PMLA Bail Order Relevant In Connected CBI Case Based On Same Facts: Delhi High Court Upholds Bail In NSE Call-Interception Case

The Court dismissed the CBI’s challenges to the regular bail granted to retired IPS officer Sanjay Pandey and former NSE Managing Director Chitra Ramakrishna in the alleged NSE call-interception case.

The Court was hearing petitions filed by the CBI under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, read with Article 227 of the Constitution, challenging separate orders of a Special Judge granting regular bail to the two respondents in the CBI case.

A Bench of Justice Madhu Jain observed: “… the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arvind Kejriwal v. CBI, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2550 wherein, while considering the prayer for bail in the CBI case… expressly took note of the interim bail granted to the accused in the connected ED matter arising from the same set of facts. Further, the conditions imposed in the ED proceedings were made applicable mutatis mutandis to the bail granted in the CBI case. The decision thus recognises that a bail order passed in proceedings under the PMLA may constitute a relevant circumstance in the connected CBI proceedings where both arise from the same factual foundation or similar set of facts.”

Special Public Prosecutor Rajesh Kumar appeared for the CBI. Advocates Aparajita R. Jha and Shivam Batra appeared for the respondents.

Background

The case concerned the alleged recording and examination of telephone calls made from the premises of the National Stock Exchange of India Limited. The prosecution acknowledged that a call-recording system existed at the NSE before iSEC Services Private Limited was engaged.

Between 2009 and 2017, iSEC was engaged through work orders described as relating to a “Periodic Study of Cyber Vulnerabilities”. The CBI alleged that the work included the unauthorised interception, recording and monitoring of calls made by certain NSE employees.

Sanjay Pandey, a retired IPS officer, had incorporated iSEC and initially held half its shareholding. Although he resigned as a director and transferred his shares to members of his family before the relevant work orders, the CBI alleged that he continued to participate in and control the company’s affairs.

Chitra Ramakrishna held senior positions at the NSE during the relevant period, including that of Managing Director. The CBI alleged that she was involved in processing or approving the engagement of iSEC and identifying employees whose calls were to be examined.

The CBI claimed that recorded data was periodically taken to iSEC’s office, where selected calls were listened to and transcribed. Reports identifying allegedly suspicious conversations were then supplied to senior NSE officials. It further alleged that no permission from the competent authority or consent from the employees had been obtained and that the NSE paid approximately ₹4.54 crore to iSEC.

The CBI registered a case involving offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the Information Technology Act, 2000, the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, the Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933 and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Enforcement Directorate subsequently registered proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 on the basis of the scheduled offences arising from the CBI case.

A coordinate Bench of the High Court granted Pandey regular bail in the PMLA proceedings. While the respondents’ bail applications in the CBI case were pending, the Special Judge considered the prima facie observations made in that judgment and granted regular bail to both respondents.

The CBI filed its charge sheet the following day. It later challenged the bail orders, contending that the Special Judge had treated the PMLA bail judgment as determinative without independently assessing the CBI’s allegations and evidence.

The respondents maintained that the PMLA judgment arose from the same factual foundation and examined the ingredients of the scheduled offences under the more stringent conditions contained in Section 45 of the PMLA. They also pointed out that no breach of any bail condition or subsequent interference with the investigation had been alleged.

Court’s Observations

The High Court first distinguished a challenge to the legality of an original bail order from an application seeking cancellation of bail because of subsequent misconduct or supervening circumstances.

Referring to Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2014), Y v. State of Rajasthan (2022), Meena Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2022) and Ashok Dhankad v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2025), the Court held that a superior court examining the original grant of bail must determine whether the discretion was affected by perversity, illegality, non-application of mind, irrelevant considerations or omission of material circumstances.

The Court observed: “The legal position emerging from the aforesaid authorities is that a challenge to the correctness of an order granting bail and an application seeking cancellation of bail on account of subsequent events operate in distinct fields. In the former, the superior court examines whether the discretion exercised at the time of granting bail stands vitiated by perversity, illegality, non-application of mind, consideration of irrelevant material or omission to consider material and relevant circumstances. In the latter, the inquiry ordinarily centres upon the subsequent conduct of the accused, violation of the conditions of bail or the emergence of supervening circumstances.”

The CBI’s petitions fell in the first category because they challenged the original exercise of discretion and did not allege post-release misconduct, breach of bail conditions or any supervening circumstance.

The Court acknowledged that proceedings conducted by the CBI and the Enforcement Directorate were legally distinct. An order passed in one proceeding did not bind the other investigating agency or immunise an accused from lawful action under another enactment.

