Natural Parent Cannot Be Denied Access To Child At Interlocutory Stage Absent Prima Facie Unfitness Or Welfare Risk: Karnataka High Court
The Court held that while the welfare of the child remains the paramount consideration in guardianship proceedings, an interim injunction resulting in complete exclusion of a natural parent can be justified only upon demonstrable material showing prima facie unfitness or an imminent threat to the child’s welfare.
The Karnataka High Court has held that an order of injunction passed at the interlocutory stage in guardianship proceedings cannot operate in a manner that completely excludes a natural parent from access to a minor child unless the material on record discloses prima facie parental unfitness or a real and imminent risk to the welfare of the child.
The Court was hearing writ petitions filed by a mother challenging a common order passed by the Family Court in guardianship proceedings instituted by the grandmother and aunt of the minor child, whereby the Family Court had continued an injunction restraining the mother from access to the child and had dismissed her application seeking vacation of the interim order.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice K. Manmadha Rao, while setting aside the Family Court’s order, observed: “An order of injunction at the interlocutory stage cannot be passed in a manner that completely excludes a natural parent from access to the child. Such exclusion can be justified only where the material on record discloses prima facie unfitness of the parent or a real and imminent risk to the welfare of the minor.”
Senior Advocate Anant Mandgi & Advocate Amit Mandgi appeared for the petitioner, while Advocate Santosh S. Gogi appeared for the respondents.
Background
The dispute arose out of guardianship proceedings initiated after the death of the petitioner’s husband in January 2025. The petitioner-mother and her husband had married in 2009 and had a daughter born in 2012. Following the husband’s demise, disputes allegedly emerged between the petitioner and the deceased husband’s family regarding the estate and management of assets.
According to the petitioner, the deceased had amassed substantial assets and held key positions in a company co-founded by him. The petitioner alleged that after his death, the respondents, the child’s grandmother and aunt, attempted to pressure her into accepting an unfavourable share in the estate and subsequently sought to alienate her from the child.
The petitioner instituted succession proceedings and also filed a partition suit seeking protection against the alienation of properties. Shortly thereafter, the respondents instituted proceedings under Sections 7 and 10 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890, seeking appointment as guardians of the person and property of the minor child.
Along with the guardianship petition, the respondents sought an interim injunction restraining the petitioner from interfering with custody. The Vacation Court initially granted an ex parte injunction restraining the mother from forcibly interfering with the custody of the child.
The petitioner thereafter entered an appearance and filed objections along with an application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC seeking vacation of the injunction. She also filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration of guardianship and permanent custody under the Guardian and Wards Act, read with the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956.
The Family Court, however, by order dated 12.01.2026, allowed the respondents’ application for an injunction and dismissed the petitioner’s application for vacating the interim order, effectively continuing the restraint against the mother and denying her visitation rights. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner approached the High Court.
Court’s Observation
The High Court observed at the outset that though the proceedings arose under the Guardian and Wards Act, the principles underlying Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC relating to prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury continued to govern the grant of interlocutory relief.
The Court emphasised that the present dispute was not between two natural guardians but between the natural mother on one side and the grandmother and aunt on the other. It held that this distinction was significant while assessing the legality of an interim order excluding the mother from access to the child.
The Court observed that the petitioner, being the mother, was the natural guardian within the meaning of Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, subject to the paramount consideration of the welfare of the child.
It noted that though the Family Court had not expressly displaced the petitioner’s status as natural guardian, the effect of the impugned order was to substantially curtail her ability to exercise incidents of natural guardianship. The Court held: “By continuing an order of injunction which restrains the petitioner from access to the minor child for a prolonged period, the Family Court has, in substance, diluted the statutory recognition accorded under Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 at the interlocutory stage.”
The High Court found that no exceptional circumstance existed on record justifying the total denial of access to the mother. It held that the material did not disclose any prima facie unfitness on the part of the petitioner or any imminent risk to the welfare of the child.
Rejecting the respondents’ contention that continuity in the child’s routine and academic examinations justified the restraint, the Court held that such considerations could, at best, justify regulation of interaction but not complete exclusion of the mother from the child’s life.
The Court further observed: “At the highest, such considerations may warrant regulation of interaction, but not complete exclusion.” It held that postponement of visitation until completion of examinations would effectively amount to denial of access for a substantial duration and could not justify continuation of the restraint order.
The High Court also examined the Family Court’s interaction with the minor child and observed that, though such interaction was a relevant factor, it could not be treated as determinative at the interlocutory stage, particularly where the child had remained in the exclusive custody of the respondents for a considerable period.
The Court noted: “The possibility of influence, coupled with the emotional circumstances arising from the loss of a parent, necessitates a cautious approach in placing reliance on such interaction at this stage.”
Relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Vivek Singh v. Romani Singh (2017), the Court observed that arrangements resulting in exclusion of a parent, particularly the mother, from the child’s life may lead to parental alienation and adversely affect the welfare of the child.
The Court also referred to the decision in G. Prabhudev v. Ranganayaki (2025), reiterating that the welfare of the child must be assessed holistically by balancing emotional, psychological and developmental needs.
While recognising that Family Courts possess incidental and ancillary powers to grant interim relief in guardianship proceedings, the High Court clarified that such powers cannot be exercised in a manner virtually determining custody or excluding a natural guardian absent compelling justification.
Conclusion
The High Court held that the impugned order of injunction, insofar as it resulted in the complete denial of access to the petitioner-mother, could not be sustained in law.
Accordingly, the Court allowed the writ petitions and set aside the Family Court’s order allowing the injunction application and rejecting the mother’s application for vacating the interim restraint.
The Court clarified that it had examined the matter only to the extent of legality of the injunction and that questions relating to custody, visitation and appointment of guardian would be decided independently by the Family Court after a full-fledged trial.
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