“Arm-Twisting Tactic Against Disciplinary Action”: Karnataka High Court Quashes SC-ST Act Case Against Company Directors
The High Court has quashed proceedings initiated under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act against the Managing Director, Executive Director and other officials of a private company, holding that the complaint appeared to have been lodged as a retaliatory measure after disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the complainant employee
Justice M. Nagaprasanna, Karnataka High Court
The Karnataka High Court has held that criminal proceedings under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act cannot be permitted to continue where the facts reveal that the complaint was lodged to wreak vengeance against an employer for initiating disciplinary proceedings.
The Court was hearing petitions filed by the Managing Director, Executive Director and other officials of Malnad Alloy Castings Private Limited seeking quashing of Crime No.39/2025 registered for offences punishable under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and Sections 351(2), 352, 127(2) and 190 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.
Observing that the complaint was filed only after issuance of a show-cause notice, appointment of an Enquiry Officer and commencement of departmental proceedings against the complainant, A Single Judge Bench of Justice M. Nagaprasanna observed:
“If the link in the chain of events as observed hereinabove are considered, the unmistakable inference is that, the complainant in order to wreck vengeance against the petitioners for having issued the show cause notice and appointing an Enquiry Officer to conduct a departmental enquiry, has registered the impugned crime in gross misuse of the provisions of the Act.”
“Not even one incident is quoted in the complaint of such hurling of abusers, prior to the said incident of negligence of the complainant during the performance of his duty. Therefore, thecomplaint will have to be viewed from the lens of the arm-twisting tactic of the complainant, by misusing of the provisions of the Act”, the Bench added.
S. Sriranga, Senior Advocate, appeared for the petitioners. B.N. Jagadeesha, Additional State Public Prosecutor, appeared for the State. Advocate Ravishankar K. appeared for the complainant.
Background
The complainant was employed as a Supervisor (Production) in Malnad Alloy Castings Private Limited and had been serving in the company for about eighteen years.
According to the company, an incident occurred during a night shift in November 2024 when negligence on the part of the complainant allegedly resulted in production loss. Following the incident, a detailed show-cause notice was issued alleging negligence in discharge of duties, wastage of company resources, loss to the company and conduct detrimental to discipline.
The complainant submitted a reply denying the allegations. The management found the explanation unsatisfactory and appointed an Enquiry Officer to conduct a departmental enquiry.
The complainant thereafter approached the Industrial Tribunal challenging the show-cause notice and the disciplinary proceedings. He sought a declaration that the action initiated by the company was unlawful, compensation for emotional and financial distress and relief relating to alleged discrimination. The Tribunal declined to grant ex parte interim relief and issued notice to the respondents.
Subsequently, the complainant lodged the impugned complaint alleging caste abuse, criminal intimidation, harassment and wrongful conduct by the company management and officials, resulting in registration of the FIR.
Court's Observations
The Court extensively referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Karnataka, wherein the Apex Court had reiterated the principles laid down in Ramawatar v. State of Madhya Pradesh regarding the exercise of powers to quash proceedings under the SC/ST Act.
The Court noted that while offences under the SC/ST Act ordinarily require strict scrutiny and protection of the rights of members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, criminal proceedings can nevertheless be quashed where the allegations do not arise on account of caste or where continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process.
The Court quoted the Supreme Court's observation: “On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily private or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings.”
The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's caution that criminal law should not be used as a means of exerting pressure in disputes that are essentially private in nature.
Referring again to Gulam Mustafa, the Court emphasised that police authorities are required to apply their mind before invoking the provisions of special statutes.
The Bench observed that registration of offences under the SC/ST Act cannot be a mechanical exercise and must be preceded by a prima facie examination of whether the ingredients of the alleged offences are disclosed.
The Court reproduced the following observation: “The officer has to be satisfied that the provisions he seeks to invoke prima facie apply to the case at hand. We clarify that our remarks, in no manner, are to dilute the applicability of special/stringent statutes, but only to remind the police not to mechanically apply the law, dehors reference to the factual position.”
The Court remarked that in the present case, it was difficult to understand how the complaint had been registered without proper verification of the allegations.
The Court next examined the ingredients of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act.
Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, the Court reiterated that for an offence under the said provisions to be made out, the alleged insult or intimidation must occur in a place within public view.
The Court reproduced the Supreme Court's observations explaining the distinction between a public place and a place within public view and noted that the allegations in a complaint must disclose the necessary ingredients constituting the offence.
The Court quoted: “Thus, it is trite principle that the FIR becomes liable in law to be quashed when it, in its bare reading, does not disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the offence alleged therein. The basic constituents of the offence alleged in the FIR must stem and stand disclosed from the contents of the FIR.”
The Court further noted the Supreme Court's observation that: “It could be said that the occurrence of the incident to become an offence under the SC/ST Act must have happened ‘in a place within public view’, is in a way, a principal requirement amongst the other ingredients.”
The Court also examined the offences alleged under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.
Referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Mohammad Wajid v. State of U.P., the Court observed that criminal intimidation requires a threat made with the intention of causing alarm, while intentional insult requires provocation likely to result in breach of peace.
The Court extracted the statutory ingredients and observed that the allegations in the complaint must be examined against those requirements before permitting criminal prosecution to continue.
A significant factor that weighed with the Court was the complainant's long service in the company.
The Court noted that the complainant had worked in the establishment for approximately eighteen years and had not referred to a single previous incident of caste abuse during that entire period.
The Court found the timing of the allegations significant, particularly when viewed in the backdrop of the disciplinary proceedings.
After analysing the chronology of events, the Court concluded that the complaint had been lodged as a retaliatory measure against the management.
The Bench further noted that the complainant had first responded to the show-cause notice, then challenged the enquiry before the Industrial Tribunal, failed to obtain interim relief and only thereafter approached the police.
According to the Court, the sequence of events unmistakably pointed towards an attempt to use criminal proceedings as leverage against the disciplinary action initiated by the company.
The Court ultimately held that continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of law.
Referring to the Supreme Court's observations on misuse of criminal proceedings for exerting pressure, the Court noted: “What is evincible from the extant case law is that this Court has been consistent in interfering in such matters where purely civil disputes, more often than not, are given the colour of criminality, only for the purposes of exerting extra-judicial pressure on the party concerned, which, we reiterate, is nothing but abuse of the process of the court.”
Applying the said principle, the Court concluded that the present case was a fit case for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita.
Conclusion
Holding that the complaint was lodged after initiation of disciplinary proceedings and that the chain of events demonstrated misuse of the provisions of the SC/ST Act to wreak vengeance against the company management, the Karnataka High Court allowed the petitions and quashed Crime No.39/2025 and all consequential proceedings pending against the petitioners.
Cause Title: B.S. Jagadish & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr. connected with Madhukar Jois Y.V. & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2026:KHC:26352)