Injunction Order Restraining Foreign Matrimonial Proceedings Not Interlocutory; Appealable U/S 19 Family Courts Act: Delhi High Court

The Court was hearing a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging an order of the Family Court, Dwarka, which had granted an ad-interim anti-suit injunction restraining the petitioner from proceeding with divorce proceedings filed before the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division-Family Part, Somerset County, United States of America, till final adjudication of the suit pending before the Family Court.

A Bench of Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar observed: “In the considered opinion of this Court, an anti-suit interim injunction restraining a party from prosecuting matrimonial proceedings before a foreign Court cannot be equated with an order passed merely for regulating procedure or preserving orderly conduct of the proceedings before the learned Family Court. Such an injunction has the effect of immediately restricting the legal remedies available to a litigant outside India and, therefore, possesses the trappings of an adjudicatory order affecting substantive civil rights.”

The Bench accordingly held: “the Impugned Order materially affects the valuable rights of the parties and possesses the trappings of an appealable order within the meaning assigned by the learned Full Bench in Dr Geetanjali Aggarwal (supra). It cannot, therefore, be characterised as an interlocutory order for the purposes of Section 19 of the FC Act and is amenable to the appellate jurisdiction under Section 19(1) thereof”.

Senior Advocate Apoorv Kurup appeared for the petitioner. Advocate Sarojanand Jha appeared for the respondent.

Background

The respondent had filed a suit before the Family Court under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act seeking, among other reliefs, a permanent injunction against the continuation of foreign matrimonial proceedings. During the pendency of that suit, she moved an application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, read with Section 151 CPC.

The Family Court allowed the application and restrained the petitioner from proceeding further with the divorce case he had instituted before the American Court. The petitioner challenged that order through an Article 227 petition before the High Court.

At the threshold, the respondent objected to maintainability. She argued that the Family Court’s order was not an “interlocutory order” under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, and that the petitioner’s statutory remedy was an appeal under Section 19(1), not a supervisory petition under Article 227.

The petitioner argued that the order was purely interlocutory because it only preserved the existing position pending final adjudication and did not finally decide the matrimonial dispute or the legality of the foreign proceedings.

Court’s Observations

The Court examined Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which provides an appeal from every judgment or order of the Family Court, except an interlocutory order. Since the Act does not define “interlocutory order”, the Court held that the expression must be understood by looking at the substance and effect of the order.

The Court observed: “Significantly, the FC Act does not define the expression ‘interlocutory order’. In the absence of a statutory definition, the expression cannot receive either an unduly expansive or an unduly restrictive interpretation. The character of an order must necessarily be determined from its substance, its effect upon the rights of the parties and the consequences which flow from it, and not merely from the stage of the proceedings at which it came to be passed.”

Relying on the Full Bench decision in Dr Geetanjali Aggarwal v. Dr Manoj Aggarwal (2024), the Court said that nomenclature is not decisive. The real test is whether the order merely regulates procedure or substantially affects valuable rights.

The Court stated: “The learned Full Bench has, therefore, held that while examining maintainability under Section 19 of the FC Act, the Court must determine whether the impugned order merely facilitates the progress of the proceedings or whether it substantially adjudicates upon or affects valuable rights of the parties. If the latter test is satisfied, the order would cease to be an interlocutory order notwithstanding that the proceedings themselves remain pending before the Family Court.”

Applying the test, the Court held that the Family Court’s order was not one regulating pleadings, affidavits, summons, adjournments or orderly conduct of proceedings. Instead, it restrained the petitioner from prosecuting matrimonial proceedings before a competent American Court.

The Court observed: “The consequence of such an injunction is both immediate and substantive during the period for which it remains operative. Till the period the injunction continues, the Petitioner remains disabled from prosecuting proceedings before the American Court. Such deprivation cannot subsequently be undone merely because the suit ultimately reaches its conclusion. The order, therefore, is not merely procedural in its operation; it directly curtails the Petitioner’s ability to pursue a legal remedy in another jurisdiction.”

It further noted that the injunction travelled beyond proceedings in India and operated upon foreign proceedings involving marital status and consequential rights.

The Court stated: “Equally, the effect of the Impugned Order is not confined merely to regulating the conduct of the proceedings before the learned Family Court. The injunction travels beyond the proceedings pending in India and operates upon proceedings pending before the American Court. Such an order undoubtedly carries significant civil consequences for both parties and substantially affects the manner in which their matrimonial disputes may be adjudicated.”

The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the order merely maintained status quo and was therefore interlocutory. It said the label used while granting relief cannot decide the nature of the order.

The Court held: “The expression ‘status quo’ cannot be determinative of the nature of an order. An order maintaining status quo may, in a given case, operate upon valuable proprietary, contractual, custodial or matrimonial rights and may have consequences far beyond the procedural management of the proceedings. The inquiry must always remain focused upon the legal effect of the order and not the phraseology employed while granting the relief.”

The Court also held that an order may be temporary in duration and yet possess the trappings of finality for purposes of appealability.

It observed: “The fact that the restraint is temporary in duration is not, by itself, determinative of its character under Section 19 of the FC Act. Temporariness describes the duration for which an order operates, it does not necessarily determine whether the order is interlocutory. The relevant inquiry remains whether, during the period of its operation, the order directly and materially affects valuable rights or determines an important aspect of the lis.”

The Court distinguished the decisions relied upon by the petitioner, including Mukund Murari Mahto and Smt. Amishi Milan Honawar (2005). It said those cases involved interim arrangements that did not directly restrain the pursuit of an independent legal remedy before a foreign court.

The Court observed: “The position in the present case is materially different. The Impugned Order does not merely regulate a temporary monetary arrangement or preserve an ancillary claim pending its final adjudication. It directly restrains the Petitioner from prosecuting matrimonial proceedings already instituted by him before a foreign Court. The restraint thus operates directly upon the Petitioner’s ability to pursue a legal remedy which he has already invoked before a competent jurisdiction.”

The Court further added: “More importantly, the Impugned Order herein bears a direct nexus with the substantive relief claimed in the suit itself, namely, the restraint against continuation of the foreign matrimonial proceedings. The interim injunction thus operates in aid of, and directly advances, the very substantive relief which the Respondent seeks by way of final adjudication.”

Having held that the Family Court order was appealable, the Court said it would not ordinarily exercise Article 227 jurisdiction when a statutory appellate remedy exists.

It observed: “Once a statutory appellate remedy is available, this Court would not ordinarily exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, though plenary in nature, is intended to be exercised sparingly and cannot be permitted to supplant a statutory remedy specifically provided by the Legislature.”

Conclusion

The High Court held that the anti-suit injunction materially affected valuable rights and had the trappings of an appealable order under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act.

It dismissed the Article 227 petition as not maintainable, leaving the petitioner free to avail remedies permissible in law. The Court clarified that it had expressed no opinion on the correctness of the Family Court’s order or on the merits of the parties’ rival contentions.

Cause Title: KK v. MK (Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:6380)

Appearances:

Petitioner: Apoorv Kurup, Senior Advocate, with Dhruv Sharma, Ritwik Mohapatra, Vardaan Wanchoo, Priya Patel, Gurjas Narula, Aayush Mishra and Divyansh Nigam, Advocates.

Respondent: Sarojanand Jha, Suraj Malik, Rajreeta Ghosh, Rahul Kumar and Muskan Saxena, Advocates

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