Defamation Complainant Need Not Invariably Produce Witness At Cognizance Stage To Establish Damage To Reputation: Karnataka High Court
The High Court clarified that the need for such a statement depends on the nature of the imputation and the other material before the Magistrate, adding that where the imputation is not prima facie capable of lowering reputation, further evidence may be required.
Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde, Karnataka High Court
The Karnataka High Court has held that, while taking cognizance of a defamation complaint and issuing process, a Magistrate need not invariably insist that a witness other than the complainant state that the complainant’s reputation has fallen in that witness’s own estimation.
The High Court held that the requirement depends on the nature of the imputation, the material produced and the surrounding circumstances.
The Court was hearing a petition under Section 528 of the BNSS challenging the Magistrate’s order taking cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 500 of the IPC, corresponding to Section 356(2) of the BNS, and issuing summons to the accused. The petitioner also challenged the Sessions Court’s decision affirming that order and sought quashing of the complaint proceedings.
A Bench of Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde observed: “…the expression “in the estimation of others” in Explanation-4 to Section 499 of IPC or 356(1) of BNS cannot be construed as having mandated, that in every case at the stage of taking cognizance and issuing the process, that a witness other than the complainant must be examined and said witness must state that in his own estimation the complainant’s reputation is lowered.”
Advocate Dalwai Venkatesh appeared for the petitioner, while Senior Counsel Ravi B. Naik appeared for the complainant.
Background
The complainant alleged that the petitioner, a Member of the Legislative Assembly, made defamatory statements at a public gathering that were subsequently broadcast on a YouTube channel. Since the statements were allegedly made before the BNS came into force, the Court treated the alleged offence as one governed by the IPC, although the complaint was instituted under the BNSS.
The Magistrate considered the complaint, the transcript, the video clips and the sworn statements of the complainant and two witnesses. After referring to the statutory provisions and Supreme Court decisions, the Magistrate took cognizance under Section 500 of the IPC and issued summons. The Sessions Court affirmed that order.
The petitioner argued that Explanation 4 to Section 499 of the IPC required the complainant to examine a person who would expressly state that the complainant’s reputation had fallen in that person’s own estimation. Although the two witnesses said that the complainant’s reputation had been lowered in the estimation of others, they also maintained that the allegations were false and that they continued to hold a good opinion of him.
The complainant argued that the widely circulated statements were inherently defamatory and that no such personal-estimation statement was required at the cognizance stage.
Court’s Observations
Reputational Harm May Be Inferred At Cognizance Stage
The Court observed that the expression “in the estimation of others” referred to persons in whose estimation the complainant’s reputation was alleged to have been lowered. However, the provision did not invariably require the particular person whose opinion was affected to be examined before cognizance could be taken.
It held: “The existence of the possible damage to the reputation, depending on the nature of the imputation and the material available, may be prima facie inferred from the circumstances surrounding the publication and the contents of the imputation itself.”
The Court clarified that a witness might still be required in an appropriate case. The inquiry remained dependent upon the nature of the statement and whether the available material permitted a prima facie inference of reputational harm.
Statement About Others’ Estimation May Not Be Conclusive Proof
The Court examined the evidentiary implications where a witness continued to hold a good opinion of the complainant but claimed that the complainant’s reputation had fallen in the estimation of others. A witness who personally heard another person express an adverse opinion could testify that such a statement was made. However, a second-hand account of another person’s opinion would be hearsay.
The Bench observed: “It is true that the witnesses have not given specific details of the other/s in whose estimation the complainant’s reputation is lowered. Nevertheless if the witness has heard somebody making a statement about another person’s reputation being lowered, the fact that the person heard the statement would be admissible but may not be conclusive proof of the fact stated.”
The Court distinguished the sufficiency of material for taking cognizance from the evidence ultimately required to establish the offence at trial.
Inherently Defamatory Imputation May Support Issuance Of Process
The Court held that where an imputation was inherently capable of lowering a person’s moral or intellectual character, credit or standing, the Magistrate could tentatively infer that reputation might have been lowered in the estimation of others.
It stated: “If the complaint and the independent witness examined state that the complainant’s reputation is lowered in the estimation of others because of the imputation, and if the imputation is of such a nature that the Court prima facie finds that it is inherently capable of lowering the moral or intellectual character of the complainant, or projects him as a person of bad character or as having engaged in conduct generally considered disgraceful, then the Court may without insisting on the statement of the witness, that in his own estimation, the complainant’s reputation is lowered, can take cognizance and issue the process.”
Referring to John Thomas v. Dr. K. Jagadeesan (2001), the Court noted that where a statement was per se defamatory, the complainant’s burden to show that the publication lowered his reputation in the estimation of right-thinking members of the public was reduced.
The Court distinguished Jaideep Bose and S. Ranganathan because the present matter involved a designated court, pre-cognizance notice and examination of two witnesses. It declined to follow Aveek Sarkar insofar as it required an independent witness to state that reputation fell in his own estimation.
Further Evidence May Be Needed Where Imputation Is Not Prima Facie Defamatory
The Court added an important qualification. A bare assertion by the complainant and his witnesses might not suffice where the imputation was not inherently capable of lowering reputation within Explanation 4 to Section 499 of the IPC or Section 356(1) of the BNS.
The Bench held: “In such circumstances, to satisfy himself that the essential ingredient of defamation is prima facie made out, the Magistrate may require further material or the statement of an independent witness who would say that in his own estimation the complainant’s reputation is lowered.”
In the present case, the Court found that the statements cast serious aspersions on the complainant’s integrity and character and were inherently capable of lowering his reputation. Whether the public believed the imputations or whether his reputation was actually lowered were questions for trial.
Conclusion
The High Court found no error in the Magistrate’s order taking cognizance or in the Sessions Court’s decision affirming it. It dismissed the petition and permitted the defamation proceedings to continue.
The Court expressly clarified that its observations were not findings on the merits of the complaint or the accused’s defence. All contentions on merits were left open for adjudication by the Trial Court.
Cause Title: Basanagouda Ramanagouda Patil Yatnal v. Shivananda S. Patil
Appearances
Petitioner: Dalwai Venkatesh, Advocate
Respondent: Ravi B. Naik, Senior Counsel; Vijetha R. Naik, Advocate