Recording Public Servants On Duty In Public Is Not Criminal Force Or Obstruction U/S 353 IPC: Gujarat High Court
The Court found that an advocate’s live Facebook video showed no aggressive gesture or use of physical force and concluded that the FIR was registered as a counterblast to proceedings against traffic personnel.
Justice P.M.Raval, Gujarat High Court
The Gujarat High Court has quashed an FIR against a lawyer and social activist, holding that recording public servants performing their official duties in a public place cannot be treated as criminal force or obstruction under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code.
The Court was hearing a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking quashing of offences under Sections 332, 353, 385 and 427 IPC and Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(u) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
A Bench of Justice P.M. Raval found that the live video showed the petitioner standing on a public road and recording the traffic personnel without making any aggressive gesture or using physical force.
The Court observed: “Recording public servants performing their official duties in a public space does not constitute ‘criminal force’ or ‘obstruction’ in law. Transparent public observation or citizen videography cannot be equated with physical deterrence under Section 353 IPC.”
Advocate S.M. Kikani appeared for the petitioner. Additional Public Prosecutor K.M. Antani appeared for the State.
Background
The FIR was lodged by an Assistant Sub-Inspector who alleged that the petitioner had used casteist words, recorded traffic personnel while they were performing their duties, demanded money from a Traffic Brigade supervisor under threat of making videos viral and assaulted the supervisor during an altercation. It was also alleged that the petitioner tore the supervisor’s uniform pocket and damaged his shoulder badge and buttons.
The petitioner stated that he had gone to the location to expose an allegedly illegal money-collection operation involving private persons, police personnel and Traffic Brigade staff. He submitted that he was live-streaming the events on Facebook when a Traffic Brigade supervisor assaulted him with a wooden object, causing serious injuries for which he was taken to hospital.
The petitioner further submitted that, following public outrage, an FIR alleging attempt to murder and other offences was registered against the police and Traffic Brigade personnel. He contended that the FIR against him was subsequently created as a counterblast to protect the officials and pressure him into abandoning the prosecution against them.
The State opposed the petition by arguing that the FIR disclosed cognizable offences and that the petitioner’s contentions concerning the counterblast, video evidence and absence of aggression constituted matters of defence requiring examination at trial.
Court’s Observations
Court Can Examine Attending Circumstances In Vexatious Prosecution
The Court referred to State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992), particularly the categories permitting quashing where allegations are inherently improbable or criminal proceedings are maliciously instituted for vengeance or an ulterior purpose.
Relying on Mahmood Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023), the Court observed that where an accused alleges that proceedings are frivolous, vexatious or instituted for vengeance, the High Court is not invariably restricted to reading the allegations in the FIR. It stated that the Court may consider the attending circumstances and material collected during the investigation.
After examining the FIR, the counter-FIR and the sequence of events, the Court found the prosecution’s account inherently improbable.
The Bench observed: “It is almost impossible to believe that an advocate live-streaming an event on Facebook in full public view would simultaneously attempt to commit extortion (Section 385 IPC) and physical assault on police personnel (Section 332/353 IPC). The narrative that the Petitioner demanded ₹1,000 per day from traffic personnel while simultaneously broadcasting the scene live is inherently improbable and absurd under Category (5) of Bhajan Lal. This Court is satisfied that the impugned FIR was brought as a classic counter-blast and an abuse of police authority to create a leverage/settlement against the grave charge of attempt to murder (Section 307 IPC) registered against the TRB/police personnel.”
Videography Did Not Attract Section 353 IPC
The Court explained that Section 353 IPC required assault or the use of criminal force against a public servant with the specific intention of preventing or deterring the discharge of official duty. It noted that criminal force under Section 350 IPC requires intentional application of force without consent to cause injury, fear or annoyance, while assault under Section 351 requires a gesture or preparation creating an apprehension of imminent criminal force.
The Court found that the live Facebook video did not show the petitioner making an aggressive gesture, advancing menacingly or using physical force against the Assistant Sub-Inspector or Traffic Brigade personnel.
The Court stated: “The record and uncontroverted live Facebook video broadcast show that the Petitioner was merely standing on a public road holding his mobile phone to record an ongoing illegal extortion racket. The Petitioner made no aggressive gestures, did not advance menacingly, and used zero physical force against ASI Gamit or any TRB personnel.”
