Statement U/S 164 CrPC Recorded Soon After FIR Cannot Be Ignored Even Though Trial Testimony Is The Substantive Evidence: Delhi High Court
The Court acquitted a man convicted of rape and house-trespass, holds prosecutrix's testimony lacked "sterling quality" and was uncorroborated by medical or forensic evidence.
The Delhi High Court has held that while the statement made by a witness before the trial court constitutes the substantive evidence in a criminal trial, a statement recorded under Section 164 of CrPC, given on oath before a Magistrate soon after the FIR, cannot be completely ignored or effaced, particularly where it conflicts with the version recorded in the FIR and offers a more consistent narrative of events.
The Court further held that where the testimony of a prosecutrix is inconsistent across her statement to the police, her Section 164 statement, and her deposition in court, it cannot be treated as being of sterling quality, and in the absence of such quality, corroboration through medical, forensic, or circumstantial evidence becomes necessary to sustain a conviction.
The judgment came in a criminal appeal filed by appellant-Dildar, who had been convicted by the trial court under Sections 376 and 457 IPC and sentenced to seven years' and four years' simple imprisonment respectively, to run concurrently, for offences allegedly committed on the intervening night of September 01-02, 2012. The High Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant.
A Bench of Justice Vimal Kumar Yadav observed, “The pursuit of truth, substantial and comprehensive justice is the aim of the judicial process. In these circumstances, the courts cannot become technical or hyper technical or mute spectator rather required to ascertain the factual and actual position. In this context, even a statement which does not fall into the definition of evidence or substantive statement, but recorded under oath by a Judicial Authority, in terms of Section 164 Cr.P.C. cannot be ignored”.
Advocate Rajat Mishra appeared for the appellant and Satinder Singh Bawa, APP appeared for the respondent.
The prosecution's case was that the appellant was found by the prosecutrix's mother inside their house in the early hours of the night, following which both the appellant and the prosecutrix fled and were later apprehended after staying at different locations. An FIR was registered under Sections 376 and 452 IPC, and after investigation, the appellant was charged under Sections 457 and 376 IPC. The trial court convicted him on both counts based primarily on the prosecutrix's testimony.
On appeal, it was contended that the appellant and the prosecutrix were in a relationship, that she had called him to her house that night, that the physical relationship was consensual, and that she was above the then-applicable age of consent of sixteen years under the unamended Section 375 IPC. Reliance was placed on her statement under Section 164 CrPC, in which she had described the encounter as consensual and stated that she had called the appellant herself.
The State opposed the appeal, contending that the appellant and prosecutrix had a three-year prior relationship involving sexual intercourse, rendering her consent immaterial if she was found to be under sixteen at the relevant time.
Applying Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 and the hierarchy of proof prescribed under Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007, the Court held that this hierarchy applies equally to determining the age of a victim, not merely an accused juvenile. On the strength of school records placing her date of birth as 27.08.1996, the Court found the prosecutrix was over sixteen years of age on the date of the incident, meeting the age of consent under the pre-amended Section 375 IPC.
On merits, the Court found the prosecutrix's Section 164 statement, her account before the Child Welfare Committee, and her conduct in fleeing alongside the appellant after being discovered, all corroborated a consensual encounter, and that her trial testimony was inconsistent and ultimately favourable to the appellant in cross-examination.
Noting the absence of any corroborating medical or forensic evidence, the FSL report having found no incriminating material, and hospital records relating to her examination being untraceable, the Court held that the prosecution had failed to establish either offence beyond reasonable doubt. Relying on P. Yuvaprakash v. State Represented by the Inspector of Police., (2024) 17 SCC 684 on the evidentiary value of an early Section 164 statement, and Nirmal Premkumar v. State on the requirement of corroboration in the absence of sterling-quality testimony, the Court held the appellant could not be held guilty of either rape or house-trespass.
The conviction was accordingly set aside, and the appellant was acquitted of all charges, with his bail bonds discharged.
Cause Title: Dildar v. State (Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:5898)
Appearances:
Appellant: Rajat Mishra and Himanshu Yadav, Advocates, with the Appellant in person
Respondent/Prosecutrix: Satinder Singh Bawa, APP, Astha, Megha Singh, Advocates.