“Quashing POCSO Cases Not Anathema To Law”: Delhi High Court Lays Down Tests For Consent-Based Closure In Adolescent Relationship Cases

The Court, however, observed that such quashing requires careful and sensitive consideration of the factual situation, especially where the plea is based on the stand of a de-juré victim who says that she has suffered no loss or injury and seeks closure of the proceedings.

The Court was hearing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, read with Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking quashing of an FIR registered under Section 64(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, where the respondent-victim was admittedly a minor at the time of the alleged offence.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Anup Jairam Bhambhani observed: “This court is of the view that though quashing of criminal proceedings under the POCSO Act is not anathema to the law, such quashing demands careful and sensitive consideration of the fact situation. When examining a plea for quashing of an offence under the POCSO Act based on the consent of a de-juré victim, the court must carefully evaluate the reasons as to why the victim disclaims any loss or injury to her and must record its satisfaction”.

Advocates Lokesh Kumar Mishra, Abhishek Kaushik and Nadeem Ahmed appeared for the petitioner, while Anand V. Khatri, ASC, represented the respondents.

Background

The petitioner sought the quashing of the FIR for offences alleged to have been committed under Section 6 of the POCSO Act

The Court noted that the respondent-victim had made no complaint herself and that the FIR came to be registered only after doctors at the hospital, where she had gone to deliver her baby, discovered that she was a minor and informed the police in compliance with Section 21 of the POCSO Act. The Court also noted the parties’ case that they had married according to Sikh rites and rituals and that a male child was born from the wedlock.

The Court further noted that the petitioner and respondent-victim were residing as spouses along with their child, and that she had filed an affidavit stating that she had no grievance against the petitioner, had married him of her own volition, was residing happily in her matrimonial home, and had no objection if the FIR and all proceedings arising therefrom were quashed. It also noted that no chargesheet had been filed.

The Court additionally recorded that during interaction in court, the respondent-victim reiterated her support for quashing, stating that the petitioner had committed no offence against her, that she was a willing participant in the relationship, and that if the petitioner were sentenced, she and the child would be left without support and sustenance.

Court’s Observation

The Court began by examining the statutory scheme of the POCSO Act and the concept of a “victim”. It noted that under the applicable definitions, a victim has suffered loss or injury, observing that “for there to be a ‘victim’, a person must have suffered loss or injury by reason of an act or omission of another.”

At the same time, the Court clarified that it was not entering into the question of consent of a minor, stating that “the consent of a minor is of no legal value”, and instead addressed the situation where a minor, though a de-juré victim, disclaims having suffered any loss or injury. It described this as a case where “there may be a de-juré victim but no de facto victim.”

The Court then identified a conceptual tension in such cases, observing that the law may treat a person as a victim despite the absence of lived harm. It noted that “the victim neither claims nor experiences harm, yet the legal framework insists on her victimhood, and the offender-status of the accused.”

It further posed the question whether strict enforcement of the statute should continue even where it would cause harm to the very person the law seeks to protect, particularly where such enforcement may lead to “serious re-victimisation of the de-juré victim, despite the fact that the victim says that she has suffered no loss or injury.”

Surveying judicial precedents, the Court noted that the predominant approach of High Courts has been to quash proceedings in cases where the de-juré victim disclaims harm and the parties have settled into family life, observing that “continuing with trial in such cases would be an exercise in futility.”

At the same time, it acknowledged contrary views, emphasising that offences under the POCSO Act are crimes against society and that “the consent of a minor is legally irrelevant”, while clarifying that such decisions did not deal with situations where parties had subsequently married and were living together with children.

The Court then highlighted a critical aspect, observing that earlier decisions declining quashing had not examined whether there was a real victim seeking prosecution. It held that “it is yet central to a prosecution that there be a de facto victim in the picture”, and cautioned that prosecuting a person solely based on a de-juré victim would be inappropriate, especially where the consequences would fall upon that very person.

Relying on precedent, the Court observed that in the absence of a de facto victim, “the commission of a crime remains a mere jurisprudential construct,” particularly where the alleged victim denies having suffered any loss or injury.

