Proposed Publication Can’t Be Presumed Defamatory: Delhi High Court Recalls Gag Order Against The Wire In Ex-Chief Secretary Naresh Kumar’s Suit

The Court held that defamation defences such as truth, fair comment and privilege arise only after publication, and a court cannot issue a gag order on the assumption that future content may be defamatory.

The Court was hearing an interim application in a defamation suit filed by Naresh Kumar against The Wire and others over an article concerning alleged links between his son and the family of beneficiaries in a land over-valuation matter involving acquisition for the Dwarka Expressway. An earlier ad-interim order had directed the takedown of the article and related posts, and had also restrained The Wire from publishing “similar defamatory content” against Kumar.

A Bench of Justice Anup Jairam Bhambhani held that the restraint on future publication was “over-broad, presumptive in nature and based purely on a hypothetical situation”.

The Court further observed: “It is important to appreciate that in matters of defamation, the defences referred to above would only arise once a publication is made. There is no conceivable way, whether in fact or in law, by which it can be presumed that what an author or publisher is proposing to publish would be defamatory, even going by any past publication that may have been made by the author/publisher.”

Senior Advocate Manik Dogra appeared for the former Delhi Chief Secretary, Naresh Kumar. Senior Advocate Nitya Ramakrishnan appeared for The Wire.

Background

Naresh Kumar filed the suit over an article published by The Wire titled “Links of Son of Delhi Chief Secretary to Beneficiary’s Family in Land Over-Valuation Case Raise Questions”. The article concerned the acquisition of land by the National Highways Authority of India for the Dwarka Expressway, where compensation was enhanced from about ₹41.52 crores to ₹353 crores.

The article stated that one of the beneficiaries was related by marriage to the promoter of a real estate company where Kumar’s son was employed. It also recorded Kumar’s denial of any wrongdoing, his assertion that his son was not dependent on him, and his claim that false and fabricated complaints were being circulated by disgruntled elements.

Kumar argued that the article was libellous, sensational and falsely suggested guilt, abuse of power and quid pro quo. He contended that the article did not fairly highlight that he had himself initiated action after the alleged land over-valuation came to his notice.

The Wire opposed the injunction, arguing that the article was a factual presentation of two views, published after due diligence, after seeking Kumar’s response, and on a matter of public interest. It also argued that the future restraint imposed by the earlier order was a gag order contrary to the Bonnard standard.

Court’s Observations

The Court first considered whether the publication related to Kumar’s official duties as Chief Secretary. Referring to R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N. (1994), the Court held that though public officials ordinarily cannot claim damages for publications concerning acts relevant to official duties, such an action may still be maintainable if the publication was made with reckless disregard for truth, or was false and actuated by malice or personal animosity.

The Court noted that Kumar himself relied on official records and actions taken by him against the District Magistrate to answer the article.

The Court observed: “In the present case, on the plaintiff's own reckoning, he stands clean since he had initiated the suspension of the delinquent DM. So, had the plaintiff not acted against the DM, such neglect would have made him answerable for dereliction of duty. Therefore, even going by the plaintiff's own submission, the reportage in the subject article did relate to the performance by the plaintiff of his official duties.”

The Court therefore held that the suit was maintainable, since Kumar had alleged reckless disregard for truth and malice, which would require trial.

The Court noted that Kumar’s case was that The Wire omitted details of steps allegedly taken by him against the District Magistrate before publication of the article. The Court said whether such omission amounted to reckless disregard for truth, or made the article false and actuated by malice, could not be decided at the interim stage.

The Court stated: “Does the fact that the subject article carried no reference to these actions taken by the plaintiff, tantamount to disregard for truth; and whether such disregard is reckless in nature, are aspects that cannot be adjudicated except in the course of trial. Another aspect that can only be tested during trial, is the question whether the omission on the part of defendants Nos.1 and 2 to include these aspects in the subject article, makes the article false and actuated by malice or personal animosity.”

The Court noted that the earlier directions requiring removal of the article from The Wire’s website and related posts from X had already been complied with. It therefore declined to interfere with those directions at this stage, holding that any contrary direction would have to await trial.

However, the Court separated those takedown directions from the broader future restraint on publication.

The Court held that para 30(iii) of the earlier order, which restrained The Wire from publishing “any similar defamatory content”, was legally untenable because it assumed in advance that future content would be defamatory.

The Court observed: “In the opinion of this court, defamation as a jurisprudential concept is different from how it is understood as a lay concept. Every statement or publication that is derogatory in fact may not be defamatory in law, since the maker or author or publisher of the statement may raise one or more of the well-recognised defences to an allegation that what they said or wrote or published does not amount to a legal wrong.”

It added: “Moreover, to assume that what someone may publish would be defamatory, is egregiously hypothetical and presumptive; and therefore cannot be the basis of a court injunction. No matter how perspicacious a court may be, it cannot act as a soothsayer and predict what an author may publish next, and presume it to be offensive to a party, and thereby gag what is yet to be put out in the public.”

The Court also referred to Bloomberg Television Production Services India Pvt. Ltd. v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. (2025), Bonnard v. Perryman (1891), Fraser v. Evans (1968), Kailash Gahlot v. Vijender Gupta (2022), and S. Charanjit Singh v. Aroon Purie (1982), on the need for caution in granting pre-trial injunctions in defamation matters.

Conclusion

The Delhi High Court deleted the earlier direction restraining The Wire from publishing similar allegedly defamatory content against Naresh Kumar. It left undisturbed, at this stage, the takedown directions concerning the existing article and related posts.

The application was disposed of in these terms.

Cause Title: Shri Naresh Kumar v. The Wire & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:5759)

Appearances

Plaintiff: Senior Advocate Manik Dogra with Advocates Bani Dikshit, Dhruv Pandey, Uddhav Khanna and Dhruva Viz

Respondents: Senior Advocate Nitya Ramakrishnan with Advocates Sarin Naved, Stuti Rai, Saurabh Sagar, Md. Zeeshan Ahmad and Md. Noumaan; Advocates Deepak Gogia and Aadhar Nautiyal; Advocates Aditya Mathur and Anuparna Chatterjee

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