High Court Cannot Sustain Termination Under Article 311(2)(b) Constitution Merely Because CAT Upheld Reasons To Dispense With Inquiry: Supreme Court

The Court emphasised that when the applicability of the second proviso to Article 311(2) is under examination, the reasons recorded by the disciplinary authority must independently satisfy the constitutional requirement that holding an inquiry was “not reasonably practicable”.

The Court was hearing a civil appeal challenging the dismissal of a Delhi Police personnel from service without conducting a departmental inquiry, where the disciplinary authority invoked clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution.

A bench of Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar, relying on the Apex Court’s previous ruling in UOI v. Tulsi Ram Patel (1985), observed: “the reasoning as given by the High Court is completely misplaced, in particular, when the Court is examining the scope and applicability of clause (b) to the second proviso of Article 311(2), the reasoning assigned by the disciplinary authority ought to be relevant for dispensing with an inquiry which is the issue involved in the present case”.

The Bench further held that “…merely indicating that the reasons provided in writing have already been held justified by the CAT would not be sufficient in the context of law laid down by the judgment of Tulsiram Patel (Supra), merely observing that opportunity of hearing has been afforded by the appellate authority”.

Background

The appellant was dismissed from service by the Deputy Commissioner of Police by invoking clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The authority dispensed with a regular departmental inquiry on the ground that it was not “reasonably practicable” to conduct such an inquiry.

The disciplinary authority relied upon a preliminary inquiry report prepared by an Assistant Commissioner of Police. According to the report, the complainant and witnesses in a criminal case allegedly involving the delinquent had been traumatised by the acts attributed to him and his associates. It was further stated that there existed a possibility that the appellant could approach the complainant or witnesses through associates to threaten or induce them to withdraw from the case or turn hostile during trial.

On the basis of this report, the disciplinary authority concluded that conducting a departmental inquiry might create fear among the complainant and witnesses and could lead to tampering with evidence. Consequently, the delinquent was dismissed from service without following the usual disciplinary procedure.

The appellant thereafter approached the Central Administrative Tribunal seeking the quashing of the dismissal order. The Tribunal declined to interfere with the disciplinary action.

The appellant then filed a writ petition before the High Court of Delhi. The High Court also dismissed the petition, observing that the appellate authority had heard the appellant before affirming the disciplinary authority’s decision. The matter thus reached the Supreme Court.

Court’s Observation

The Apex Court examined the constitutional framework governing dismissal from service under Article 311 of the Constitution and reiterated that the provision generally requires that a civil servant cannot be dismissed, removed, or reduced in rank without a departmental inquiry in which charges are communicated and a reasonable opportunity of hearing is afforded.

The Court noted that clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) permits the disciplinary authority to dispense with such an inquiry only when it is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry.

Referring to the Constitution Bench judgment in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, the Court reiterated that the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority must be based on objective material. The reasons must demonstrate that the circumstances genuinely made it impracticable to conduct an inquiry.

The Court emphasised that the power to dispense with an inquiry is an exception and cannot be exercised lightly, arbitrarily, or merely to avoid holding a disciplinary proceeding.

In the present case, the Court examined the preliminary inquiry report relied upon by the disciplinary authority. It noted that although the report contained statements of the complainant and other witnesses, none of the statements disclosed any instance of intimidation, threat, or inducement by the appellant.

The Court further observed that the disciplinary authority relied solely on a presumption that the appellant might threaten witnesses. No material was placed on record to substantiate such apprehension.

The Court also noted that at the time the dismissal order was passed, the appellant was already in custody in connection with the criminal case. Despite this, the preliminary inquiry report did not indicate any instance where the appellant had attempted to threaten or influence witnesses while in custody.

Accordingly, the Court held that the disciplinary authority had dispensed with the departmental inquiry without proper application of mind and without any material demonstrating that holding such an inquiry was not reasonably practicable.

The Court further observed that the High Court had adopted an erroneous approach by relying on the fact that the CAT had upheld the disciplinary authority’s reasons. When the legality of invoking Article 311(2)(b) is in question, it was observed that the Court must independently examine whether the reasons recorded by the disciplinary authority meet the constitutional standard.

“In case such a decision invoking the extraordinary power is taken by the competent authority in light of the judgment Tulsiram Patel (Supra) within the parameters as discussed, the scope of judicial review is available to the Constitutional Courts, wherein the reasons as assigned for satisfaction of the authority must be reasonable, valid, justified and in writing, …in addition, the satisfaction as recorded must be the objective satisfaction on the basis of material brought on record, which ordinarily the disciplinary authority may take as a prudent person, …otherwise, dispensing with the enquiry is not permissible in law”, the Court concluded.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that the reasons recorded by the disciplinary authority for dispensing with the departmental inquiry were not supported by any material on record and were based merely on presumption. Consequently, the invocation of clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) was not justified.

The Court therefore set aside the orders passed by the disciplinary authority, the appellate authority, the Central Administrative Tribunal, and the High Court.

Cause Title: Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 234)

Appearances

Appellant: Senior Advocate V. Mohana; Advocates Sandeep Choudhary, Ram Niwas Buri, Basudeb Biswas, Naresh Sharma, Sreepriya K, and Kartik Solanki

Respondents: Additional Solicitor General Brijender Chahar with Advocates Sanjay Kumar Tyagi, Mili Baxi, Rajat Nair, Vibhu Shanker Mishra, and Aaditya Vikram

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