Disability Percentage Alone Cannot Secure Reservation Unless Condition Is Specified Under RPwD Act: Delhi High Court

The High Court clarified that the condition must first be recognised as a specified disability under the Act’s Schedule or notified by the Central Government.

The Court was hearing a petition under Article 226 seeking a direction to the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities to include Mayer-Rokitansky-Küster-Hauser Syndrome Type-II as a specified disability. The petitioner also challenged two communications rejecting her request for its inclusion.

A Bench of Justice Amit Mahajan observed: “It is thus evident that the benefit of reservation under Section 32 of the RPwD Act is available only to a ‘person with benchmark disability’ under Section 2(r) of the RPwD Act, and cannot be claimed merely on the strength of a percentage of disability”.

The Bench added: “To qualify as such, the condition must first fall within a ‘specified disability’ under the Schedule, or a category notified by the Central Government under clause 6 thereof. Only thereafter does the question of assessing its extent at not less than 40% under Section 56 of the RPwD Act, and its certification under Sections 57 and 58 of the RPwD Act, arise.”

Advocate Dushyant Kishan Kaul appeared for the petitioner. Advocate Devvrat Yadav appeared for the Department, while Advocate Sayid Marzook Bafaki appeared for the other respondents.

Background

The petitioner has MRKH Syndrome Type-II, a congenital condition associated in her case with right renal agenesis. In 2017, the Kerala Government classified congenital absence of the uterus as a 50% disability, following which a State Disability Assessment Board certified the petitioner as having 50% disability.

After appearing in NEET-2018, the petitioner’s claim for admission to an MBBS course under the quota for persons with disabilities was rejected because her condition was not included in the Schedule to the RPwD Act.

The Kerala High Court upheld the rejection but permitted her to approach the Central Government for inclusion of the condition in the Schedule. Her representation was subsequently considered by a High-Powered Inter-Departmental Committee comprising medical experts from AIIMS, the Directorate General of Health Services, the Indian Council of Medical Research and Lady Hardinge Medical College.

The Committee concluded that MRKH Syndrome was a congenital anomaly but did not independently qualify as a disability because it did not affect the individual’s daily functioning. The Department consequently rejected the representation through communications issued in February and October 2023.

The petitioner argued that her 50% disability certificate exceeded the statutory benchmark of 40% and that Section 2(s) broadly covered long-term impairments interacting with barriers to hinder participation in society. The Department submitted that inclusion of a new specified disability was a policy decision for the Central Government and that the expert committee had found no effect upon daily functioning.

Court’s Observations

Specified Disability Must Precede Benchmark Assessment

The Court explained that Section 2(s) defined a “person with disability” through three elements: a long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairment; its interaction with barriers; and the resulting hindrance to full and equal participation in society.

Reading Sections 2(c) and 2(s) together, the Court held: “Combined reading of Sections 2(c) and 2(s) of the RPwD Act makes it clear that the mere existence of an impairment is not sufficient. It is only when the impairment, in interaction with such barriers, hinders the person’s participation in society on an equal basis with others that the person falls within the ambit of a ‘person with disability’.”

The Court noted that a “specified disability” under Section 2(zc) meant a disability included in the Schedule. Clause 6 of the Schedule authorised the Central Government to notify an additional category.

Referring to Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission (2021), the Court observed that “person with disability” under Section 2(s) could not be conflated with “person with benchmark disability” under Section 2(r). The latter expression applied only where the individual had a specified disability.

The Bench consequently held that a medical assessment of 40% or more became relevant only after the underlying condition qualified as a specified disability. The petitioner’s 50% certificate could not independently satisfy that statutory requirement.

Court Cannot Direct Government To Notify A Disability

The Court observed that inclusion of a condition in the Schedule required a notification by the Central Government under clause 6. It therefore could not issue a mandamus compelling the Government to notify MRKH Syndrome Type-II as a specified disability.

Relying on Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Association v. Union of India (1989), Mallikarjuna Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1990) and State of Himachal Pradesh v. Satpal Saini (2017), the Court held that judicial review could examine whether the Government’s decision was arbitrary or contrary to law, but could not compel legislative or delegated legislative action.

The Court stated: “Thus, it is well settled that this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot direct the legislature, or the executive exercising delegated legislative power, to enact or amend a law. The scope of judicial review in such matters is confined to examining whether the decision of the authority is arbitrary or contrary to law.”

Expert Committee’s Decision Was Not Arbitrary

The Court noted that the expert committee had distinguished between a medical condition and a disability. The Committee found that disability arose when an impairment hindered daily activities and stated that any condition subsequently resulting in a specified impairment would already be covered under the appropriate category in the Act.

The Bench found that this test flowed from Section 2(s) itself and had also been applied to conditions such as diabetes, cystic fibrosis and a single kidney.

The Court observed: “On a careful perusal of the record, this Court finds no arbitrariness or perversity in the view taken by the Committee. Pertinently, the test of whether daily functioning is affected flows from Section 2(s) of the RPwD Act itself. The Committee is an expert body comprising medical experts from AIIMS, DGHS, ICMR and Lady Hardinge Medical College, and it applied the same yardstick to other conditions as well, including diabetes, cystic fibrosis and single kidney. There is, thus, no hostile discrimination against the condition of the Petitioner.”

The Court acknowledged the petitioner’s concerns regarding social stigma but held that sympathy could not support a direction unavailable in law.

The Bench added: “The concerns of the Petitioner about social stigma are real and deserve sympathy. However, sympathy alone cannot be a ground to issue a direction that the law does not permit. Whether such social barriers justify treating MRKH Syndrome as a disability is a matter that the Committee and the Central Government are best placed to weigh.”

Conclusion

The High Court held that the communications rejecting the petitioner’s request did not suffer from illegality, arbitrariness or perversity and dismissed the petition. It clarified that the petitioner could submit a fresh representation if new medical material emerged and directed that any such representation be considered in accordance with law. Pending applications were also disposed of.

Cause Title: Anu Aravind P. v. Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities, Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment

Appearances

Petitioner: Advocates Dushyant Kishan Kaul, Jaimon Andrews, Piyo Harold and Adhishwar Suri

Respondents: Advocates Devvrat Yadav, Kartik Sharma, M. Chawla and Pearl Sharma; Advocates Sayid Marzook Bafaki, Lakshmi Sree P., Risvi Muhammad and Vaisakh S.

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