Power Of Review Is A Core Judicial Function; Executive Authorities Cannot Exercise It Without Express Legislative Mandate: Supreme Court
Holding that the power of review is inherently judicial in nature, the Apex Court ruled that statutory executive authorities cannot assume such jurisdiction in the absence of an express legislative mandate, as doing so would blur the constitutional separation between executive and judicial functions and undermine adjudicatory finality.
Justice M.M. Sundresh, Justice N. Kotishwar Singh , Supreme Court of India
The Supreme Court has held that the power of review is a core judicial function that cannot be exercised by executive or statutory authorities unless the legislature has expressly conferred such jurisdiction.
The Court observed that permitting executive authorities to revisit and re-adjudicate their own determinations without explicit statutory authorisation would dilute the principle of finality, allow them to sit in judgment over their own decisions, and disturb the constitutionally mandated demarcation between executive and judicial powers.
The Court was hearing an appeal arising out of proceedings under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, where a Revenue Officer purported to review a decades-old vesting order on the strength of a government notification vesting civil court powers in such authorities.
A Bench of Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice N Kotiswar Singh while examining whether the statutory scheme permitted such a review, observed: “The power of review is essentially a core judicial function, and conferring such a power upon executive authorities, absent an express legislative mandate, would blur the constitutionally mandated demarcation between the executive and the judiciary, permit the executive authorities to sit in judgment over their own decisions, and erode the rule of law by diluting finality”.
Any contrary construction, the Bench further observed, “would, therefore, be inconsistent with legislative intent and would impermissibly encroach upon the basic structure of the Constitution.”
Background
The dispute concerned land vesting proceedings under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (WBEA Act). A vesting determination had been made in the early 1970s by the competent Revenue Officer.
Decades later, relying on a state notification issued under Section 57A of the Act, which vested certain civil court powers in Settlement and Revenue Officers, the authority purported to reopen and review the earlier vesting order.
The respondent company defended this exercise on the ground that the notification effectively conferred review jurisdiction. The Tribunal, however, set aside the review order, holding that no such substantive power existed. The High Court reversed the Tribunal, prompting the State to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Court’s Observations
Statutory Authorities Are Creatures of the Act
The Supreme Court began by reiterating a foundational principle: quasi-judicial authorities derive their powers strictly from statute. They cannot assume inherent judicial powers unless expressly conferred.
Relying on established precedent, the Court underscored that review is not an incidental or procedural power; it is a substantive judicial function.
A statutory authority, the Court explained, may exercise review jurisdiction only where the statute clearly authorises it, either expressly or by necessary implication. The WBEA Act, the Court found, contains no such conferment.
The Court observed that Section 57A merely enables the vesting of certain civil court powers for procedural facilitation. It does not transform executive authorities into full judicial bodies empowered to reopen concluded determinations. Allowing otherwise, the Court stated, would distort legislative intent and undermine the statutory architecture.
“We, therefore, must eschew any such interpretation of the statute which seeks to confer a blanket power of the Civil Court, including the power of review to such administrative authority in the exercise of quasi-judicial power”, the Bench stressed.
Review Is a Core Judicial Function
The Bench emphasised that review jurisdiction occupies a unique place in adjudicatory structures. It permits reconsideration of concluded findings, a power historically reserved for courts and tribunals expressly authorised by law.
Permitting executive officers to review their own orders would, in substance, allow them to sit in judgment over prior determinations without the institutional safeguards that accompany judicial review. The Court warned that such an interpretation would collapse the constitutionally mandated separation between executive and judicial functions.
It was observed that executive authorities exercising quasi-judicial power must not be equated with civil courts possessing inherent corrective jurisdiction. To do so would effectively convert administrative tribunals into parallel judicial forums, contrary to settled constitutional doctrine.
Legislative Scheme Demonstrates Absence of Review Power
The Court closely examined the relevant statutory framework. It noted that the proviso to Section 57B expressly bars reopening matters already decided under the Act. This structural safeguard reflects legislative intent to preserve finality and prevent administrative re-litigation.
The Court held that if the legislature intended to grant a substantive review power, it would have done so explicitly. The absence of such language is decisive. Government notifications cannot enlarge statutory jurisdiction or confer powers beyond what Parliament has authorised.
“To permit these authorities to undertake a wholesale re-adjudication of a vesting order by exercising the power of review would be to attribute to them a power far wider than what the legislature had envisaged”, the Bench remarked.
Separation of Powers and Institutional Integrity
The Bench placed the controversy in a broader constitutional context. Judicial independence and separation of powers, the Court emphasised, require that adjudicatory finality not be diluted through executive intervention masquerading as procedural authority.
Allowing administrative authorities to exercise review power would erode public confidence in finality, enable repeated reopening of settled rights, and destabilise land reform administration. The Court reaffirmed that statutory interpretation must avoid outcomes that undermine constitutional structure or blur institutional boundaries.
“Separation of power and independence of the judiciary have been considered integral parts of the basic structure of our Constitution as propounded in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, and reiterated in subsequent decisions of Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N.”, the Bench underscored.
Conclusion
Applying these principles, the Supreme Court held that the Revenue Officer lacked jurisdiction to review the vesting determination. The Tribunal had correctly appreciated the statutory limits, while the High Court erred in treating executive notification as conferring substantive review power.
The Court allowed the State’s appeal, set aside the High Court judgment, restored the Tribunal’s order, and quashed the review order. The original vesting determination was directed to continue in accordance with the law.
Cause Title: State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd. (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 132)
Appearances
Appellants: Rakesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate; Kunal Mimani, AOR; Parag Chaturvedi, Advocate; Mranal Prajapati, Advocate
Respondent: Advocate Anand Shankar Jha, AOR