Magistrate Can Commit Case To Court Of Sessions U/S.209 Or 323 Of CrPC Even During Course Of Trial: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court was considering an appeal filed by the complainant in a case registered under Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, challenging the grant of bail to the accused respondent.
While setting aside the order of the Allahabad High Court granting bail to an alleged habitual offender, the Supreme Court has held that it would always be open to a Magistrate, if he is of the opinion that any of the offences in the case are exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions, to commit the case to a Court of Sessions under Sections 209 or 323 of the CrPC.
The Apex Court also explained that under Section 323 CrPC, such power can be exercised by the Magistrate even during the course of the trial.
The Apex Court was considering an appeal filed by the complainant in a case registered under Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, challenging the grant of bail to the accused respondent.
The Division Bench of Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice K. Vinod Chandran held, “In that view of the matter, it would always be open to a Magistrate, if he is of the opinion that any of the offences in the case are exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions, to commit the case to a Court of Sessions under Section 209 CrPC or Section 323 CrPC. It may be noted that under Section 323 CrPC, such power can be exercised by the Magistrate even during the course of the trial. Therefore, the assumption of the High Court that the case on hand is triable by a Magistrate is premature.”
Factual Background
It was the case of the complainant that he had supplied foodgrains to the four named accused in the FIR, including the first respondent, but he was paid only ₹5,02,57,000 out of the total sum due and payable to him, i.e., ₹11,52,38,156. He claimed that cheques were issued, but when those cheques were presented, they were dishonoured for want of funds. He further claimed that his inquiries had revealed that the accused conspired with each other, prepared forged documents with false and fabricated addresses, including Aadhaar Cards, and had cheated him.
The first Respondent approached the High Court, and by the impugned order, the Judge noted his plea that he was entitled to parity, as his other co-accused was granted bail and another co-accused was granted anticipatory bail. The Judge held that the respondent was entitled to the grant of bail. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant approached the Apex Court.
Reasoning
On a perusal of the facts of the case, the Bench noted that one of the grounds that weighed with the High Court was that the offences against the first respondent were triable by a Magistrate. However, the High Court overlooked the fact that the offences alleged against the respondent included offences under Section 409 IPC and Section 467 IPC also. The Bench explained that the punishment for offences under these provisions can extend to imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of up to ten years. Some of the other offences for which the respondent had been hauled up entailed a possible sentence of imprisonment of over three years.
“Under Section 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , a Magistrate of First Class can pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, while a Chief Judicial Magistrate may pass a sentence of imprisonment, excepting imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years or a sentence of death or imprisonment for life. A Metropolitan Magistrate has the same powers as a Magistrate of First Class while a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is equivalent to a Chief Judicial Magistrate”, it added.
The Bench stated, “We are also conscious of the fact that this is not a case of cancellation of bail but a challenge to the validity of an order granting bail. Even in cases of cancellation of bail, the power to do so is not just limited to occurrence of supervening circumstances as the Court has the inherent power and discretion to cancel the bail of an accused even in the absence of supervening circumstances (See Dolat Ram and others vs. State of Haryana ). One of the grounds enumerated therein, as relevant for exercise of such power, is where the past criminal record and the conduct of the accused are completely ignored while granting bail.”
Coming to the facts of the case, the Bench noted that the investigation against the first respondent, as was borne out by the counter affidavit filed by the State, demonstrated that he is a habitual offender. The number of diverse and unconnected aliases, fake IDs and the deliberate changes of identity, including his father’s name, manifested his nefarious intention to dupe innocent victims and cheat them.
“In such circumstances, the High Court ought not to have blindly extended the parity principle to him without considering the particular and distinctive features of his individual case. Given the fact that respondent No.1 has not turned over a new leaf, despite the indulgence shown by grant of bail in relation to FIR No. 229 of 2017, as evidenced by the FIRs registered against him over the years, we are of the opinion that letting him loose on society would only pose a risk and hazard to others”, it added.
Thus, allowing the appeal, the Bench set aside the impugned order of the Allahabad High Court granting bail to the first respondent. “The State shall, however, ensure that the trial in the case is expedited by taking all necessary measures”, it ordered.
Cause Title: Rakesh Mittal v. Ajay Pal Gupta @ Sonu Chaudhary (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 161)