However, where the proceedings arose from the same FIR and the scheduled offences formed a common factual foundation, a judicial assessment concerning those offences could not be treated as wholly irrelevant to bail.

The Court held: “The fact that the judgment was rendered in proceedings instituted by ED affected the weight to be attached to it, but did not render it an irrelevant circumstance.”

The PMLA bail judgment concerned the same NSE-iSEC arrangement and examined the ingredients of offences that also formed part of the CBI case. Although its findings were prima facie and did not bind the Special Judge, they constituted relevant material.

Referring to P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement (2020), the Court clarified that an earlier decision may bear upon the consideration of bail but cannot by itself determine whether bail should be granted or refused. The decision must ultimately rest on the facts and material of the individual case.

The Court observed: “The judgment, even though neither binding nor determinative upon the learned Special judge when considering applications for grant of bail, was a relevant circumstance.”

The High Court rejected the CBI’s contention that the Special Judge mechanically adopted the PMLA bail judgment while granting bail to Pandey.

It noted that the Special Judge had recorded the CBI’s objections that it was not a party to the PMLA proceeding and that its status report considered in that proceeding had been filed in a separate quashing petition.

The Special Judge also identified the common factual and legal foundation of the CBI and ED proceedings, the alleged payment of ₹4.54 crore, the scheduled offences and the additional rigours governing bail under Section 45 of the PMLA.

The Court observed: “A perusal of the impugned order clearly shows that it cannot be characterised as one which was passed upon a mere mechanical adoption of the judgment passed in the PMLA proceedings. The learned Special judge considered the objection of CBI, the common factual foundation, the nature of the alleged predicate offences, the additional rigours of Section 45 of the PMLA and the fact that the remaining offences invoked in the FIR were bailable.”

The Special Judge had also imposed conditions to secure Pandey’s presence and cooperation and prevent interference with the investigation or prosecution witnesses.

The Court separately examined the bail order concerning Ramakrishna because she had not obtained bail in the PMLA case when the Special Judge decided her CBI bail application.

It found that the Special Judge had recorded the CBI’s contention that her alleged role differed from Pandey’s. The order also considered the allegation that she had processed or approved the work orders during her tenure in senior NSE positions and that transcripts were allegedly received by NSE officials.

The Court held: “Even where the acts attributed to two accused persons are different, a prima facie judicial assessment concerning the absence of an essential ingredient of the common offence may still remain relevant to both.”

The PMLA judgment was considered only regarding the common ingredients of the alleged predicate offences. Ramakrishna’s individual role was not omitted from consideration, and the Special Judge did not assume that the acts attributed to both respondents were identical.

The CBI argued that the charge sheet filed a day after the grant of bail contained the cumulative material collected during the investigation and required an independent assessment.

The High Court rejected this argument, holding that the legality of the bail orders had to be examined by reference to the material and prosecution case placed before the Special Judge on the date they were passed.

It observed: “The subsequent filing of the charge-sheet, including the alteration or addition of penal provisions, cannot retrospectively render the impugned orders perverse. The consequences of any offence subsequently added in the charge-sheet are matters to be dealt with by the competent court in accordance with law at the appropriate stage.”

The Court also distinguished Manik Bhattacharya v. Ramesh Malik (2022), observing that the respondents were not claiming immunity from the CBI’s investigation or other lawful action.

The Court found that the objections raised by the CBI before it had already been advanced before and considered by the Special Judge.

It held: “CBI has not identified any material circumstance, which placed before the learned Special judge, was omitted from consideration, nor has it demonstrated that the discretion exercised was vitiated by perversity, illegality or reliance upon an irrelevant consideration.”

A mere repetition of the same objections, without establishing a legally sustainable ground for interfering with bail, could not justify substituting the High Court’s discretion for that exercised by the Special Judge.

Conclusion

The Delhi High Court dismissed the CBI’s petitions and declined to interfere with the orders granting regular bail to Sanjay Pandey and Chitra Ramakrishna.

It clarified that its observations were confined to deciding the CBI’s challenges to bail. The Trial Court was directed to proceed uninfluenced by any prima facie observations contained in the PMLA bail judgment, the Special Judge’s bail orders or the present judgment.

Cause Title: Central Bureau of Investigation v. Sanjay Pandey c/w Central Bureau of Investigation v. Chitra Ramakrishna (Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:8163)

Appearances

Appellant: Rajesh Kumar, Special Public Prosecutor

Respondents: Advocates Aparajita R. Jha and Rahul Kamerkar; Advocates Shivam Batra, Rony O. John, Arshdeep Singh, Arpita and Mohd Ibrahim

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