De-Recognition Is Not Closure; Statutory Prior Approval Under Rule 46 DSEA Rules Mandatory Before Surrendering School Land: Delhi High Court
The Court held that if closure of the School is proposed, it must be considered as per Rule 46 of the DSEA Rules, including the prior approval of the Director after consultation with the Advisory Board.
The Delhi High Court has held that de-recognition of a school does not automatically equate to its lawful closure, holding that statutory requirements under Rule 46 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973, including prior approval of the Director after consultation with the Advisory Board, must be strictly followed before a school can be closed or its land surrendered.
The Court has partially allowed an appeal filed by teachers against an order directing the management of a de-recognised school to hand over land to its lessor.
Furthermore, the Bench noted that the management could not have been directed to hand over possession of the property while the school remained under state takeover.
The Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyay and Justice Tejas Karia observed, “In the present case, the Representation Order merely de-recognises the School and does not record that prior approval for its closure was obtained from the Director after consultation with the Advisory Board, as required under Rule 46 of the DSEA Rules…The statutory requirements prescribed under Rule 46 of the DSEA Rules cannot be regarded as mere formalities or dispensed with solely on the ground that the School has been de-recognised. If closure of the School is proposed, the matter must be considered in accordance with Rule 46 of the DSEA Rules, including the requirement of prior approval of the Director after consultation with the Advisory Board.”
Advocate Khagesh B Jha appeared for the Appellants, while Advocate Jayant Tewethia appeared for the Respondents.
Factual Background
Respondent No. 1 operated a private unaided school recognized by the Directorate of Education (DoE) on land leased from a co-owner. Citing financial difficulties, the society submitted representations seeking the school's de-recognition and closure under the relevant rules. Subsequent inspection by the DoE revealed recruitment irregularities.
On these findings, the Chairman of the Society dismissed the twelve teachers, including the appellants. The affected teachers successfully challenged their termination before the Tribunal which ordered their reinstatement with back wages. The society appealed to the High Court, but the court upheld the Tribunal’s decision, ordered reinstatement and the teachers returned to work for a short time.
When the school subsequently failed to pay staff salaries, the teachers initiated further writ proceedings. Consequently, the High Court directed the DoE to assume control of the school's affairs, freeze its existing bank accounts, and expedite takeover proceedings.
After approval from the Lieutenant Governor, the DoE officially took over the school’s management for a designated period. During this time, the court ordered the unfreezing and transfer of accumulated bank funds to disburse payments to the staff on a pro-rata basis.
The society also filed a writ petition challenging the takeover and seeking closure. The High Court then directed the DoE to decide on the society's pending closure request, leading the DoE to issue an order formally de-recognizing the school.
The single bench then directed the society to yield peaceful possession of the land back to the lessor, prompting the appellant-teachers to file the present appeal. During the pendency of this appeal, the statutory period for government management expired, and the DoE handed control of the school back to the society.
Contentions of the Parties
The Appellants/Teachers contended that the Representation Order was passed by the Deputy Director, who holds no power under Rule 46 of the DSEA Rules. The Deputy Director, without any delegation under Rule 46 of the DSEA Rules, passed the Representation Order de-recognising the School.
It was argued that Section 24(4) of the DSEA Act could not be invoked when the School was already under the LG’s management. De-recognition presupposes default by the management, whereas the DoE was then managing the School. Further, de-recognition is a regulatory action and could not be sought by Respondent No. 1 through the Representations. As the DSEA Act and Rules contain no provision allowing Respondent No. 1 to seek de-recognition through such Representations, the Writ Petition was not maintainable.
The Respondents argued that pursuant to the Takeover Order, the management of the School had been taken over by the LG for a period of three years under Section 20(1) of the DSEA Act. The period of taking over of the School for three years expired on 09.05.2026, and the LG did not wish to take over the management of the School for a further period of one year.
It was submitted that the Court had directed that, considering that the amount lying in the Bank Account is limited and the number of staff members of the School was large, distribution of the amount lying in the Bank Account was required to be made strictly in a proportionate manner and only to genuine and eligible staff members.
Observations of the Court
The main issue for the consideration of the Court was whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the direction contained in the Impugned Order requiring Respondent No. 1 to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the Land to its lessor could be sustained.
The Court noted that the Impugned Order was passed in May, 2026, before the expiry of the three-year period for which the management of the School had been taken over by the LG. Accordingly, as on the date of the Impugned Order, the Takeover Order remained in force, and the management of the School continued to vest in the LG.
“The challenge to the Takeover Order was not adjudicated upon in the Impugned Order. Consequently, the Takeover Order continued to govern the management of the School on the date of the Impugned Order. In these circumstances, Respondent No. 1 could not have been directed to hand over possession of the Land to the lessor when it was itself not in possession thereof”, it added.
The Court observed that since the Representations formed the basis of the Writ Petition, the very foundation of the Writ Petition was a nullity. However, the Representation Order was not under challenge in the present Appeal, nor was its validity examined in the Writ Petition. Therefore, the Representation Order continued to remain operative and could not be treated as invalid while adjudicating the challenge to the Impugned Order in the present Appeal.
“As regards the distinction between de-recognition and closure of a school, Section 24 of the DSEA Act governs the inspection of schools and the action that may be taken where the manager of a school fails to comply with directions issued by the Director under Section 24(3) thereof. In such circumstances, Section 24(4) empowers the Director to take such action as may be considered appropriate, including withdrawal of the school’s recognition under clause (b) thereof”, the Court held.
The Court held that the direction contained in the Impugned Order requiring Respondent No. 1 to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the Land to its lessor was contrary to the statutory scheme of the DSEA Act and the DSEA Rules.
Accordingly, the appeal was partly allowed, and the direction was set aside.
Cause Title: Krishna & Ors. v. Ring Midways Educational Institute & Ors. [Neutral Citation:2026:DHC:8516-DB]
Appearances:
Appellants: Advocates Khagesh B. Jha and Shikha Sharma Bagga
Respondents: Advocates Jayant Tewethia, Abhinav Sharma, Ujjwal Jain and Manisha Singh