Once Man’s Right Is Terminated In His Sister’s Premises, His Wife’s Status Also Becomes No Better Than That Of Trespasser: Delhi High Court

The Delhi High Court was considering a Regular Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC).

Update: 2026-06-15 14:50 GMT

Justice Neena Bansal Krishna, Delhi High Court

While dismissing an appeal of a woman who allegedly tried to create third-party rights in her sister-in-law’s property, the Delhi High Court has held that once the right of the husband itself was terminated in his sister’s suit property and he also vacated the premises, the status of the wife became no better than that of a trespasser.

The High Court was considering a Regular Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) of the Appellant/second Defendant against the judgment upholding the order decreeing the suit for permanent injunction in favour of the Plaintiff, thereby directing the Defendants to hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property to the Plaintiff.

The Single Bench of Justice Neena Bansal Krishna held, “The sole question which arises is what is the right of the Appellant to continue in occupation of the Suit property. First and foremost, it is her husband Munish Kumar who had been permitted to occupy the Suit premises and after marriage she had merely joined him to reside in the Suit property, as his family member. Once, the right of the Munish Kumar itself was terminated and he also vacated the premises, the status of the Appellant becomes no better than that of a trespasser and she is liable to vacate the property.”

Advocate Mohammad Sajid represented the Appellant, while Advocate Tushar Sannu represented the Respondent.

Factual Background

The Plaintiff/Respondent filed a suit for mandatory injunction against the Defendants/Appellants, directing them to remove their belongings from the suit property and to hand over the possession and for a permanent injunction restraining them from creating a third-party interest. The Plaintiff/first Respondent is the owner of the Property containing the Ground Floor and Second floor, along with roof rights in Ramesh Nagar, New Delhi. The property originally belonged to her mother and devolved upon her by virtue of a Will, after her demise.

The Plaintiff’s brother (first Defendant/second Respondent), after the demise of the mother, requested that he be permitted to reside in the Ground Floor portion (suit property). The Plaintiff permitted him to occupy the Ground Floor as a licensee. After his marriage, it was alleged that the defendants started harassing the Plaintiff and other family members and threatening them to transfer the property in the name of the Defendants. The Plaintiff thus issued a legal notice asking them to vacate the suit premises. However, the Defendants (plaintiff’s brother and his wife) tried to create a third-party interest in the Suit property, though they did not succeed. Hence, the Plaintiff filed the suit for a mandatory injunction to seek possession of the suit property and a permanent injunction to restrain the Defendants from creating a third-party interest in the Suit property. The Civil Judge held that the Plaintiff/Respondent was entitled to the decree of mandatory injunction. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the appeal filed by the wife of the plaintiff’s brother, she filed the Regular Second Appeal.

Reasoning

The Bench noted that once the right of the plaintiff’s brother, Munish Kumar itself was terminated, and he also vacated the premises, the Appellant was also liable to vacate the property.

The Bench took note of the main contention of the appellant that there was an evident collusion between the brother and sister, which was evident from the fact that the Defendant husband had admitted all the facts as stated by the Plaintiff. However, it was noted that it could have been a case of collusion had there been any disputed facts. “The ownership of the Plaintiff or Defendant having been permitted to reside in the property has also not been disputed by the Appellant. While she may claim that there is collusion, but in the facts and circumstances of the case, no collusion is evident”, it added.

Considering that the Appellant had claimed that she had not sought protection of her possession under the D.V. Act, which was exclusively the domain of the Magistrate, the Bench stated,“However, Section 26 of the D.V Act itself proves that the relief under D.V Act can be granted in any proceedings and is not limited to the proceedings preferred before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, under the Domestic Violence Act”

The Bench was of the view that the Appellant had come to reside with her husband in the suit property, as a permissive user, and once the permission was withdrawn, she had no right, title, or interest to continue to reside in the property. Considering the fact that the appellant herself had stated that a Petition under the Domestic Violence Act had already been filed by her, against the husband, the Bench held that once she had already resorted to the requisite relief, her remedy lay against her husband and not against the Plaintiff, who happened to be the sister of her husband.

“The discord inter-se the husband and the wife cannot become a penalty for a sister-in-law, who in good faith, had permitted them to occupy her Suit property”, it stated while also adding, “There is no Substantial Question of Law raised in the present Second Appeal.” Thus, finding no merit in the Appeal, the Bench dimsissed the same.