The Court further found that the Traffic Brigade supervisor had struck the petitioner with a wooden object, resulting in serious injuries and the registration of a counter-FIR against the personnel. It concluded that the allegation that the unarmed petitioner had used criminal force against the officials was inherently improbable.
SC/ST Act Ingredients Were Absent
The Court observed that Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(u) of the SC/ST Act required the relevant intention to humiliate a person specifically because of caste identity or to promote enmity, hatred or ill-will against members of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe communities.
The Bench found that the alleged altercation originated from the petitioner’s recording of traffic-checking operations and allegations of official corruption. It held that the alleged reference to the complainant’s Adivasi background was not supported by foundational material establishing caste-based malice.
The Court observed: “Sweeping and omnibus allegations of caste slurs inserted to invoke stringent provisions of the Atrocities Act, particularly in the backdrop of a pre-existing dispute or counter-blast, cannot be allowed to stand. The invocation of the Atrocities Act in the present case appears to have been used purely as an ‘umbrella shield’ to insulate the police personnel from quashing proceedings. To attract the invocation of Section 3(1)(r) of the Atrocities Act, the alleged intentional insult or intimidation must be committed with the explicit mens rea to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe specifically because of their caste identity, and such act must occur in a place within ‘public view.’ A routine dispute or general altercation cannot be wrapped under the umbrella of the Atrocities Act unless the foundational element of targetted, caste-based humiliation is established.”
The Court further held that the FIR reflected an individual and localised dispute concerning traffic enforcement rather than an attempt to incite hatred or public disharmony against the complainant’s community. It consequently found the essential ingredients of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(u) absent.
No Material Showing Hurt To Public Servants
Examining Section 332 IPC, the Court stated that the prosecution had to establish that the accused voluntarily caused hurt to a public servant to deter the discharge of official duty.
The Court found no medical certificate, medico-legal report or physical evidence showing that any police or Traffic Brigade personnel had suffered bodily pain or injury. It noted that the petitioner was the person shown to have sustained serious injuries requiring emergency hospitalisation.
The Court also observed that the petitioner was holding his mobile phone in live mode and found the allegation that he simultaneously delivered punches to the officials unsupported by the video material.
Extortion Allegation Found Inherently Improbable
The Court observed that Section 385 IPC required an attempt to place a person in fear of injury with the dishonest object of committing extortion. It stated that the allegation had to disclose a direct connection between fear of injury and inducement to deliver money or property.
The Court found the allegation that the petitioner demanded ₹30,000 per month while publicly live-streaming the incident inherently improbable.
It observed: “An activist lawyer broadcasting live to thousands of online viewers in broad daylight cannot, by any stretch of human logic, be simultaneously conducting a secret extortion racket. Section 383/385 IPC requires a direct nexus between putting a person in fear of injury and inducing them to hand over money or property. Exposing official corruption or public misconduct on social media does not constitute putting an officer in unlawful ‘fear of injury’ under Section 385 IPC.”
The Court also noted that the alleged earlier demands had not been reported to a superior authority before the physical altercation. It treated the subsequent allegation as an afterthought designed to introduce a non-bailable offence.
Uniform Damage Did Not Establish Mischief
Addressing Section 427 IPC, the Court observed that the offence required an intention or knowledge that the act would cause wrongful loss or damage to property.
The Court found that the video did not show the petitioner initiating physical contact with the officials or intentionally damaging the Traffic Brigade supervisor’s uniform. It held that any displacement of the uniform buttons or badge during the supervisor’s alleged assault could not be attributed to the petitioner as intentional mischief.
Conclusion
The Gujarat High Court held that the essential ingredients of Sections 332, 353, 385 and 427 IPC were absent and that the SC/ST Act provisions were also not attracted. It found that continuing the prosecution would constitute an abuse of the legal process and that the case fell within the fifth and seventh categories identified in Bhajan Lal (1992).
The Court allowed the application and quashed the FIR and all consequential proceedings arising from it insofar as they concerned the petitioner.
Cause Title: Mehul Mansukhbhai Boghara v. State of Gujarat and Another