The Court also referred to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Ayyub Malik & Anr. vs. State of Uttarakhand & Anr. (2026) that continuation of criminal proceedings in such circumstances may be unjustified, noting that such proceedings would “become harassing and stand as an abuse of process of law.” It concluded that pressing on with prosecution in the absence of a real victim would be “an exercise in futility… leading to absurdity.”

Emphasising its core duty, the Court stated that “the principal duty of a court is to do justice; and if unleashing the letter of the law leads to manifest injustice, a court cannot look the other way.” It further noted the grave consequences of continuing proceedings, observing that “two lives… would be completely destroyed” if prosecution were allowed to continue.

Finally, while recognising concerns of misuse, the Court cautioned that courts must remain vigilant, warning against “wanton misuse of ‘compromise’ quashing… by unscrupulous offenders” and emphasising the need for “strong guardrails and parameters” before granting such relief.

Tests Laid Down by The Court

The Court then laid down the tests that must guide consideration of such cases. It said that when examining a plea for quashing of an offence under the POCSO Act based on the consent of a de-juré victim, the court must carefully evaluate the reasons as to why the victim disclaims any loss or injury to her and must record its satisfaction inter alia on the following aspects:

• Based on the circumstances of a given case, the court must be satisfied that in granting a „no-objection‟ to the quashing of criminal proceedings, the de-juré victim is genuinely acting on her own free will and volition and has not been misled, pressurised or deceived into offering such no-objection;
• Whether the de-juré victim has taken a consistent stand in favour of closing the case from the inception of the criminal proceedings, and has disclaimed that she has suffered any loss or injury at the hands of the offender;
• Whether the circumstances of the case justify an inference that the acts or omissions that the parties have indulged in were volitional on the part of the de-juré victim;
• Whether the marriage or other arrangement, based on which the offender and the de-juré victim are seeking closure of criminal proceedings, evokes confidence on the part of the court, or does it appear to be a ruse or stratagem of the offender to evade conviction and punishment;
• Whether the parties have been living together as a family for a length of time, and whether children are born to the parties, whose future would also be impacted by a decision not to quash the criminal proceedings;
• Whether the offender is alleged to have committed any violence or brutality on the de-juré victim, or has committed any other act or omission that points to the absence of genuine volition on the part of the de-juré victim; and if so, is there any medical and other forensic evidence to show such conduct on the offender's part;
• What was the respective age of the offender and the de-juré victim at the relevant time; whether both were minor; and what are the ramifications of the relative age difference and minority?

The Court, however, cautioned “that the aforementioned considerations are only suggestive and far from exhaustive; and before quashing any criminal proceedings under the POCSO Act, the court must interact with the parties and arrive at a subjective satisfaction that the quashing of the case is warranted on larger considerations of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of law, as discussed above”.

The Court then addressed how the above view would fit within the framework of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab 6 SCC 466, reproducing the Supreme Court’s observations that inherent power is of wide plenitude to secure the ends of justice or prevent abuse of process, and that the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with criminal proceedings, or whether continuation would amount to abuse of process, and if the answer is in the affirmative, the High Court would be within its jurisdiction to quash the proceedings.

Conclusion

In the case at hand, the Court held that, upon a conspectus of the facts and circumstances, and in particular keeping in mind the enormous consequences that would befall not only respondent No. 2 but also her infant, both of whom would be left bereft of support and sustenance if the petitioner were imprisoned, the right course of action to secure the ends of justice and especially to prevent re-victimisation of the de-juré victim would be to quash the criminal proceedings. It also recorded that the State had no objection to the FIR being quashed.

Accordingly, the Court quashed the FIR dated registered under Section 64(1) of the BNS and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, and closed all proceedings arising therefrom.

Cause Title: Harmeet Singh v. State GNCT of Delhi & Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:3142)

Appearances

Petitioner: Lokesh Kumar Mishra; Advocates Abhishek Kaushik, Nadeem Ahmed

Respondents: Anand V. Khatri, ASC for the State;

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