Writ Jurisdiction Not Normally To Be Exercised If Remedy Is Available To Party Before High Court In Another Jurisdiction: Supreme Court

The civil appeal by special leave challenged the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court whereby the appellant’s writ petition came to be dismissed on the ground of omission of the appellant to pursue the alternative remedy of appeal provided by the Customs Act, 1962, as well as on merits.

The Division Bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Aravind Kumar held, "We may profitably refer, in this context, to the Constitution Bench decision in Thansingh Nathmal v. A. Mazid, Superintendent of Taxes. In Thansingh Nathmal (supra), this Court had the occasion to lay down a principle of law which is salutary and not to be found in any other previous decision rendered by it. The principle, plainly, is that, if a remedy is available to a party before the high court in another jurisdiction, the writ jurisdiction should not normally be exercised on a petition under Article 226, for, that would allow the machinery set up by the concerned statute to be bye-passed."

AOR Chitrangda Rastravara represented the Appellant, while ASG Raghavendra P. Shankar represented the Respondent.

Factual Background

In the year 1992, the alleged smuggled silver weighing 252.177 kgs came to be seized. Confiscation of the seized silver was done and a penalty of Rs 50,000 was imposed on the appellant. The order was carried in appeal by the appellant before the CEGAT under Section 129A(1) of the 1962 Act. The CEGAT dismissed the appeal, but the amount of the penalty was reduced to Rs 30,000. The order of dismissal of the appeal by the CEGAT was not challenged by the appellant within the prescribed period of limitation, i.e., 180 days, and the appellant approached the High Court in its writ jurisdiction.

Declining to invoke its writ jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court held that since the appellant did not challenge the confiscation order before the CEGAT (but only challenged the order of penalty), the order of the CEGAT had attained finality. The High Court noted that the order of the criminal revisional court, which set aside the Special Magistrate’s direction to return the seized silver, was never challenged by the appellant. It was held that when there was no order directing the return of silver, the appellant could not have asked for the relief in a writ petition.

Reasoning

The Bench, at the outset, explained, “ Insistence by the courts – both this Court and the high courts – of exhaustion of a statutory remedy provided by an enactment before invoking the writ jurisdiction of a high court under Article 226 of the Constitution can be traced to one of several selfimposed restrictions, laid down by judicial precedents of this Court. Unless, of course, any of the exceptions [challenge to an act/order grounded on (i) breach of a Fundamental Right; (ii) violation of natural justice principles; (iii) lack of jurisdiction; and (iv) unconstitutionality of a statute] is satisfied, that a writ court may refuse to entertain a writ petition does not admit of any doubt.”

The Bench also observed, “However, as in the present case, if the statutorily designated alternative forum happens to be the high court itself whose jurisdiction under Article 226 is invoked and not any ordinary statutory functionary/tribunal, refusal to entertain the petition should be the rule and entertaining it an exception.”

The Bench made it clear that although there is no period of limitation for invoking the writ jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226, the courts insist on the invocation of its jurisdiction with utmost expedition and, within a “reasonable period”. As per the Bench, what would constitute “reasonable period” cannot be put in a straitjacket, and it must invariably depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.

“We have not found any provision in the 1962 Act which either expressly or by necessary implication excluded the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963. As such, in terms of Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act, the High Court in its reference jurisdiction could have well been approached with a request to condone the delay in presentation of the application under Section 130A of the 1962 Act", the order read.

It was further noticed that the order of the CEGAT was subjected to challenge by the appellant well after the prescribed period of limitation for seeking a reference by making an application under Section 130A of the 1962 Act (as it then existed). “Although, an explanation was sought to be given by the appellant why the writ jurisdiction could not be invoked earlier, we are not impressed. The belated invocation of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court could not have been justified by the appellant by taking the plea of pursuing remedy elsewhere”, it added.

Noting that the writ petition lacked the basic pleadings and hence, the High Court did not fall in error in dismissing it even on merits, the Bench stated, “Drawing from our judicial experience, we may observe that not all points raised or grounds urged in a petition are advanced in course of hearing. In order to have the court examine the objection of non-consideration raised as well as to succeed, there has to be a direct challenge that the authority whose order is being questioned did not deal with the point/ground much to the detriment of the party raising it.”

Thus, dismissing the appeal, the Bench upheld the impugned order of the High Court.

Cause Title: Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1337)

Appearance

Appellant: AOR Chitrangda Rastravara, Advocates Anirudh Singh, Abhijeet Singh, Aishwary Mishra, Dhananjai Shekhwat, Sakshi Aggarwal, Yuvraj Singh, Pearl Pundir, Dashrath Singh

Respondent: ASG Raghavendra P.Shankar, Advocates Amit Sharma-ii, Raman Yadav, AOR Arvind Kumar Sharma

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