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC must be decided from the plaint averments without relying on disputed facts introduced by the defence.

It nevertheless found that the plaint itself showed that the predecessor through whom the plaintiffs claimed had died before the amendment commenced.

The Court observed: “It is clear that the plaintiffs have no legal right to claim partition when their mother was not alive on the day the amendment came into force. The trial court has failed to appreciate this fact. In those circumstances, the impugned order needs to be set aside.”

Conclusion

The Karnataka High Court set aside the trial court’s order, allowed the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and rejected the partition plaint.

The civil revision petition was allowed, and all pending applications were closed.

Cause Title: Leela Scottish Lace Limited & Anr. v. Smt. Vinoda & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026:KHC:60058)

Appearances

Petitioners: Senior Advocate Dhyan Chinnappa with Advocates Shirish Krishna and Joseph Anthony

Respondents: Advocate H. Sunil Kumar

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