Concealing Existing Marriage Indicates Intention To Deceive From Inception & Take Undue Advantage Of Sexual Lust: Jharkhand High Court Upholds Rape Conviction
The Court held that a false promise of marriage vitiates consent under Section 90 IPC only when the promise was made merely to satisfy sexual desire from the very beginning.
The Jharkhand High Court has upheld the conviction of a man under Section 376 IPC for committing rape on a false promise of marriage, observing that the case involved not a mere breach of promise but a promise that was deceitful from its inception.
The Bench noted that the consent of the victim was vitiated as the accused, despite already being married, concealed this fact and continued sexual relations with the victim by assuring her that he would marry her.
Justice Pradeep Kumar Srivastava observed, “…When he declined to solemnize marriage with the prosecutrix then this case was lodged. As against it, the defence has brought nothing on record regarding any exceptional circumstances due to which he was prevented from solemnizing marriage with the victim. He has also concealed the factum of his being already married person clearly indicates that from the very inception, he had intention to deceive the prosecutrix and take undue advantage of sexual lust…”.
“…Therefore, it cannot be said that there was any breach of promise of marriage due to reason of any exceptional hardship rather it was false promise of marriage which was never intended to be fulfilled vitiating the consent of prosecutrix under Section 90 of the I.P.C. The mere fact that no case was lodged since long period of 3-4 years does not hold much water to throw out the prosecution case”, the Bench observed further.
Advocate A.K. Chaturvedi appeared for the appellant and S.K. Srivastava, A.P.P. appeared for the respondent.
The appeal was filed by Ramesh Sahu challenging the judgment of the Additional District & Sessions Judge-II, which had convicted him under Sections 376 and 313 IPC and sentenced him to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment for rape and five years’ rigorous imprisonment for causing miscarriage.
The prosecution case was that the victim, who had become a widow within two years of her marriage, started residing at her parental home. The appellant allegedly developed a relationship with her and, on December 10, 1999, forcibly committed sexual assault upon her in a forest area while threatening her with death.
It was further alleged that thereafter the appellant assured her that he would marry her, started living with her, and continued sexual relations. The victim became pregnant twice, and she alleged that the pregnancies were terminated by the appellant. When the appellant eventually refused to marry her, she lodged an FIR in 2004.
The appellant argued that the relationship was consensual, that the FIR was lodged after several years due to a failed relationship, and that the case amounted only to a breach of promise to marry. He relied upon the Supreme Court judgment in Mandar Deepak Pawar versus The State of Maharashtra & Anr. 2022 Live Law (SC) 649 to contend that every failure to fulfil a promise of marriage cannot amount to rape.
Rejecting the defence argument, the Court referred to the distinction between a false promise and a subsequent breach of promise.
The Court further noted that to establish consent being vitiated by misconception of fact, two conditions must be satisfied: the promise of marriage must have been false and made in bad faith without intention to fulfil it, and the promise must have had a direct nexus with the woman’s decision to engage in sexual intercourse.
However, the Court set aside his conviction under Section 313 IPC for causing miscarriage, holding that there was no concrete evidence to establish the offence. The Court noted that although the victim alleged that the accused had terminated her pregnancies by assaulting her, there was no documentary evidence or medical testimony establishing the allegation.
“…there is no concrete evidence on record that the appellant has caused miscarriage of the prosecutrix without her consent. It appears that the learned Trial Court has simply believed the testimony of prosecutrix without satisfying his conscience about the ingredients of offence under Section 313 of the I.P.C. Therefore, conviction and sentence of the appellant for the offence under Section 313 of the I.P.C. is hereby set aside”, the Bench concluded.
Cause Title: Ramesh Sahu v. The State of Jharkhand & Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2026:JHHC:18889)
Appearances:
Appellant: A.K. Chaturvedi, Advocate.
Respondent: S.K. Srivastava, A.P.P.