Judicial Officers Must Maintain Distance From Advocates: Gujarat HC Upholds Dismissal Of Magistrate Who Accepted Phone From Lawyer
The Bench noted that the charge regarding an improper judicial order could not have been laid; however, with non-reporting of vehicle purchases and a bank loan also proved, dismissal was the only appropriate punishment.
Justice N.S. Sanjay Gowda, Justice J. L. Odedra, Gujarat High Court
The Gujarat High Court has held that a Judicial Officer should not associate himself with practicing advocates and must keep a distance from them to prevent any impression of impropriety. On that footing, it upheld the dismissal of a Judicial Magistrate First Class who had received and used a mobile phone from an advocate practicing at the same station.
The Court held that a charge based on a wrong judicial order or departure from procedure could not have been framed against a judicial officer. It found the remaining charges, on the phone, non-reporting of vehicle transactions and non-reporting of a bank loan, proved by clear and cogent evidence, and held that read together they reflected a lack of integrity for which dismissal was the only punishment.
A Bench of Justice N.S. Sanjay Gowda and Justice J.L. Odedra observed, “If a Judicial Officer decides to accept a phone from a practicing advocate and it is established that he was communicating with the practicing advocate over a certain period of time, that, by itself, would be improper. A Judicial Officer should not associate himself with practicing advocates and has to maintain a distance from the advocates to prevent any impression of impropriety”.
“In our view, the Committee and the Disciplinary Authority was absolutely justified in coming to the conclusion that the conduct of the petitioner was unbecoming of that of a Judicial Officer”, the Bench noted.
Advocate Radhesh Y. Vyas appeared for the petitioner and Dhruti Pandya, AGP appeared for the respondent.
The petitioner was suspended on May 15, 2008 over a vigilance inquiry while serving as JMFC, Surat. A charge-sheet with 12 charges followed on April 24, 2009, of which four, Charge Nos. I, II, IV and VII, were relevant before the Court. They alleged use of mobile phones in third parties' names, including one received from an advocate, failure to report vehicle transactions, failure to report a Rs. 35,000 personal loan, and improper handling of two cheque-dishonour cases.
An inquiry was held, with 14 witnesses for the department and five for the petitioner. After a second show-cause notice dated July 2, 2014, a two-Judge Committee heard him and recommended dismissal. The Standing Committee accepted this, the Full Court approved it on March 15, 2016, and the Government dismissed him by notification dated May 23, 2016.
Noting the limited scope of Article 226 review in disciplinary matters, the Court said it would not re-appreciate evidence and would interfere with punishment only if disproportionate and shocking to the conscience. On Charge I, it found no fault with the finding that the charge was partly proved, observing that securing and using the phone from an advocate "by itself, clearly amounts to misconduct".
“If the evidence indicated that he had actually secured the phone from a practicing advocate and was using the same, that, by itself, clearly amounts to misconduct. We are, therefore, of the view that the finding on the first charge that it was partly proved cannot be found fault with”, the Bench noted.
It held that the petitioner did not dispute Charge II (unreported vehicle transactions) or Charge IV (unreported loan), and that Conduct Rules required prompt compliance. On the charge concerning the cheque cases, it held that a judicial officer cannot be proceeded against for passing a wrong order or not following procedure, though it noted material suggesting the procedure was incorrect.
“In our view, the laying of such a charge itself would be improper, fundamentally because the petitioner could not have been proceeded against for passing a wrong judicial order or for not following the prescribed procedure while discharging his judicial functions. We are therefore of the view that though there was material to indicate that the procedure adopted by the petitioner was incorrect, the charge itself could not have been laid against the petitioner”, it noted.
It distinguished M. V. Bijlani v. Union of India & others (2006) 5 SCC 88 because the key charges were admitted, and Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra and another (1999) 7 SCC 739 because these were not trifling complaints.
The Court dismissed the writ petition.
Cause Title: Amratlal Narendrabhai Vizoda v. State of Gujarat & Anr. (Neutral Citation 2026:GUJHC:61207-DB).
Appearances:
Petitioner: Radhesh Y. Vyas, Advocate.
Respondent: Dhruti Pandya, AGP, I.G. Joshi and Law Officer Branch, Advocates.