Offensive Taunt Does Not By Itself Promote Enmity: Karnataka High Court Quashes FIR Against Influencer Over Remark On Siddaramaiah’s Support For Muslims

The Court was hearing a petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), challenging an FIR registered for allegedly promoting enmity between communities and deliberately insulting religious beliefs under Sections 196(1)(a) and 299 BNS.

A Bench of Justice Suraj Govindaraj observed: “… the nature of the words, their context and the speaker’s intention must be considered together. Mere criticism or an offensive expression does not automatically amount to the promotion of enmity. The question is whether the words, read in their proper context, promote or attempt to promote the kind of disharmony or ill-will that the provision prohibits.”

The Bench added: “The words quoted in the complaint are directed at then Chief Minister Siddaramaiah and questions his decision to contest an election while supporting Muslims. The final sentence is an insulting taunt that uses a reference to Muslims as a term of abuse. The expression may reasonably be regarded as crude, offensive and hurtful. That, however, does not by itself establish that the speaker was inciting the audience to develop hatred or hostility towards Muslims or another community.”

Advocate Aiyappa K.G. appeared for the petitioner, while High Court Government Pleader Ranjith Kumar N. appeared for the State authorities.

Background

The complaint referred to stone-pelting during a Ganapati procession, the subsequent protest and bandh, and the deployment of police personnel. The State relied on these events as establishing a background of communal tension. The complaint alleged that the petitioner made statements intended to hurt another community’s religious feelings and encourage ill-will between communities. The statement was allegedly recorded and circulated online.

The petitioner argued that the words contained no call for violence or hostility against any community and did not disclose the ingredients of either offence. She also contended that a preliminary inquiry should have been conducted under Section 173(3) BNSS before the FIR was registered.

The State submitted that the statement referred to a religious community and had to be considered against the prevailing communal tension. It argued that its circulation on social media could have aggravated hostility and that the statement’s effect required investigation.

Court’s Observations

Words Did Not Incite Hostility Between Communities

The Court held that Section 196(1)(a) BNS required promotion or attempted promotion of disharmony, enmity, hatred or ill-will between different groups. Applying Amish Devgan v. Union of India (2021), Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya (2021), Ramesh v. Union of India (1988) and Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat (2026), it examined the content, context, intention and likely effect of the statement.

The Court observed: “The quoted words do not call upon the audience to hate Muslims, avoid them, act against them or engage in violence. Nor do they call upon one community to act against another. On the words pleaded, the immediate target is a political figure and his alleged political position. The complaint does not set out any further words or conduct that would establish the required promotion or attempted promotion of enmity between groups.”

The Court found no pleaded connection between the statement and the surrounding incidents. The complaint also did not identify any reaction or subsequent disturbance attributable to the statement. Referring to Amish Devgan, it held that the likelihood of disturbance had to be real rather than remote or fanciful.

No Insult To Religion Or Religious Beliefs

Turning to Section 299 BNS, the Court explained that an offensive reference to a religious community was not sufficient. The words must insult or attempt to insult the community’s religion or religious beliefs with a deliberate and malicious intention to outrage religious feelings.

Relying on Mahendra Singh Dhoni v. Yerraguntla Shyamsundar (2017), the Court observed: “The statement may reasonably be regarded as offensive or insulting. However, Section 299 BNS does not punish every insult directed at a person or a community. The insult must be directed at the religion or religious beliefs of that class. The alleged words do not refer to Islam’s religious beliefs, practices, sacred texts or other religious matters.”

The Court held that the complaint did not identify any words insulting Islam or disclose facts showing the required deliberate and malicious intention. The existence of communal tension could not supply these missing ingredients.

Preliminary Inquiry Ordinarily Appropriate In Speech Cases

Referring to Imran Pratapgadhi (2026), the Court held that a preliminary inquiry under Section 173(3) BNSS should ordinarily be considered where qualifying cognizable offences are founded on spoken or written words. If that procedure is invoked, prior permission from an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police is mandatory.

However, the absence of an inquiry did not automatically invalidate every FIR. The Court stated: “The absence of a preliminary enquiry does not, by that fact alone, automatically invalidate every FIR falling within the provision. The relevant question is whether the statutory safeguard received due consideration in the circumstances of the case, having regard to the nature of the allegations, the material relied upon, the ingredients of the alleged offence and the constitutional protection afforded to free expression.”

The availability of a recording did not dispense with this consideration because its authenticity and attribution remained distinct from whether the words legally disclosed an offence.

Legal Insufficiency Of Allegations Justified Quashing

The Court clarified that Article 19(1)(a) did not confer immunity where speech satisfied a valid penal provision. Equally, reliance on public order under Article 19(2) could not dispense with the statutory ingredients of the offences invoked.

Applying State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy (2004), the Court examined the complaint without adding or subtracting facts. It distinguished an impermissible assessment of disputed evidence from determining whether the allegations, even if accepted, constituted an offence.

The Court held: “The distinction is between a case where the allegations disclose an offence but the accused disputes the evidence, and a case where the allegations, even if accepted, do not disclose an offence. In the former, investigation and trial ordinarily must proceed. In the latter, continuation of the criminal process cannot be justified merely by saying that further evidence may be collected.”

Conclusion

The High Court allowed the petition and quashed the FIR and all consequential proceedings against the petitioner under Sections 196(1)(a) and 299 BNS.

The Court confined its decision to the petitioner and these offences. It clarified that the order did not prevent the police or the State from investigating the stone-pelting incident or any other offence disclosed by the available material in accordance with law.

Cause Title: Jyothi R v. State of Karnataka and Another (Neutral Citation: 2026:KHC:60067)

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