The Himachal Pradesh High Court has held that while the demand for return of stridhan may remain a continuing offence when the parties are only judicially separated, it may not retain that character after their marriage is dissolved.

The Court also held that a complaint filed beyond three years from the decree of divorce was barred by limitation under Section 468 CrPC.

The Court was hearing a petition under Section 482 CrPC seeking the quashing of a complaint alleging offences under Sections 406 and 506 IPC, together with the Judicial Magistrate’s summoning order, notice of accusation and subsequent proceedings.

A Bench of Justice Chirag Bhanu Singh observed: “In Krishna Bhattacharjee's Case (supra), it was held that if there is only a decree of judicial separation, the relationship between husband and wife continues and the legal relationship continues as if it has not been snapped. Thus understood, the demand for ‘Istridhan’ will remain a continuing offence. After the dissolution of marriage, it may not remain the same. The distinction may be subtle, but it is indeed marked, and so has it been held in the aforesaid judgment.”

Upon examining the facts of the matter, the Bench further added: “… admittedly there has been a severance of the relationship between the parties as husband and wife with effect from 09.10.2012. Even in case the respondent/complainant had forgotten to lay a claim to the Istridhan, either while filing a petition under Section 13 HMA or filling a suit for maintenance under Section 528 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, she could have done so within the prescribed period of limitation, that is, three years therefrom. Had the marriage not been dissolved and their relationship had continued even subject to their being separated the offence of retention of "Istridhan" could have been said to be a continuing offence”.

Senior Advocate Peeyush Verma appeared for the petitioner. Advocate Abhishek Dulta appeared for the complainant, while Additional Advocate General Raj Pal Thakur appeared for the State.

Background

The parties married in 2007 and had been living separately since approximately 2008. The complainant alleged that her stridhan remained with the petitioner and that her requests for its return, made from 2011 onwards, were unsuccessful.

Their marriage was dissolved through a decree of divorce dated October 9, 2012. The complainant subsequently filed a criminal complaint on July 19, 2017, alleging criminal breach of trust and intimidation under Sections 406 and 506 IPC.

The Judicial Magistrate summoned the petitioner in June 2018 and issued a notice of accusation in September 2022. The petitioner contended that the complaint had been filed beyond the three-year limitation period prescribed under Section 468 CrPC.

The complainant argued that retention of stridhan constituted a continuing offence for which limitation did not arise. She relied on Krishna Bhattacharjee v. Sarathi Choudhury (2016), Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan (2022) and Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar (1985).

Court’s Observations

Divorce Severs Marital Status Unlike Judicial Separation

The Court held that dissolution of marriage and judicial separation had different legal consequences. It explained that divorce severs the parties’ status as husband and wife, whereas judicial separation does not terminate their legal relationship.

The Court observed: “It is thus evident that, rightly or wrongly, the status of the parties was severed with effect from 09.10.2012 and they ceased to be husband and wife since then. It would be important to note these facts, as there is a distinction between a decree for divorce and a decree of judicial separation. In the former, there is a severance of status and the parties do not remain husband and wife; whereas in the latter, the relation between the husband and wife continues and the legal relationship continues as it has not been snapped.”

The Court stated that this distinction determined whether the alleged retention of stridhan continued to constitute a continuing offence after the divorce decree.

The Court acknowledged that a wife may institute civil proceedings to recover her stridhan or lodge a criminal complaint alleging criminal breach of trust. It also accepted that retention of stridhan may constitute a continuing offence in an appropriate case.

The Court, however, read Krishna Bhattacharjee v. Sarathi Choudhury (2016) as distinguishing cases where the matrimonial relationship continued from those where the marriage had been dissolved.

The Court held: “There can be no dispute that a wife cannot only file a suit for recovery of the ‘Istridhan’, but she may also not be barred from lodging a criminal complaint for criminal breach of trust. It would also be a ‘continuing offence’, as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment. But a clear distinction has been carved out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court itself, holding that in case the status of the parties is not severed because of a decree of dissolution of marriage, the offence may be a ‘continuing offence’, but if the status between the parties has been severed, it may not be a ‘continuing offence’.”

Applying that distinction, the Court held that the alleged retention of stridhan did not remain a continuing offence after the parties’ marriage was dissolved on October 9, 2012.

Complaint Filed Beyond Three-Year Limitation

The Court observed that Sections 406 and 506 IPC carried punishment not exceeding three years and that Section 468 CrPC consequently prescribed a three-year limitation period for taking cognizance.

The Court noted that the complainant claimed to have demanded the return of her stridhan from 2011. Even if limitation were calculated from the divorce decree of October 9, 2012, the complaint filed in July 2017 was beyond three years.

The Court held: “Viewed in the totality of circumstances discussed above, it can safely be held that in the factual circumstances of the present case, it cannot be said that the offence was a continuing offence. The respondent/complainant could have laid a claim to the ‘Istridhan’ at best within three years of the decree of divorce, that is, three years from 09.10.2012. The complaint having been made much thereafter, the same was thus barred by limitation as prescribed by Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

The Court also noted that the complainant had pursued maintenance proceedings and a civil suit but had not claimed stridhan in those proceedings.

Conclusion

The High Court allowed the petition and quashed the criminal proceedings pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Shimla. It also quashed the summoning order dated June 1, 2018, the notice of accusation dated September 3, 2022, and all subsequent proceedings.

The Court disposed of the pending miscellaneous applications as well.

Cause Title: TR v. KL and Another (Neutral Citation: 2026:HHC:45122)

Appearances

Petitioner: Senior Advocate Peeyush Verma with Advocate Ajay Kumar

Respondents: Advocates Abhishek Dulta and Vishal Verma; Additional Advocate General Raj Pal Thakur

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